



Uncle Jack and His Nephew;

Clever

— OR —

CONVERSATIONS OF AN OLD FOGY


WITH A YOUNG AMERICAN,

— BY —

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ARAE

he certainly sees very little in modern notions and movements to approve, while his nephew is a genuine son of the nineteenth century, having thoroughly imbibed its spirit and fully adopted its ideas. He shares its good and its bad qualities,—is liberal, philanthropic, fond of action, indifferent to religion, impatient of restraint, enthusiastic for social regeneration and progress, and carried away by a sort of revolutionary mania. It may very well be believed there are few topics on which he and Uncle Jack do not take opposite views. Their conversations are long and frequent, and sometimes assume almost the form of elaborate discussions. Minutes of some of these conversations have been furnished us, and a portion of them we venture to offer to our readers. They will be read, we doubt not, with eagerness, and perchance with much pleasure and some profit, as they touch subjects of deep interest at all times, but more especially at the present.

CONVERSATION I.

“I like best, my dear Dick, the rule that leaves it to old men to counsel, and young men to execute. Your Young America, Young Ireland, Young France, Young Italy, and Young Germany forget this rule, settle your plans, form your resolutions, call upon us to help you carry them into execution, and then denounce us as old fogies, or tell us that our eyes are on the backside of our heads, and that we dwell only among the tombs, if we refuse. Is it not possible that you youngsters, in your zeal for the rights of man, forget the rights of age?”

“Not intentionally, my dear uncle; but forgive me if I am unable to understand the rights of age to damp the holy ardor and generous zeal of the young. Those are noble words which Schiller puts into the mouth of the Marquis of Posa,—‘Tell him, when he is old, not to forget the dreams of his youth.’ Old age is sometimes cold and selfish, and feels too little interest in the amelioration of society and the progress of civilization.”

“And youth in its rashness and inexperience often attempts what is impracticable, and indulges dreams which no wise man could wish to see realized. Age has no right to do wrong, and I admit that there are old men who have profited little even in the hard school of experience, and who are devoured by an insane ambition or an insatiable avarice

long after they have outlived every other passion, and when they have one foot already in the grave. Yet, old men for counsel and young men for war, remains as one of those precious maxims in which is condensed the wisdom of mankind. The young prince who, on coming to the throne, dismisses the experienced counsellors of his wise father, and surrounds himself with advisers of his own age, is generally regarded as on the high road to the ruin of himself, if not of his kingdom. Sometimes, indeed, we find a marvellous young man, wise beyond his years ; but ordinarily the wise head is not found on young shoulders."

"But, Uncle Jack, you forget that the youth of our generation have advantages which those of former generations had not."

"I do not know that. The young fancy every succeeding generation superior, as the old regard it as inferior, to its predecessor. Both old and young are probably wrong. If the young were right, the world would by this time have made such progress that nothing would need amending ; and if the old were right, it would have become so bad that there would be no enduring it. The young count all changes improvements, and the old count them deteriorations. Perhaps, if a just balance were struck, one generation would be found not much superior, nor much inferior, to another."

"At any rate you will concede that we better understand liberty, and are prepared to make more generous sacrifices to obtain it."

"Not in any worthy sense of the word. Our age perhaps surpasses all others in its skill in using good words in bad, or old words in new, senses. One not initiated into your philosophical, moral, and political doctrines can hardly understand you, even when you speak plain English. Oblige me by telling me what you mean by *liberty*."

"I mean by liberty, democracy, freedom from kings and aristocrats, tyrants and oppressors, the free and full exercise of all my rights as man."

"So you recognize liberty only under a democracy ?"

"There can be none under kings and aristocrats."

"If among the rights of man you recognize the right to be governed, could you not conceive it possible that liberty might exist wherever man is wisely and justly governed, whatever the form of the government ?"

"No man is free under a tyrannical and oppressive government."

" Yet, my dear Dick, you must settle the question what is liberty, before you can determine whether any given government is or is not tyrannical and oppressive. For aught I know, you may regard as oppressive what I regard as wise and salutary restraint, and as tyranny, what I hold to be just and legitimate government. We must know what liberty is before we can know what violates it."

" Liberty, I have said, is the free and full exercise of all my rights as man."

" It is undoubtedly that, but is it nothing more?"

" I can conceive no broader liberty than that."

" The rights of man as man are simply his natural rights, rights which one has by virtue of the fact that he is a man, and which every man has equally with every other man. If you recognize only these rights, you exclude from your notion of liberty your rights as a scholar, as a gentleman, as a citizen, as a proprietor, and, if such you were, your rights as a magistrate, as a senator, as a sovereign prince. Do you hold that there is true liberty where these rights, civil rights, adventitious or vested rights as they are called, are not secured to their possessors?"

" All men have equal rights, and liberty is enjoyed only where equal rights are secured to all."

" As men, all have equal rights, and there is no liberty where these are not secured to all, however high or however low, however rich or however poor, I grant; but do you wish to be understood to maintain that liberty excludes or denies all rights not included in those equal rights possessed alike by every man?"

" Liberty demands equality, and admits no unequal rights or special privileges."

" Regarded simply as men in a state of nature, as it is called, all that is very true. But men live in society, and are to be regarded not as existing in a state of nature alone. In civil society they have or are supposed to have unequal rights, special rights growing out of their special relations,—the rights of husband and wife, of parents and children, rights of property, rights of position or rank, rights of office, &c. Do you deny all rights of this sort, or do you hold that true liberty requires the free and full exercise of these rights, as well as of the natural rights, or the rights of man as man?"

" I know no rights but my simple natural rights as a man."

"And these rights being equal, every man has an equal right with yourself to your very large and desirable estate. Every man has an equal right to every man's wife. Either General Pierce has no right to fill the office of president, and to discharge its duties, or else every other man, no matter of what nation or country, has an equal right to call himself president of the United States, and to act as such. As much must be said of every governor of a state, of every senator or representative, of every magistrate, and of every public officer. There would be some confusion and disorder were we to admit all this. Government would be impossible, and civil society would be dissolved ; for civil society is possible only on condition that there are civil rights, and that these rights are secured."

"As a democrat I assert universal suffrage and eligibility. All should be citizens and electors, and all should be eligible to any and every office in the gift of the people. One man has no more right to be elected president than another."

"Be that as it may, it is nothing to our present purpose. The question relates to the rights of the incumbent of the office. Now that he is elected to fill that office, and during the term for which he has been elected, has not General Pierce certain vested rights which no other man in the world has,—certain exclusive rights, which during that period no other man may claim or exercise ? If you say no, you deny his exclusive right to officiate as president, and deny all civil authority, and all civil society, even democracy itself ; for democracy asserts the right of the people to choose representatives to act in their name, and to clothe each of them with certain special and exclusive powers. If you say yes, you must concede a class of rights not included in the simple natural rights of man as man, that is, civil rights, or, in general terms, vested rights. Now, is there freedom in any broad and adequate sense of the term, where there is no security for the free and full exercise of these vested rights?"

"You know, my dear uncle, that we democrats are opposed to your old fogy doctrine of vested rights. It is in the name of vested rights that tyrants reign, and all abuses are perpetuated. It is precisely against what are called vested rights of kings and nobilities, that we rebel, and have sworn eternal hostility. It is in the name of vested rights that the people are enslaved, that social progress is arrested, reforms are resisted, and the noble and generous friends of

the people are martyred. How many of our brothers, free and noble spirits, who lived but to emancipate the people, have fallen victims to this bloody Dagon of vested rights! Their blood cries to us from the ground to avenge them, and avenge them we will, or die in the attempt."

"All very fine, my young revolutionist. But if these rights really are rights, it is not they who assert and maintain them that war against liberty, but you who deny and seek to destroy them. I understand by liberty the secure possession and enjoyment by every man of all his rights, whether natural or civil; and I look upon the man who seeks to rob me of my vested rights, whether he do it in the name of liberty or any other name, as a tyrant and a despot in heart and in deed. You are mistaken, my dear Dick, when you say that it is in the name of vested rights, that tyrants reign, for a tyrant is, by the very force of the word itself, one who has no vested right to reign, and one who exercises the supreme power in the city or state in opposition to vested rights. Tyrant, as the word is now used, means literally a usurper, one who deprives others of their vested rights, and reigns without any vested right to reign. It is precisely this fact that has rendered this word universally odious. You revolutionists are laboring to annihilate all vested rights, and against all such rights to grasp and wield the supreme power of the state, and you are consequently tyrants in the present strict and proper sense of the word. I cannot agree with you any more when you say that in the name of vested rights the people are enslaved, for it is no slavery to be debarred from robbing the state or individuals of their rights."

"But your pretended vested rights are merely usurpations, and in compelling those who hold them to abandon them, we do them no wrong, and are laboring only to restore the just and legitimate order of things."

"These vested rights are not usurped, unless they have been illegally assumed, or are in their nature contrary to the natural law. They are held by authority of civil society, and are not assumed in contravention of the civil law, and they are not contrary to the natural law, unless they violate some natural right of man, or some precept of the law of God. What precept of that law do they violate? To what natural right of man as man are they repugnant?"

"They are repugnant to the natural right of equality."

"I am not aware of any such natural right. All men hav3

certain equal rights, for all are equally men ; but it does not follow from that fact, that all have a natural right to equality in all things. Even you yourself would shrink from so gross an absurdity. You do not pretend that all men have an equal right to be of the same height, and that those who are below a certain standard must be stretched, and those who rise above it must be lopped off. If it were so, your own head would be in danger. Neither can you pretend that all have a natural right to equality of intellect or genius. All have an equal natural right to property, but not therefore to equal property. All have an equal natural right to marry, but not therefore an equal right to demand of every woman the rights of a husband. Every one has an equal right to be himself, but not to be another ; an equal right to his own, but not that his own shall be equal to every other man's own. Up to a certain point, all men have equal rights, and are to be treated by general and civil society as equals ; that is, the rights which we possess in virtue of our simple humanity or as men are equal. These rights I hold to be sacred and inviolable, and there is no true liberty where they are not equally recognized and secured in the case of every one. But beyond these are the rights of individuals, not simply as men, but as such or such men. These rights are unequal, because men as such and such men are unequal ; but these contravene not the other rights which are equal. The equal rights are general, the others are special, but the special does not contradict the general. I do John Smith no wrong when I employ instead of him Bill Thompson to be my coachman ; I do no wrong to Peter Hagarty's nephew in leaving my estate to my own nephew instead of leaving it to him, although by so doing I make my nephew a rich man, and leave Peter's poor ; for Peter's nephew has no natural or acquired right to my estate. If he is suffering, I am bound by the common ties of humanity and religion to relieve him, but not to enrich him.

"So you see, dear Dick, that your dream that men have a natural right to equality in all things is a dream, and a very silly dream, not worth relating. There are two classes of rights, natural rights and civil rights, or the rights of men as men and the rights of men as members of society, both as members of natural society and of civil and religious society. You and your associates recognize only the first class of rights, and regard liberty as restricted to the free and full exercise of them, and as a consequence, their right to make

war on all other rights, and to rob their possessors of them. Here is where you are wrong, and here is why I cannot hold you to be true friends of liberty, but its enemies rather. Your views of what liberty is are too superficial and narrow. You do not mean enough by liberty to satisfy me. Your liberty would leave me only a small portion of my rights, and I demand a liberty which leaves me in full possession of all my rights. You claim the right in the name of liberty to dispossess me of all my vested rights, and in so far you make liberty a pretext for robbery and oppression. We whom you call old fogies have a broader and deeper love of liberty than you have. We assert the natural and equal rights of men as energetically as you do, and are as ready as you are to war for them in words, and deeds too, if necessary. It is not, as you foolishly pretend, because we do not hold these rights as sacred and as inviolable as you do, that we do not make common cause with you. Are we not men as well as you? And is not whatever is human as near to us as to you? Who gave you youngsters the monopoly of humanity? Who made you more alive to wrongs and outrages upon a fellow-man than we are? Do you imagine, because age thins the blood and abates the fire of passion, that it dries up the affections of the heart, and blunts the sense of justice? Foolish boy! wait till you are old, and you will learn that the heart of the old beats as warm and as lovingly as that of the young, and that nothing pertaining to the soul ever becomes sear and yellow. We go not with you, we oppose you, because we hold vested rights as sacred and inviolable as the natural rights themselves, in which they have their origin and foundation, and because you trample on them, and are banded together to destroy them, and thus to take away all our protection even for our natural rights. We love liberty too much, and are too determined to maintain it in its broadest and fullest sense, to be your accomplices. It is as the friends of liberty, it is in the name of liberty, a sacred name for us, and which you only profane, that we oppose you, and resist to the utmost your revolutionary schemes, and your anti-liberal, your tyrannical movements."

CONVERSATION II.

"You gave, my dear uncle, in our last conversation, an unexpected turn to the subject on which we were talking, and I confess that I hardly know what to say to the view

you presented ; but I am not satisfied with it. I think there must be some sophistry on your part somewhere, though I may not be able to detect it. All the more enlightened men of our enlightened age seem to have fully settled the question that liberty is practicable, nay, conceivable, only under a democracy. But if liberty requires the assertion and maintenance of vested as well as of natural rights, we should be obliged to maintain, as a condition of maintaining liberty, even monarchy where it is a vested right, and assert the doctrine of legitimacy to its fullest extent. We should be obliged to respect nobility where it is a vested right, and with it the exclusive privileges of rank. This is so contrary to the spirit of our age, that I cannot accept it."

" But, my dear Dick, in appealing to the authority of the nineteenth century against my views, you abandon the very cause you espouse. Natural rights rest on the authority of reason, which is the same in all men, and is no more in all men than it is in each particular man. They are the rights of each individual man, and can neither be confirmed nor denied by the authority of one age or another. They have nothing to do with the consent of mankind, or with the people, collectively taken, in any age or country. The people can neither give them nor take them away, for they are the rights of man as man, and therefore are good against the people acting as sovereigns, good against kings and nobles, good against all human authority whatever. If then you allow an appeal beyond the individual to the age, to the ages, to the community, to the people, you recognize rights not included in the list of natural rights. Either the nineteenth century is an authority which has the right to give the law to the reason of the individual, or it is not. If it is, you abandon your doctrine ; if it is not, it deserves no consideration with me, and even if it condemns my views, I am under no obligation to abandon them. You cannot assert the supremacy of my natural rights as man, and then call in the opinion of the age as an authority to which I must submit. Moreover, the authority of the nineteenth century, whatever it be, is not and cannot be greater than that of any other century, and can never set aside the authority of all the ages which have preceded it. If you may appeal to it in support of your denial, I may appeal to all its predecessors in support of my assertion of vested rights, for they have all asserted them, and indeed even those who deny them in this age are only a minority, who have less right

than we old fogies to speak in the name of the nineteenth century."

"But if we are the minority, we nevertheless represent the intelligence of this century."

"In your own estimation, very possibly; in reality, not so certain. You have given me no remarkable proofs of your superior intelligence, and when you have more years over your head, you will not need any one to tell you that much which you now call your wisdom is nothing but ignorance and folly. In my youth, I reasoned as you do, and prided myself as being superior to the prejudices of past ages. I gloried in the name of reform, and I was madder than you are in my zeal for political changes and social ameliorations. Hitherto, I said, the world has gone wholly wrong; nobody has really understood the true science of government and society. For the first time in the history of the human race, true science is possible, and true wisdom is conceived. I thought I and my radical associates were the only sages the world had ever seen, and that the hopes of mankind were centred in us, or rather in myself alone, as their chief. But I have lived long enough, Dick, to laugh at my folly, and to see that my egotism was the result of my feeble understanding and deplorable ignorance. There never was a time when the world could not have survived my loss, or when I could not have died without its suffering any serious detriment. He is a very ignorant man who fancies all ignorant but himself, and a very proud man who imagines that he is superior to all the world beside. No little of our lofty estimate of our own superior knowledge is the result of our real ignorance. We fancy we understand propositions, simply because we do not understand them, because we have not penetrated to their real significance, and comprehended them in their various relations with other propositions. In early life we take without examination the principles or premises which the popular sentiment of our age, our country, or our circle gives us; from these we draw conclusions, sometimes logical, and sometimes illogical, and then assume these conclusions as certain truths according to which the world should be constructed, society organized, and government constituted and administered. Finding, the moment that we look out of ourselves, that the world is constructed, society organized, and government constituted and administered on precisely contrary principles, we assume the attitude of hostility to all generally received principles

and usages, and believe it our mission to revolutionize the whole moral, social, and political world, and reorganize the whole according to the conclusions we have drawn from the premises furnished us by popular opinion.

"All this is very natural, and I am not disposed to be very hard upon the young men of our age. In nine cases out of ten, those who reject with horror their conclusions, maintain with a dogged tenacity their premises. I had the temerity when a young man to publish an essay in which I only pushed the principles stoutly contended for by all my Protestant and democratic countrymen to their logical consequences, and forthwith I was denounced from one end of the country to the other as holding horrible doctrines. They were horrible doctrines; I now see and own it; but they were doctrines which every Protestant and every democrat should accept, or renounce the premises he holds. My error was not an error of logic, for my conclusions followed necessarily from my premises; but in accepting false premises; the error of my Protestant and democratic countrymen was not in recoiling from my conclusions, and denouncing them as horrible, but in doing so while they held the premises which warranted them. I took some interest in the Dorr rebellion in Rhode Island, and felt it my duty to support the public authorities against it. I even went so far as to visit the state and give one or two public addresses against the revolutionary movement and in favor of the party of law and order. My addresses were listened to with sufficient respect, and at their conclusion I was invited to eat an oyster with a club composed of several old dons of the state who had been the firm supporters of the government against Mr. Dorr and his party; and yet, to my surprise and very great scandal, I found myself obliged to defend in this club itself, against these old dons themselves, the only principles on which the Dorrites could be consistently condemned. The two parties adopted the same principles, and one of the most distinguished lawyers in the state, and who had signalized himself in defence of the constituted authorities, boldly maintained against me the popular right of revolution, and that the question between the government party and the Dorr party was not one of principle, but simply a question of expediency. The constitution of this commonwealth in the preamble to its bill of rights defines the state to be a voluntary association, and asserts the right of revolution in the broadest terms; thus denying all government in the very

instrument in which it constitutes it, and settles its powers. The majority of our people are Protestants, and Protestantism is based on the supposed right of rebellion and revolution, or the denial of all authority. I cannot therefore cast all the blame on you young men. Nay, I have a respect for you which I have not for the real old fogies who oppose you, for you have the merit of being faithful to their principles, which they have not."

"But it strikes me, Uncle Jack, that you are hardly consistent with yourself, when you say my views are embraced by only a minority of even our own age. It would seem from what you have last said, that the great majority embrace them."

"The majority embrace your premises, a minority only accept your conclusions; not indeed because your conclusions are not warranted by their premises, but because their practical good sense is stronger than their theoretical or speculative sense. It is never more than a small minority of mankind that have the courage to be consistent. I have been myself censured by even my Catholic brethren as "more Catholic than Catholicity," simply because I love consistency and venture to draw from the premises which every Catholic admits, and must admit, their strictly logical conclusions. To be more Catholic than Catholicity, is not to be Catholic at all, but a heretic or an infidel, and yet these good people who denounce me as being ultra-Catholic do not pretend, and dare not pretend, that, on the points even on which they represent me as ultra, I am heterodox. The meaning of their denunciation is, that I push Catholic principles further than they find it convenient to go with me. The sin which they would lay to my charge is not a sin of heresy, material or formal, but a sin of imprudence; and they, in order to guard against my assumed imprudence, not unfrequently fall into real heresy of doctrine. The spirit of compromise, of obtaining a settlement of difficulties by splitting the difference, as we see in our high-church Episcopalians, who try to find a *via media* between Catholic truth and Protestant falsehood, is a very prevalent spirit, and has done and does no little mischief."

"You forget, uncle, that I am a Protestant, as you yourself were at my age."

"I am not likely to forget it, since I pray day and night for your conversion. Yet Protestant as you are, you may

find young Catholics enough who go with you heart and soul six days out of seven. Some of the most rabid Jacobins in the country, and who push the democratic doctrines of our countrymen to the most dangerous extremes, were brought up Catholics. The worst radicals abroad are or were nominally Catholics. The founders of Protestantism had all been Catholics, Luther, Calvin, Zwingli, Melanchthon, Bacon, Henry VIII. and his daughter Elizabeth, and her secretary Cecil. There are a large number who will be damned as Catholics, as well as Protestants and infidels. Voltaire was reared a Catholic, and so were D'Alembert, Diderot, Condorcet, and the majority of the French philosophers of the last century. Joseph II. of Germany, and, if I am not mistaken, his minister Kaunitz, were nominally Catholics. Comparatively few men, I tell you, Dick, have the courage to be consistent, and the majority seek by one set of principles to serve God and save their souls, and by another to serve Mammon and make sure of the world. Protestantism is essentially anarchical, at war with all authority and all vested rights, and yet there are Protestants who in practice are stanch upholders of authority, and able defenders of liberty in its truest and broadest sense. The church is conservative, every consistent son of the church must be conservative, and yet there are Catholic radicals as well as Protestant radicals."

"How do you account for this fact, uncle?"

"I account for it, in the first place, from the fact, that the flesh, with its concupiscence, remains in all men after baptism, and therefore in Catholics as well as in others; and the flesh seeks naturally the world, with its vanities and its pride, and to seek reason, to seek always God, the right, the truth, demands self-denial, a warfare against the flesh, a strong and continued effort, which few have the resolution to make. I account for it, in the second place, by the prevalence of false notions in all modern communities, which supply a set of false premises and dangerous maxims to both young and old. Protestantism grew out of the old heathen doctrines in regard to the mutual relations of the spiritual and the temporal orders, or the Manicheism propagated and transmitted by various heretical sects, and the civil authorities and their supporters. Protestantism gave birth to the Baconian philosophy in England, and to the Cartesian philosophy in France. These two philosophies have passed into general literature, and

given Protestant premises to the great body of the young in all countries, whether Catholic or Protestant. All general literature has become pagan, and therefore Protestant. Protestant philosophy has permeated the whole modern world, and hence, save in what is expressly of dogma and ritual, the whole thought of our times has become uncatholic. Uncatholic premises, in relation to society, to politics, to earthly felicity, are the first premises adopted by our educated youth, and from these they are diffused to a frightful extent even among the uneducated. In our own country, the tendency, you well know, is to a wild and rabid democracy, and Catholics have felt it dangerous to resist that tendency; and some have even attempted to show that Catholicity favors it. Your great standing charge against our religion is, that it is incompatible with democracy. We naturally seek to repel this charge, and our easiest way to do it is to show ourselves extremely democratic. Moreover, the majority of our Catholics are emigrants from foreign monarchical states, where for ages they had suffered the most cruel oppression. Nothing more natural than that they should ascribe their oppression there to monarchy, and the liberty they enjoy here to our democratic form of government, although nothing is further from the truth.

"Then, again, you must remember, my dear boy, that men are governed more by their passions and their interests than they are by their principles. Catholics are not seldom worse than their principles, Protestants are sometimes superior to their principles; or rather Catholics often abandon certain Catholic principles which some Protestants now and then adhere to. Lord Aberdeen showed more Catholic principle in opposing, recently, in the English Parliament, the Ecclesiastical Titles Bill, than did Lord Beaumont or Mr. Chisholm Anstey in denouncing the measure which called forth that bill. We often find, in reading history, courtly prelates who side with the court against the church, and seldom do we find a Catholic statesman or politician that has not at least a dash of Manichaeism, and is not disposed to uphold the temporal against the spiritual power. Worldly interests have, over most men, during the more active portion of their lives, a predominating influence, and in pursuing them they forget their God and their religion, and in their intercourse with the world live and act as if there were no God, or as if God had no

business to meddle with the temporal order. Nobody can doubt that James II. of England was sincerely attached to the Catholic faith, but he was far enough from maintaining Catholic morals and manners ; and at the very moment that he was risking his crown for his faith, he kept his mistresses, and was very remote from listening as a dutiful son to the prudent advice of the Holy Father. We find thousands of Catholics in our days who would die sooner than renounce their faith, who yet are real atheists or pantheists in their politics. Interest, passion, false philosophy, triumph over their faith in practice, and leave them to act in real hostility to their religion. It is in this way I account for the fact that so many Catholics are Protestants six days out of seven."

" But how do you make good your assertion, Uncle Jack, that Protestantism originated in Manicheism ? "

" I do not mean to say that it had an exclusively Manichean origin, for in some respects it had an atheistic origin ; that is to say, in the assumption of the superiority of the temporal to the spiritual. But, practically considered, it originated in the quarrels between the two powers. Save at brief intervals, the leading temporal powers of Europe have been and are Manichean. The essence of Manicheism is the assertion of two eternal and independent principles, a dual first and dual final cause of all things. The doctrine almost always maintained, or at least acted on, by temporal governments, is what since 1682 has gone by the name of Gallicanism, and Gallicanism involves the essential principle of Manicheism. It asserts a dual end or final cause of man, and therefore by implication asserts a dual first cause or origin. It assumes the church and the state to be two distinct and independent powers, or that the secular and the spiritual have each an end of its own distinct from and independent of that of the other. If this be true, the two orders cannot have had the same first cause. Unity of the first cause implies unity of the final cause. If you assert the unity of the final cause, you must assert that the temporal and the spiritual are ordered to one and the same end, and then it is absurd to assert them as two co-existing and mutually independent orders. One must be subordinated to the other, and either the spiritual must be for the temporal, or the temporal for the spiritual, and subject to it. But as Gallicanism denies this subordination, it must admit two ends of man, each absolute, one secular, the

other spiritual ; then it must admit two mutually distinct and independent first causes of man ; then two eternally distinct and independent principles, which is the essence of Manicheism.

“ Protestantism is only full-blown Gallicanism, and Protestants are distinguished from Gallicans only in being a little more daring, and drawing one or two conclusions which the Gallican shrinks from. Protestantism not only asserts the two principles, but it completes its Manicheism by making one good and the other wicked. According to it the secular or principle represented by the state is the good principle; and the spiritual or principle represented by the church is the bad or wicked principle. Hence it calls the church the ‘mystery of iniquity,’ and the pope ‘the man of sin,’ ‘Antichrist.’ Protestants claim to be the descendants of the Albigenses, who were the descendants of the Paulicians, who were, as is well-known, Manicheans. I might prove Protestantism to be Manichean, when not atheistic in its character, by an examination of its early dogmas, but it is not necessary.”

“ You would then maintain that Gallicanism contains the germs of all that you find to condemn in us liberals of to-day.”

“ Most assuredly. You are all children of the old French revolution, and that revolution was only the last word of Gallicanism. The Gallican bishops in the first place, emancipated the temporal order from the spiritual, and asserted its independence ; and in the second, by undertaking to define the extent and limits of the papal power, they practically asserted the right of subjects to judge their sovereign. They transferred to the spiritual order the principles on which the English rebels had acted in the civil order, and deprived authority in both orders of all its sacredness. The convention, in judging Louis XVI. and condemning him to death, only applied to the civil order the principles asserted by the assembly of 1682. The assembly consecrated the principle of rebellion by sitting in judgment on the powers of their spiritual chief, and the principle of rebellion once consecrated, all authority is denied, all vested rights are annulled, and nothing can be asserted but the simple natural rights of man as man, which ends either in pure individualism, or in pure social despotism ; that is, either in atheism or pantheism. All the dangerous heresies of our times were in principle sustained, almost from the first, by the leading

monarchies of Europe, in spite of the anathemas of the church, and these monarchies are now reaping their reward. It is perhaps fitting that they should be punished by their own sins."

"But I thought Gallicans were Catholics, and the better class of Catholics."

"They are, doubtless, Catholics against whom Protestants have the fewest objections to urge, which to a Catholic mind is not much to their credit. Gallicans who do not push their principles to their logical conclusions, who really submit to the sovereign pontiff as supreme pastor and governor of the church, and neither in theory nor in practice deny his spiritual supremacy, are, doubtless, Catholics; but that does not say that Gallicanism, logically developed, is not an unsound opinion, and destructive of all legitimate authority, and incompatible with that reverence and submission which we owe to the Holy See. The four articles may not have been formally condemned; indeed, we are told that they have not been, but the Holy See has shown, on more occasions than one, that it disapproves them. Innocent XI. annulled them, and declared them of no authority; and Pius VI., in his bull *Auctorem Fidei* against the acts of the Synod of Pistoia, seems to me to come very near expressly condemning them. Pius IX. seems also to have condemned the very principle of the first of them, which I regard as the worst, in his recent condemnation of Professor Nuytz's work on Canon Law, and Bailly's *Theology* heretofore used in several French ecclesiastical seminaries. However, of these matters I am no judge. I only know that these articles are not, and never were, accepted at Rome; and I seek to be a Catholic as they are Catholics at Rome, not merely as they are at Paris, for Rome, not Paris, holds the chair of Peter. Yet the French are not the worst Gallicans in the world, and it would be wrong to suppose that Gallicanism, save at the court, predominates in France. The doctrine, since it was attacked by De Maistre, has lost ground, and the immense majority of the French bishops and clergy reject it as strenuously as I do. It is retained now by very few anywhere, except by the laity, and they, it is hoped, will soon abandon it. The ultramontane doctrine is, no doubt, very odious to the civil power, and to non-Catholics; but it is the Roman Catholic doctrine, and all odious as it is, we are not a little indebted for the wonderful increase of Catholicity during the last thirty years to

its fearless and energetic assertion. Gallicanism is a species of old fogyism, in the proper sense of the word, and as such is powerless. Even non-Catholics are forced to respect the Catholic who is not afraid nor ashamed to be true to the most rigid doctrine of his church."

CONVERSATION III.

"Forgive me, my dear uncle, but you seem to me as little satisfied with things as they are, as I am. To you, as well as to me, the world is out of joint. The child is the father of the man, and I suspect you have still, as in youth, the spirit of a reformer."

"There is some truth in what you say, my dear Dick. We retain usually through life our early characteristics. St. Paul retained the same zeal, the same energy, the same earnestness, the same unreserved devotion to what he regarded as the cause of God, that had distinguished the young Saul of Tarsus. St. Augustine, the Catholic bishop, retained the tenderness, the activity, the inquisitive and penetrating intellect, the same tendency to give himself up heart and soul to whatever he undertook, that had characterized Augustine the rhetorician; and St. Francis Xavier, as a priest and missionary, had the same desire of excelling that he had shown in his literary and philosophical studies. Conversion does not change one's nature, or the original bent of one's character; it changes simply the direction of his affections, the objects on which he places them, and the motives from which he acts. No doubt I am the same man that I was before my conversion, with the same mental and moral characteristics. I am just as little contented with what I see that is wrong, and just as earnest in pursuit of those ameliorations which I regard as necessary and practicable, as ever I was; but I hope from higher and purer motives, and with a juster understanding of the changes to be effected, and the means of effecting them. I am an old man, but not in reality an old fogy, though it pleases my young friends to regard me as one, and to them I perhaps am one. An old fogy is one who, from indolence, interest, or cowardice, refuses to push the principles he holds to their legitimate consequences, or condemns his more consistent brethren for laboring to effect those changes which are authorized by the principles which he and they hold in common. Thus a Protestant who opposes those who push

their denials to the absolute rejection of Christianity, an Episcopalian who wars against dissent, a Protestant churchman who throws up his hands in holy horror at the Puritan, the English whig that frowns upon the English radical, the American democrat that talks of law and order, or the Cartesian, that objects to private judgment, and appeals to authority, is an old fogy, because he will not follow out nor suffer others to follow out his principles. He says two and two, but will neither add nor suffer you to add, *make four*. Indeed, all except strict, thorough-going Catholics have more or less of the old fogy in their character. For myself, I love the free, bold, consistent mind that pushes its principles to their legitimate conclusions, and recoils from an inconsequence as from a mortal sin, even when it is in error; and I have more respect for the young Sauls who breathe forth threatenings and death against the disciples of the Lord, than I have for the Gallios who care for none of these things. There is always hope of a man who has the courage or the energy to be consistent; such a man has principles, and is capable of distinguishing between truth and falsehood. You have only to show him that his premises are false, to lead him to embrace the truth.

"But if things are out of joint with me as well as with you, they are not so for the same reason, nor do I seek to set them right by the same means. You are a Cartesian, and would begin by destroying all existing institutions and denying all existing beliefs. You would annihilate the old world, and create a new one. I am less ambitious. My notions of reform are restricted to the right use of the world as it is, and hearty conformity to the institutions which God has already given us. You would make yourselves gods, and be always annihilating old worlds and creating new ones; I would have men understand that they are creatures, and that their business is to love and serve their Creator, and to seek the ends he had ordained by the means he has provided. My work is much humbler than yours, but perhaps in the end it will amount to somewhat more."

"I do not precisely understand you, uncle, nor can I conceive why you should call me a Cartesian. I have no respect for that shallow Frenchman. I have studied, you know, in Germany, where we have little respect for anything French."

"Descartes regarded it as his mission to reform philoso-

phy, to take away all uncertainty in regard to philosophical questions, and to put an end for ever to all the scandalous wranglings of philosophers. A great and noble mission, perhaps; but he began, or laid it down that we ought to begin, by doubting all things,—all our previous scientific notions, all our religious beliefs, the universe, and even God himself,—and to admit nothing save as we demonstrate its truth. Consequently he compelled himself to begin in nothing, and from nothing to reconstruct God and the universe, religion and science, man and society. The poor man carried his doubt as far as he could, but his egotism was too great for him to doubt himself, and so he exclaims, *Eureka! Cogito, ergo sum*,—I think, therefore I exist. Having thus by a miserable sophism proved his own existence, he proceeds from the conception of his own *ego* to demonstrate, after the manner of the geometricians, God, man, and the universe, which of course could on his hypothesis be only modes or affections of himself. You adopt his method. You begin by doubting or denying whatever exists, by sweeping away the existing world and starting with your new world from nothing, or what is the same thing, from your sublime self. But as man has no proper creative power, you can obtain by your labors only nothing, or at best only self. He who begins in philosophizing by denial or doubt, can never arrive at an affirmation, and that the Cartesian philosophy, a product of the seventeenth century, had much to do with the doubt and incredulity of the eighteenth, can hardly be questioned. It reduced to almost nothing the sphere of revelation, enlarged beyond all bounds that of natural reason, and at the same time threw doubt on reason itself. How it could ever have obtained the vogue it has among men who have no sceptical tendencies, is to me a mystery. I find its method defended in the most popular text-books of philosophy used in the schools of France and this country even at the present moment, and I have been much pleased to find the *Civiltà Cattolica*, at Rome, during the last year, opening its batteries against it. He who would philosophize must begin, not by denying, but by affirming, in truth, not in falsehood, if he means to arrive at truth for result."

So he that would reform what is amiss in society or in the administration of government must begin with a truth, something positive, and proceed to maintain it, and labor not for organic changes, but for the simple correction of

abuses; that is, to bring men to the right use of the institutions God in his providence has founded for them. In beginning by destroying, you deprive yourself of the spot on which to rest the fulcrum of your lever; you have nothing to work with, and therefore can substitute nothing in the place of what you destroy. Luther imagined abuses in the church and he sought to remedy them, not by laboring to remove the obstacles which the church everywhere encountered to her free and salutary action, not by exerting his gifts to induce men, cleric and laic, to conform to her discipline, but by attacking the church herself, casting off her authority and founding a new church of his own. You know the result. Others followed him, and thought his church was quite imperfect, and set to work to make a new one in its place. These were followed by others who treated their work as they had treated Luther's, and thus on down to our time, till you more advanced Protestants have found yourselves without any church, and, giving up church-making in despair, boldly maintain that no church is necessary, and, indeed, that the grand mistake committed by all Protestants since breaking away from the old church has been in supposing a church of some sort is needed. Luther's work, which started with destruction, has resulted only in destruction. Neither he nor his followers have been able to construct any thing. The case is the same with regard to dogmas of faith. Luther thought that he must reform the creed of Christendom. He began by denying a few articles, though retaining the larger number. His followers thought he retained too many, and they denied a few more; their followers thought the denial ought to be carried a little further, and each new generation has carried it still further, till now the great body of living Protestants have denied the whole creed, from the *credo in Patrem omnipotentem* down to the *vitam eternam*. You reject all dogmatic theology, resolve Christianity into a sentiment of the heart, which many of you are beginning to resolve into mere lust. Beginning by destroying, you can end only in destruction; beginning by stripping off one garment after another, you needs must find yourselves at last reduced to simple nakedness. In society you arrive at the same sad result. You begin by attacking the government and its institutions, denying all vested rights, and you find yourselves thrown out of civil society, out of a well-ordered state, back into a state of pure nature, below that of our American savages. All this is

inevitable, if you start as destructives, and the more logical and daring you are, and the fewer old fogies you have among you, the sooner you will find yourselves at this sad termination of all your labors.

“Count, my dear Dick, the history of the past as worth something. You know that I have been stating to you only simple historical facts. You have the history of the reformation before you. In religion Luther engendered Voltaire, in philosophy Descartes, in politics Jean Jacques Rousseau, in morals Helvetius. In religion you have ended in the rejection of the supernatural, in philosophy in doubt and nihilism, in politics in anarchy, in morals in the sanctification of lust. Here is the fact which you cannot deny, which stares you in the face, and with which all Protestantdom groans. This fact ought to have followed, it is a logical consequence of your premises, and you need not imagine that you can, by going through your process again, arrive at any other result.”

“You may be shocked, my dear uncle, but I do not wish to arrive at any other result. I read history as you do, and I acknowledge that the movement of the reformation has been precisely as you describe it. I accept the result obtained by the more advanced Protestant party. That result is what was implied in Luther’s movement, only he knew it not, and it brings us back to pure and primitive Christianity, to Christianity as it lay in the mind of its Author, though his ignorant and superstitious disciples, with their minds obfuscated by their Jewish prejudices, never understood it. The church has never done justice to the free and noble thought of her Master. She has applied to a future world, to a supposed life after death, what he understood of this world, and applied to an extramundane God what he affirmed only of God in man. He taught that God has come in the flesh, and that the God we are to love, worship, and obey is the God that lives, moves, and speaks in the instincts and aspirations of man’s own nature,—those very instincts and aspirations which the church condemns and commands us to mortify. It is the man-God that Christianity proposes to the worship of man,—God in the flesh that she bids us adore. To be true followers of Christ, then, we must renounce all your sacerdotal doctrines and spiritualistic dreams, and put man in the place you assign to your God, the earth in the place of your imaginary heaven, and the flesh in the rank you claim for the spirit.

Here is the true and genuine doctrine of Him whose name you wrongfully usurp, and to this the reformation has, perhaps against its intention, conducted us, and therefore we honor it. This is the mighty progress it has enabled us to make."

"A progress, by the way, in losing,—a sort of progress which you cannot continue much longer, for I do not see what more you have to lose. You have reached the last stage this side of nowhere, and another step, and you must vanish in endless vacuity. In plain words, if I understand you, my dear Dick, and I ought to understand you, for—I blush to confess it—I once held your very doctrine, you would have me hold that the divine Founder of our religion came into the world to teach us that there is for us no God but man, to free us from all religion, from all moral obligation, and to bid us live as we list,—atheism for doctrine, and Epicureanism for morals. You have, indeed, made a marvellous progress—backwards. Why, my dear Dick, the devil must be in his dotage, or else he finds you very easily duped. Your so-called Christianity, under the name of heathenism or carnal Judaism, is a very old doctrine, and has long since been condemned by the common sense of mankind. Satan preached it six thousand years ago to our first parents, and your enlightened nineteenth century is just able to revive it. Well, well, Solomon was right when he said, 'There is nothing new under the sun ; the thing that is has been, and the thing that has been shall be.' Even the devil has failed to invent a new delusion, and you with all your wonderful progress have fallen into his old snare. I am almost ashamed of you, Dick. I did hope that, if a heretic you were resolved to be, you would at least embrace a heresy not wholly discreditable to your intellect. If you recognize Christianity at all, or in any sense the authority of Jesus Christ, you must admit that he never taught the vile heathenism you ascribe to him. It was not because he sought to establish an earthly kingdom, and to promote the worldly prosperity of mankind, that the Jews rejected him, and refused to own him as the Messiah, but because he came as a spiritual prince, and taught men to mortify their lusts, to crucify the flesh, to trample the world beneath their feet, and to labor not for the meat that perisheth, but for the meat that endureth unto everlasting life. It was because he did *not* teach what you allege, but the exact opposite, that they crucified him between two thieves. He con-

demned the doctrine you ascribe to him as heathenism, as you must know if you know any thing of his teachings. If there is any one thing certain with regard to our blessed Lord, it is that he taught that our true good is not derivable from this world, and is enjoyed in this world only by promise ; that the good of the soul in all cases takes precedence of the good of the body ; that, if we will be his disciples, we must deny ourselves, take up our cross, and follow him ; that we are to set our affections, not on things of the earth, but on things in heaven, and that we are to lay up treasures, not on the earth, where moth and rust corrupt, and thieves break through and steal, but in heaven, where neither moth nor rust doth corrupt, nor thieves break through and steal. He bids us not fear him who can kill the body, and after that hath no more power, but him who hath power to destroy both body and soul in hell. No, my poor boy, you cannot shelter your heathenism and your worship of the flesh under his august name. On this point at least there is no difference between his teaching and that of the church, and the Jews rejected him for precisely the same reasons that you reject her. You must either renounce your doctrine of the earth, earthy, your deification of man and the worship of lust, or not have the audacity to call yourself a Christian or to pretend that you embrace Christianity."

" You may be right, Uncle Jack, but we of the movement party have prejudices enough against us already, and more than we can easily overcome. A large portion of so-called Christendom have indeed outgrown the church, become indignant at Christian asceticism, and attained to the very rational conclusion, that man is placed in this world to enjoy himself, that his present concern is with this present life, and that, if a heaven hereafter there be, the best way to secure it will be by making sure of a heaven on earth : but still many retain a sort of reverence for the name of Christ, and, bold as they are, would not dare to avow the truth itself under another name. Truth indeed is truth under any name, but not every name is equally good to conjure with. To a great extent even the far advanced are still the slaves of names, and require for the present to be treated as nurses treat sick children. If we should come out and boldly disavow the name of Christ, and declare what we are aiming at is in direct opposition to what he taught, the majority would shrink from going with us, and we should fail to accomplish the emancipation of mankind.

It is in the name of Christianity that we must proceed to emancipate the world from Christianity. This is the way taken by the reformers themselves. It is very likely that they had views which reached much further than their adherents imagined, much further than their age could bear. There are expressions to be found in Luther which lead one to suspect that he saw the truth; but he would have ruined his whole cause if he had brought it out clearly under its own name. He avowed no hostility to Christianity; he even professed a profound reverence for it, and to be more Christian than the papists themselves. He comprehended how much his age would bear, and he made his principal war on the pope and the papacy, in which he could make sure of the sympathy of a large portion of his countrymen, and of the open or secret support of the greater part of the temporal princes of the time. Having demolished the papacy in the name of Christ, the church, and the Scriptures, he broke the authority of the spiritual power, and prepared the way for his successors to go further. These successors distinguished between Christianity and the church, as he had distinguished between the church and the papacy, and in the name of Christ denounced the Christian church, whether Catholic or Protestant, and made war on all organized Christianity, resolving Christianity into mere doctrine and sentiment, to be determined by each one for himself, by his own private interpretation of the Scriptures. These were followed in turn by a new generation of reformers, who distinguished between Christianity and the Scriptures as the former distinguished between Christianity and the church, and in the name of Christ denied all authority and all revelation except man's own spiritual nature. We act on the same principle in distinguishing between man's spiritual nature and his carnal nature, and asserting always in the name of Christ the supremacy of the latter. It is a wise and necessary policy. For ourselves, indeed, it makes no difference whether you call the truth by the name of Moses, Zoroaster, Confucius, Christ, Arius, Manes, Mahomet, Luther, Joe Smith, or Saint-Simon, but by taking the name of Christ, as the Christian world does, as the symbol of truth, and proclaiming the truth in his name, and our own doctrine and purposes as the real significance of his, we prevent suspicion, we disarm prejudice, and induce multitudes to co-operate with us, who otherwise would stand aloof from us, perhaps oppose us."

"There is no doubt of what you say. If you can make the world believe that what you teach and are aiming at is what our Lord *meant*,—and there are not wanting fools enough who can be made to believe so, as I can testify from my own experience,—you can bring to your aid whatever authority his name still retains. But, my dear Dick, what right have you to do so, knowing as you do that what you seek to make the world believe is false? Do you not feel degraded even in your own eyes by the deception you practise?"

"I regret, my dear uncle, that it is necessary to practise it, for I avow I prefer open and manly dealing. I love the straightforward and ingenuous policy which says what it means, and means what it says. But you must take the people as you find them, and the world as it is, and when you cannot do as you would, you must do as you can. The people will have something to worship, and when they can have nothing else, they will worship a log or a stone, a crocodile or a calf. We must humor them, if we would do them any good. It is always right to emancipate them from the thraldom in which the church for so many ages has held them, to free them from the priestly domination which degrades them, and to use such means as are necessary to this end. If deception is necessary, then we have a right to practise deception. If we deceive the people it is for their good, to emancipate them from those who have so long abused them."

"After all, Dick, you hardly dare accept your own doctrine. If you had full confidence in it, why labor to prove that your cause is not repugnant to moral principle? You aim to emancipate the flesh, nay, to elevate the flesh to the rank of the supreme divinity. You propose as your God, God in the flesh, not in the Christian sense of the incarnation, as you would fain make fools believe, but in the pantheistic sense that the flesh is God and lust is his worship. Why then should you apologize for following the flesh, and doing its works? 'Now the works of the flesh are fornication, uncleanness, immodesty, luxury, idolatry, witchcraft, enmities, contentions, emulations, wrath, quarrels, dissensions, sects, envy, murders, drunkenness, revellings, and such like.' These, though mortal sins in view of the Christian, must be heroic virtues in yours. On your principle there can be nothing in lying, deceiving, cheating, robbing, stealing, murdering, assassination, to be ashamed of, to

apologize for, or to defend, as your European friends very clearly show by the means they adopt for carrying out their plans of political and social regeneration. Do they not make a free use of the stiletto, and have they not instituted the worship of the dagger? You reverse the whole moral code of mankind, and call by the name of truth what has hitherto gone by the name of falsehood; a holy act what has generally been punished as a crime; virtue what old-fashioned morality has stigmatized as vice. In all this you are consistent with yourselves, and loyal to your principles. Your doctrine consecrates vice and divinizes crime. If you are right in principle, your conduct needs no defence. But I suspect, Dick, that your good sense and better feelings disavow your doctrine, and refuse to worship the idol you set up."

"You wrong us, uncle. We do not advocate even what you call vice, and we abhor what you name, after Paul, as the works of the flesh. We love and venerate virtue, and our sole object is to render all men sincere, honest, virtuous, and to enable them to live together in a holy society, in a loving brotherhood, in peace and friendship, each loving his brother as himself. We would realize on earth the sweet vision of paradise."

"All very fine—in words, my poor boy; but the mischief is that you miscall words, and are the dupes of your own cunning. You are really seeking to emancipate the flesh. One of the ablest of the fathers of young Germany was Heinrich Heine, who praises Luther's reformation because it was, as he says, a noble assertion of sensuality, of the rights of the flesh against the spirituality of the church; and he contends that we ought to institute festivals in honor of the flesh, to atone to it for the wrongs and indignities for so many ages heaped upon it by Catholicity. You cannot emancipate the flesh without asserting your right to do the deeds of the flesh. These deeds are never good; they are always bad, and destructive of both soul and body. The experience of all ages proves that the works of the flesh are what the apostle asserts, and that virtue, that love, that friendship, that peace, domestic or social, private or public, is possible only on condition that the flesh is resisted and kept in subjection to the law of the spirit, appetite and passion are subjected to reason, and reason to the law of God."

"Time was, my dear Dick, when I thought and reasoned as you do. I imagined that the whole world had gone

wrong from the beginning, and because men had set out with the persuasion that the inclinations of the flesh are to evil, and that to be virtuous we must resist them and practise self-denial. I placed the evil I saw and deplored in restraint, in the restraint which moralists teach us to impose upon ourselves, and to which priests and magistrates always labor to subject us. Only give us liberty, only leave us free to follow our instincts, the natural sentiments of our own hearts, the promptings of our own natural affections, and vice and crime will disappear, wrongs and outrages will cease to be committed, and the whole world will live in peace and love. But, alas! I found by a painful experience that the heart is deceitful above all things, and exceedingly corrupt, that human nature, whose praises I had chanted, is rotten, and that the sweetest and apparently the purest sentiments easily become the most degrading and disgusting lusts, and that to give loose reins to the flesh is only to be precipitated into unbridled licentiousness. I found peace, and recovered self-respect, only in proportion as by the grace of God I was enabled to practise self-denial, and to return and conform to the very doctrine which I had regarded as the origin and source of all the evils flesh is heir to. Be assured, my dear nephew, that the evil originates not in the restraints imposed by religion and morality, but in breaking through them, and following wherever our natural inclinations lead."

CONVERSATION IV

"At the bottom of what you say, my dear uncle, is the assumption that man's nature is corrupt, and that his natural inclinations are to evil. This is the grand error of the religious world. It was invented by the priests as the foundation of their doctrine of redemption and expiation, and, I may add, of their power and influence. If it were once admitted that nature is good, and that all its instincts and tendencies are pure and holy, there would be no place left for a priesthood; the whole fabric of superstition would fall, and man would have free scope to display his divine and deathless energies. Just see what he has done since Luther struck down the pope, Descartes demolished the schoolmen, and Voltaire exploded the Bible. The mind of man has taken a sudden bound, and displayed a might and a majesty never before dreamed of. New arts and

sciences have sprung up, as if by magic. The heavens have been mapped; the globe has been explored, the earth forced to disclose her secrets; the minutest particle of matter has been analyzed; mind has become omnipotent over matter; and man by his inventions has annihilated time and distance, made the winds his servants and the lightnings his messengers. Commerce spreads her white sails over every ocean, manufactures flourish, science multiplies man's productive power a million-fold, wealth unfolds her exhaustless treasures, and luxury finds its way even into the cottage of the humble peasant."

"Bravo! Bravissimo! my dear Dick. Nevertheless, let us leave these marvels of which you boast till we are at leisure to consider them, and have found some criterion by which we can determine their value. I agree with you, that, if we reject the doctrine of the fall, and assert the purity and sanctity of all our natural propensities, instincts, and tendencies, there is no place for a priesthood, and the whole fabric of the Christian church falls to the ground. All that is plain enough to every one with half an eye. But if the sacerdotal doctrine be an error, and nature as pure, as holy, and as efficient for good as you pretend, there are certain facts which perhaps you would find it not easy to explain. How, indeed, would you explain the existence of that doctrine itself?"

"It was invented by the priests, and taught as the means of maintaining their existence and power."

"But priests could not invent it before they existed, and according to you there can be no priests without it. How will you explain the fact that there were priests to invent it, when, till its invention, there were and could be none?"

"Pardon me, my dear uncle; I did not use the word *priest* in its strict and proper sense. I know a *priest* is one who offers sacrifices, who really or symbolically makes an atonement or expiation by the victim he offers upon the altar, and therefore presupposes that man has fallen, and can be restored only by sacrifice. But we Protestants sometimes use the word to designate simply a public teacher, for in the strict sense we admit no priests. There may have been public teachers at a very remote period of the world's history, and among them there may have been ambitious and designing men, who naturally studied to magnify their office, and to extend and consolidate their power. These

were not precisely priests before inventing the doctrine, but they became priests on its invention."

"But if human nature be pure and holy in all its instincts and tendencies, how do you explain the existence of these ambitious and designing public teachers? The world, in point of fact, is very much depraved, and men are very corrupt, as you and your party not only concede, but stoutly maintain; for you demand everywhere what you call moral, political, and social reforms. You complain, in season and out of season, of tyranny and oppression, of wrongs and outrages, and that nothing in the world has hitherto gone right. Every thing you see is out of joint; every individual you meet, you regard as needing to be reformed. Your whole movement proceeds on the assumption of the general prevalence of evil, and of evil so deep, so aggravated, as to excuse, nay, to demand, the application of the most violent remedies. How, with such a human nature as you assert, do you explain this terrible fact?"

"It is all the work of crafty priests and ambitious and selfish rulers, who have made it their business to keep nature in chains, to repress its native energies, and restrain its pure and noble operations."

"But that, my dear Dick, only removes the difficulty a step further back; it by no means solves it. These crafty priests, and these ambitious and selfish rulers, with such wicked principles as you ascribe to them, whence came they? Whence originated their craft, their ambition, and their selfishness? On your own principles, they are the spontaneous products of human nature. Yet prior to them, nature, according to you, must have been free, her operations unimpeded, and her energies unrepressed. Nature was then left to herself, and had free and full scope to display her divine instincts and her noble energies. But if nature left free spontaneously produces crafty priests, ambitious and selfish rulers, tyrants, and aristocrats, how can you maintain that all her propensities, instincts, and tendencies are pure and holy, and that all that we need, in order to create and secure a paradise on earth, is to emancipate human nature from all restraints, and leave it to its own spontaneous and unimpeded operations? It is very easy to ascribe existing evils to bad governments, to falsely organized society, to superstition, to the craft of priests or the wickedness of rulers; but always does the same ques-

tion recur,—Whence these bad governments, this falsely organized society, this superstition, this craft of priests, this wickedness of rulers? These things must have had some origin, and, according to you, could have originated only in the free, spontaneous workings of a human nature which is pure and holy, which is divine, and which, when free, always leads to pure and noble, just and holy results. Here is something, my dear Dick, which needs explanation,—a mystery which you are required to clear up."

"Whether there be here a mystery or not, it is no more a mystery, my dear uncle, for me than it is for you. The question in the last analysis is one which you must meet as well as I. You are no Manichean, and must explain the origin and existence of evil with a single original principle, and that a pure, holy, and divine principle. Man, according to you, when he came from the hands of his Maker, was perfect. His body was held in subjection to his soul, and his soul in subjection to the law of God. Explain to me, then, how he could sin? Do not tell me of Satan who tempted him, for Satan was himself created pure and holy, and the same question will recur as to him."

"You mistake the point of my objection. You assert the impeccability of man by nature, and assert the sufficiency of nature for herself. You assert that nature tends always to her true good, and, if left to herself, will always go right, and yet are obliged to concede that she has gone wrong from the beginning. According to you, she was and always has been left to herself; for whatever has controlled or attempted to control her, you must regard as having been her own spontaneous production, therefore as natural, included in nature, not something foreign or extrinsic to her. It is, therefore, impossible for you to explain the origin of evil, of wrong, of sin, or iniquity; for on your principles nothing could possibly go wrong. I have no difficulty of this sort to solve. Neither man nor the angels were created impeccable. They were created free, with free will, and therefore capable of obeying or disobeying, of standing or falling. When we say man was created perfect, we mean that he was perfect of his kind, perfect as man, not as God. His nature and faculties are limited, and this limitation is an imperfection of his being. Imperfect as being, and endowed with free will, he could sin and err. He was created with all his present nature,

his present appetites and passions, in so far as they are natural ; but they were not then morbid, as they have since become, and were held by the supernatural grace of God, in subjection to reason, and moved only as reason, itself conformed to the will of God, moved and directed them. Having sinned, he forfeited and lost that grace ; the appetites and passions then escaped from their subjection to reason, and, operating each according to its special nature, carried away both reason and will into captivity. There was no physical change or corruption of man's nature. The nature of the appetites and fashions was not altered ; they only escaped from their subjection to reason and the law of God, and followed what was their original natural tendency, or what would have been their natural tendency if they had not been restrained by the gifts and graces with which man was favored. The flesh tends naturally, when left to itself, to the creature, and therefore from God. If from God, certainly from good ; for God is the supreme and only good. As evil is the privation of good, so man, abandoned to his appetites and passions, to the empire of the flesh, tends continually to evil. He can, then, tend to good only in breaking the empire of the flesh, in restraining his appetites and passions, mortifying his lusts, emancipating the soul, and walking according to the spirit. A little reflection on these points must convince you that your retort is not admissible, and that, though the origin and continuance of evil are easily explained on Christian principles, they are wholly inexplicable on yours, or on the assumption of the divinity of the flesh. The very way to continue and aggravate the evils man endures is to emancipate the flesh from the restraints imposed by Christianity, and to give loose reins to appetite and passion. You and your party are, in fact, under the pretext of reforming society and improving man's earthly condition, really laboring to increase the evils now suffered ; and if you could succeed, we should have only those works which St. Paul enumerates as 'the works of the flesh.' ”

“ You do not seem to me, Uncle Jack, to explain the doctrine of total depravity in the sense I was taught it by my old Puritan pastor.”

“ Very likely not. The Lutheran or Calvinistic doctrine of total depravity, or total corruption of man's nature by the fall, is no doctrine of the Catholic Church. It is a heresy which she condemns. Man's nature at the fall

underwent no physical change, and is instrinsically what it was from the beginning. It lost no natural faculty, and received no new appetite or passion. As pure nature, *seclusa ratione culpæ*, it is what it always was, and always will be in this world. But what you are to bear in mind is, that our nature never was intended to operate well, or to attain to its beatitude, save as the flesh was subordinated to the spirit. On this point Christianity introduces no new law, but simply asserts what was the law from the beginning. Always was the same law necessary and obligatory, and all the difference is, that before the fall the flesh did not rebel, and obedience required no effort, no interior struggle; but since the fall it has become rebellious, and it is only by effort, by struggle, by a painful and unceasing interior warfare, that we can subdue it, and bring ourselves into conformity with the law of God. By the fall we lost, with the supernatural grace which elevated us to the plane of our supernatural destiny, what theologians call the *indebita*, that is, the integrity of our nature, exemption from sickness and death, and, more especially to our present purpose, the subjection of the flesh to the spirit, or exemption from that interior conflict between inclination and duty, the flesh and the spirit, which makes our whole earthly existence one continual warfare, and originates all the tragedies of life. What was before easy is now painful; what was before done without effort is now possible, only by self-violence, self-denial, mortification, interior crucifixion."

"There you are again, uncle, back in your Christian asceticism, preaching your eternal war against nature, and anathematizing all that is sweet in our natural emotions, and ravishing in our sentiments. You will tolerate nothing that is natural. You will not permit a bird to sing, or flower to bloom. All nature must be silent and drab-colored. No heart must be allowed to expand with joy, no fresh young love must be tasted, no sweet, intoxicating sentiments indulged."

"I understand you, Dick, but you do not understand the religion I profess. I anathematize nothing that is good, war against no pure and ennobling sentiment, and I love, even more than in my cold and stormy and heretical youth, the blithesome song of birds, and the beauty and fragrance of flowers. To the Christian, nature is neither drab-colored nor silent. It is clothed with the beauty of its Creator, and

vocal with the music of his love. Christian love purifies our sentiments, and gives them new sweetness and power. All experience proves that Christian asceticism, as forbidding as it may appear to you, is the highest wisdom, nay, the only true philosophy of life. No life is so miserable as that of the unrestrained indulgence of our appetites and passions, which grow by indulgence, and become all the more importunate in their demands the oftener they are gratified. There is no appetite or passion of our nature that does not become morbid by indulgence, and therefore a source of torment. Heathen wisdom taught that, if we would make a man happy, we must study to moderate his desires. The philosophy of the Porch was defective, because it substituted pride for humility, and therefore the self-denial of the Stoics is not to be named with the self-denial of the Christian ; but it was far superior to the philosophy of the Garden. Such is the nature of man, quarrel with it as you will, that he cannot attain to real good without imposing a severe restraint on his appetites and passions, without keeping them under, and maintaining in spite of them the freedom of the spirit,—that true freedom where-with the Son of God makes us free, and which none but the true Christian ascetic ever attains to, or can even comprehend. Freedom of the flesh is the slavery of the spirit, and the emancipation of concupiscence is only another name for the subjection or slavery of reason. These, my dear Dick, are only commonplace truths ; nevertheless, they lie at the foundation of all morality, of all science of virtue or beatitude, and that too whether you consider man individually or socially."

" You may think so, uncle ; but you must allow me to tell you, that not so thinks this enlightened and advanced nineteenth century. You are behind the age. We have exploded all those notions. You still talk of reason, and profess to respect logic. We have learned better. We do not respect logic ; we place very little reliance on reason. The reason or intellect, the logical understanding, is a very low faculty, and, as the inspired Fourier has taught, should serve as a mere instrument of the passions, which are the springs of action ; not as their master. We have passed beyond the Petrine Gospel, that of authority, attempted to be realized in your old popish church, fit only for women and children or the infancy of nations ; we have passed beyond your Pauline Gospel, or that of the intellect, reason,

or understanding, on which Luther and Calvin founded their churches, and which were fit only for a certain stage in the development of society; and we have passed on to the Johannine Gospel, the Gospel of Love, preached by St. John, ‘the beloved disciple,’ which never fails, but endures for ever. We rely on the heart; we place religion in the heart, and virtue in sentiment. We seek the man who has a soul, who can feel, who has pure, lofty, warm, gushing feelings, and who is moved by their noble impulses, not by the dry deductions of logic or the cold calculations of duty. We hate that word *duty*. It freezes our blood; it dries up the juices of our hearts. Give us the man who acts from love, not duty,—who devotes himself to the sacred cause of humanity, not because commanded, not because he sees that it is reasonable, or fears that he will be damned if he does not, but from love, from the promptings of his own free, warm, and loving heart. This, dear uncle, is the Gospel of the nineteenth century, the Gospel of to-day.”

“And no great novelty, after all. It was preached in substance, by the fifth-monarchy men in the seventeenth century, the Anabaptists in the sixteenth, the followers of the *Evangile Éternel* in the fourteenth, and various sects of the Gnostics in the third. It is only a phase of antinomianism, virtually held by all so-called Evangelical sects. It is a very old, and not a very specious, heresy. Its revival does not say much for the progress of your boasted nineteenth century.”

“No matter if it is old, if it be true. Undoubtedly the advanced spirits of past ages, indeed of every age, have had glimpses, as it were, a presentiment of it; but never was it generally embraced, or recognized as the authentic Gospel of the age, before our times.”

“Be it so. It gives loose reins to all unlawful passions. The ministers of this Gospel, I take it, are your modern novelists, who celebrate fornication and adultery. Old-fashioned lawful love, the love of the husband for his lawful wife, or of the wife for her lawful husband, is too insipid for the taste of these modern evangelists. Duty is humdrum, what is lawful is cold and repulsive. Love, to be interesting, must be unlawful, must be forbidden, on the principle that ‘forbidden fruit is sweetest,’ and is pure and beautiful only as it is a violation of duty. Has not George Sand proved this? Has not Bulwer proved it? Have not

countless hosts of German and French sentimentalists proved it? How complacently they dwell on an unlawful passion, and follow it through all its windings, and how eloquently they extol its depth, its purity, its sanctity? There is no question but the greater part of your modern popular literature is written in the true spirit of your Gospel of love. That your Gospel of love is very generally embraced, and faithfully observed, may be safely concluded from the wan-
ing intellect of the age, the superficial character of its pro-
ductions, and the general relaxation of morals. Your
own party proves its prevalence in their war against all
established authority, in their lack of common understand-
ing, their ceaseless agitation, their violence, their despot-
isms, their cruelties, their assassinations, their worship of
the dagger.

“But, my poor boy, why do you suffer yourself to be the dupe of words? God is Love, the Gospel of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ is a Gospel of love, and love—charity—is the bond of perfection, the origin, life, and end of crea-
tion. What Christian knows not that? But the love of which the Christian Gospel speaks is not the burning pas-
sion nor the watery sentimentality of your novelists and re-
formers. It is the love of the heart, not of the senses; the free, voluntary exercise of the rational nature, not the mor-
bid cravings of the sensitive soul. It is the highest and purest exercise of the rational soul, and is on the part of man only another name for duty, or a true moral conform-
ity to the law of God. The distinction you seek to set up between love and duty is founded upon the ambiguity of the word *love*, sometimes used to express a blind passion, with which one is carried away, or a simple affection of concu-
piscence, and sometimes an affection of the rational soul, reason and will, and therefore a free, voluntary affection. In the former sense it is irrational, involuntary, and there-
fore not moral. It is by resolving love into this affection of the inferior soul, making it an affection of the sensitive nature, as distinguished from the rational, that your popu-
lar authors are led to their immoral doctrine that love can-
not be controlled,—that it submits to no law but the neces-
sity of nature, and regards no considerations of duty,—that we love where we must, and that we cannot help loving where we do, or bring ourselves to love where we do not. Coupling with this the evident sanctity of love in the other sense of the word, they lay down the doctrine that even

the most irregular and licentious love, if strong, if intense, is pure and holy. The wife is not censurable for not loving her husband, or for seeking to fill up the void in her heart by loving another,—perhaps another woman's husband. Hence the whole force of modern literature is directed against the cruelty of those laws which seek to control the affections, and of those parents who interfere with the affections of their children, arrange their marriage, or cross them in their love affairs. The custom still prevalent in some countries, for parents to select a wife for a son, or a husband for a daughter, is condemned as absurd, as a treason to love. Parents may undoubtedly abuse their power in this respect, as they may every other, and the abuse is always to be condemned ; but there can be little doubt, that there were fewer mismatches and more domestic love and happiness under the old custom than there are under our modern custom, which leaves the most important affair of life to be settled by the inexperience, the fancy, the caprice, or the excited passions of youth, incapable of making a wise or prudent choice. Then youth grew up pure and innocent, and their hearts retained their virginity, and their imagination its chastity. Now the girl is hardly in her teens before her head is filled with thoughts of love and marriage, and she is on the alert to see who will love her, or whom she will love. All this grows out of your low and sensual view of love, of your making it an affection of the sensitive nature instead of the rational, and supposing that it does in no sense depend on reason and will to love wherever it is our duty to love.

" You do not know, my dear boy, how much misery results from this false notion of love. You know the popular literature of our age. It breathes the tone of unsatisfied love, of strong, ardent affections, which nothing can meet or satisfy,—a longing after something which is not possessed, which cannot be obtained. The heart is empty. The delights of home and of domestic affection are praised, are chanted in all tones, but are not realized. The husband finds it impossible to be satisfied with the wife of his bosom, and seeks to solace himself with his mistress; the wife is unfaithful in turn, or pines away in secret with an untold affection or an unsatisfied love. All your novelists touch upon married life only when it is criminal or miserable, and in general drop the curtain as soon as the marriage ceremony is over, as if conscious that the love which they have traced

thus far will not survive the honeymoon. The reason of all this is plain. The affections of the sensitive nature cannot be satisfied, and the object they crave, however worthy, is loathed as soon as possessed. They are morbid and capricious. You do not feel this truth yet, because you are young, and are just now engrossed with a passion for world-reform. The gloss of novelty has not yet worn off, and your emotions are still fresh. You have not yet learned to exclaim from the bitterness of your own experience, *Vanitas vanitatum, et omnia vanitas*. Yet you find no satisfaction; you find no repose; and you are hurried on, not so much by any real regard for the good of mankind, as by your own interior and unexplained uneasiness; you are moved by a craving for something you have not, for you know not what, and to be other than you are. You plunge into the work of political and social revolution as a dissipation. You will soon grow weary of it. Then you will seek to fill the void in your heart with woman's love, run a career of debauchery, and end by attempting to drown your misery in the wine-cup. Or if you recover, you will turn to Mammon, and die a miser; for avarice is the only passion that is sure to retain its power to the last."

"A sad picture, my dear uncle, and not very complimentary."

"Nevertheless, you need not doubt its fidelity. I have lived longer than you, and have had some experience. You will not believe me now, but hereafter, if God in his mercy touches your heart, you will see and own the truth of what I say. Our age is a sentimental age, and every sentimental age runs the career I have described. Sentiment distinguished from duty, and placed above it, or regarded as a higher principle of action, always runs into vice, and becomes the parent of a whole family of the most degrading and loathsome vices. Your error lies not in demanding love, but in demanding sensitive instead of rational love. Love, as an affection of the rational soul, an intelligent and voluntary affection, is something noble, something worthy to be lauded. Love in this sense is under our control, and in this sense we can love wherever it is our duty to love, and refrain from loving where and what we ought not to love. This love, the true Eros of the Greeks as distinguished from the Anteros, is always one with duty, or rather is the full and perfect discharge of duty. It surpasses by far in sweetness and generosity your sensitive love. What you call love,

the love that laughs at duty as something dry and cold, is selfish, heartless, and cruel, for it seeks always its own gratification, and never any thing else. But rational love, operating from a sense of duty, has in itself no taint of selfishness; it gives itself up entirely to its object. Your sort of love seeks to unite the object to itself; this seeks to unite itself to its object. All love is unitive, but only rational love seeks union by giving itself to the object, and making itself one with it. Sensitive love pursues its object, not for the sake of the object, but for itself; rational love seeks to possess the object for the object's sake, not for its own. The one will sacrifice itself for the object, the other will sacrifice the object for itself. What else is it to act from a sense of duty than to act from this love, which is the sacrifice of our own will, or, what is the same thing, the unification of our will with the divine will, of which law is the expression? Understand this, and you will see at once that duty and love coincide, are in fact one and the same; for to love rationally is to love what we ought to love, and because we *ought* to love it, and is the fulfilment of duty. There is nothing dry, cold, or forbidding in this, and it calls for and gives free scope to all the sweetest, purest, strongest, warmest, and most generous affections of our nature. Compared with the ages of faith and duty, our age is dry, cold, and heartless. We have nothing of that tender sensibility, nothing of those warm, gushing feelings, fresh from the heart, of that generous love of husband and wife, of parents and children, or that disinterested devotion to the welfare and interests of our neighbor, that we find in the old Christian romances. We have nothing of that simplicity, that freshness of feeling, that lightheartedness, that sunshine of the soul, that perpetual youth, which characterized the Christian populations of the middle ages. Our hearts are dark and gloomy, our spirits are jaded, our faces are worn and haggard. We have no youth of the heart. Life to us is a senseless debauch, or a heavy and hateful existence. Our affections are blighted from the cradle, and we live a burden to ourselves. O, give us back the good old times of faith and duty, when reigned the soul's love, and the heart's joy gave new melody to the song of birds, and new beauty and fragrance to flowers!"

CONVERSATION V.

"It seems to me, my dear uncle, that you occasionally forget yourself. In our last conversation you seemed to regret the past, and to think that our lot is cast in peculiarly evil times. Yet you had told me previously that you considered one generation about as good as another."

"You are hypercritical, Dick, and make no allowance for the imperfection of the human mind, which ordinarily considers things only under special aspects. Evils that we see impress us more than those we merely read of. And the virtues of past ages loom up in our view far larger than those which are practised half in secret in our own times. We forget the evils of the past in the contemplation of those of the present, and the virtues of the present in the contemplation of those of the past. What if, when considering the worth of past times and the evils of the present, we speak out as we feel, without stopping to see whether, if a just balance were struck, the two periods might not upon the whole appear about equal? Moreover, when I contrast the nineteenth century with the thirteenth, I am really only contrasting your Protestantism with my Catholicity. Catholicity has not changed, and real Catholics are substantially now what they were then. Some things they have lost, which I regret; others they have gained, which may, perhaps, upon a general average, compensate for what they have lost. But this age, regarded as distinct from what is purely of the church, is Protestant, and the literature which is its exponent is non-Catholic. It is of our age in that it is non-Catholic I speak, when I contrast it with past times. It is, in so far as it has renounced reason for sentiment, rational for sensitive love, charity for philanthropy, law for rebellion, authority for anarchy, the church for humanity, God for the devil, that I speak of it, and tell you its real character and tendency. I wish to show you the shallow and destructive nature of the principles and maxims of this non-Catholic age, which young men, like you, mistake for truth and wisdom, and by which you are seduced from all good, and involved in misery and wretchedness."

"You speak of us, uncle, as seduced, and warn us against the fatal tendency of our principles and maxims; but you forget that the world has been governed for six thousand years on your principles and maxims, and that

during all that period vice and crime, misery and wretchedness, have abounded. The whole world rises up in witness against your kings, priests, and nobilities. You have had your day and done your best; let us now have ours. We can hardly make worse work of it than you have done."

"Spoken like a philosopher of the nineteenth century, or a foolish young man, my dear Dick. If, with the principles and maxims which have formed the basis of the moral order in the past, so much iniquity has abounded, and so much misery has been suffered, what would the world have been without them? If with priests and rulers the world has been so wicked and wretched, what would it have been if it had had none? You are mistaken in supposing that the world has in the past been really governed by the principles and maxims I contend for. They have always been asserted, but they have not always been obeyed. Indeed, only a small minority of mankind have been uniformly faithful to them. Though admitted in theory, the majority have generally violated them in practice, and yielded to the seductions of the flesh, instead of walking according to the spirit. But in so far as mankind have been faithful to the principles you and your party reject, they have been virtuous, prosperous and happy. The evils which have been done or suffered have uniformly resulted from disobedience to them, not from obedience. Your objection to the religious world is very shallow, and your excuse for yourselves is of no avail."

"But you ask me, Uncle Jack, to embrace your church. You tell me she is the divinely constituted medium for the regeneration of man and society. You claim for her a supernatural power, and hold that her omnipotent Founder, her celestial Bridegroom, is always with her, to aid her in accomplishing her work. And yet I find that political and social evils have always abounded in Catholic countries. There have been in Catholic countries kings and aristocrats, tyrants and oppressors, the distinctions of noble and ignoble, and of rich and poor. The history of professedly Catholic nations presents the same monotonous picture of vice and crime, violence and bloodshed, war and rapine, public and private misery, presented by that of heretical or infidel nations. Whence comes this, if your church be what she professes to be? Why does she not use her power to make sovereigns rule justly? Why does she not

assert the equality of all men, and compel all to live together as brothers? I listen to her magnificent promises, and my imagination, if not my heart, is captivated; I turn over the records of her history in vain to find their fulfilment."

" You are two sweeping in your assertions, my dear nephew. It is not true that you find no difference to their advantage between Catholic nations and non-Catholic nations. The immense superiority of Catholic nations over all others in all that constitutes the true wisdom and glory, the true greatness and happiness, of a people, is manifest, even to-day, to every one who knows how to observe. Compare Great Britain with Italy, the United States with Austria, Turkey in Europe with Spain, or any infidel or heretical country as it now is, with what it was when it was sincerely Catholic, and you will be satisfied that, however little you may imagine the church has done, she has infinitely surpassed all that infidelity or heresy can do. On this point I am quite at my ease. You Protestants are very untrustworthy as travellers and historians, and suffer grievously for lack of truth. You have so long and so confidently claimed the superiority for yourselves, and so long kept your eyes shut to your own defects and open to those of Catholic nations, that you are surprised if a Catholic ventures to deny that superiority. In purely material civilization, no Protestant nation has attained to any thing like that of ancient pagan Greece or Rome. And in all those points on which you claim superiority, you are surpassed by the existing Catholic nations. I concede the material or physical power of Great Britain,—a power of some fifty years' standing; but great as her power is, it is not superior to that of France, and is far inferior to that of Catholic Spain in the sixteenth century. In the arts, in moral and spiritual culture, in the morals, refinement, and temporal well-being of her operatives and peasantry, she is far below the lowest Catholic continental state. Her industry is great, and she manufactures for the whole world. Her commerce is extensive, and lays all nations under contribution. But her commercial and industrial system, while it builds up large fortunes for the few, reduces the many to a state of servile dependence and squalid poverty. It is opposed to the best temporal interests of mankind, and lays no solid foundation even for her own temporal prosperity. The duration of the greatness of all

commercial and industrial nations is short, and when a people has once based its power and existence on commerce and manufactures, the day of its decline is never far distant. The territory of Great Britain can no longer support her population ; she has become dependent on foreign states for her food. The growth of a new commercial or manufacturing rival, a change in the marts of the world, or the opening of new routes or channels of commerce, will be fatal to her power. Her American daughter, spanning this immense continent from the Atlantic to the Pacific, will in a few years transfer the commercial capital of the world from London to New York, and wrest from her the commerce of both oceans ; while Russia will monopolize the inland trade of all northern and upper Asia as well as of northern Europe. France and Germany are extending their own manufactures, and driving her already from some of her best markets, while the emigration of her laboring population, going on at the rate of some three hundred thousand a year, must soon tell on her military force, and on her ability to undersell her rivals. The power of England, apparently great, cannot survive a single rude shock. We see that she herself is conscious of it, in the fear she betrayed of a French invasion a year and a half ago, and the timid, hesitating, and ridiculous policy she has, up to the present, adopted on the Eastern question. The *matériel* of her navy, in which lies her great strength, after her power as head of the modern credit system, is great, I admit, but its *personnel* is inferior to that of France. In a general naval war, she would lose her superiority on the ocean, and Russia has proved, within the last few months, that the continental nations are fast emancipating themselves from their dependence on her credit system. Most of her colonies hold to her by very feeble ties, and all that is necessary to wrest from her grasp her immense Indian empire, is for the native troops, who detest her, simply to disband themselves. I do not, therefore, regard Great Britain, under any point of view, as offering any justification of the arrogant pretensions of Protestantism. I see in her no signs of permanent prosperity.

"We are mixed Protestant, infidel, and Catholic people. The non-Catholic element, however, predominates ; and owing to our vast extent of cheap and fertile lands, we are free from many of the material evils of older countries.

But in real well-being, in the refinements of life, in the culture of the soul, in the higher civilization, or in true national or individual virtue and happiness, we are far below the lowest Catholic state. We can boast only of our industry. Our literature is not worth naming; our newspapers, for the most part, are a public nuisance; our common schools amount to little, and cannot be named with those of Austria; we have not a respectable library or university in the country; and the liberty we boast is merely the liberty of the mob, to govern us as it pleases. There is perhaps no people on earth that has less of moral and mental independence, or less individual freedom and manliness. We are the slaves of committees, associations, caucuses, and a public opinion formed by ignorant and fanatical and lying lecturers, preachers, newspapers, and demagogues. A man can be a free man here, and speak and act as a true man conscious of his individuality, only at the expense of becoming a pariah, an outcast. No, my poor boy, refer not to the United States for evidence to justify the insane pretensions of self-deluded Protestantism.

"There are no other Protestant nations to be considered; for if these cannot compete with Catholic nations in real greatness, none can. But if you penetrate beneath the surface, or mingle with the mass of the people, peasants, artisans, and laborers, you will find that, in all that constitutes true domestic and individual content and enjoyment, there is a heavy balance in favor of Catholic nations. Nowhere in Catholic states do you find that abject and squalid poverty that you find in Great Britain, and even in many of our own externally thriving cities. The English operative or agricultural laborer is a mere animal beside the Italian or Spanish peasant, who never loses the sense of his manhood. The inmates of your English and American poor-houses are more than a set-off to the Italian beggars of which Anglo-Saxon and Anglo-Norman travellers complain so loudly. Then you will look in vain through all Catholic countries for your English gin-palaces, or for that drunkenness so common in all Protestant countries, and which, with all your temperance societies and Maine liquor laws, you can do so little to prevent. Ireland is no fair specimen of a Catholic nation, for the Irish state is Protestant, and the greater part of its nobility Protestant and also foreign; and yet, in proportion to her population, she consumes only about one-ninth the quantity of ardent spirits

consumed by Scotland, that pattern of a Protestant people. In vain, also, will you seek in Catholic countries for that general impurity which is the shame of the modern Protestant, as it was of the ancient heathen, world. The crimes of Catholic nations are for the most part those which spring from sudden passion or emotion, and are crimes against persons rather than against property. You will seldom find with them those cool, deliberate crimes and frauds which prevail to such a frightful extent in all Protestant states. Among Catholics hypocrisy is a rare exception ; among Protestants it is the rule. The Catholic fears God, if he fears any thing, and before men he is open, free, natural, easy, independent. The Protestant has seldom the fear of God before his eyes ; he sometimes fears the devil, and generally is the slave of public opinion. If he can stand well with his public, he is contented, and he seldom looks higher. Hence he has a certain meanness and servility, which are alike foreign from true virtue and real personal independence. His morality stops with a low prudence, and a sort of external decorum. When once he shakes off his fear of public opinion, or the opinions of his friends and neighbors, he abandons himself to any vice or crime to which he finds himself attracted. The Catholic may disregard public opinion, think little of how he stands with his friends and neighbors, and still maintain his integrity, his virtue, his piety.

" Moreover, I do not deny, nor do I wish to extenuate in the least, the evils which abound and always have abounded even in Catholic states. All who know any thing of history know that the church wrought a great and marvellous change in the manners and morals and in the happiness of the people of the old Roman empire, and that she exerted a most salutary influence on the northern barbarians who overthrew and supplanted it, and who have been moulded by her into the modern states of Europe. Yet I do not pretend that, even when things were best, all went as it should in Catholic states. There was, even in what are called the ages of faith, vice, and crime, and suffering ; there were tyranny and oppression, the pride and insolence of power ; there were violence and outrage, wars and rapine, bad government, and terrible political and social evils. But you must bear in mind that it was not they who obeyed the church, who accepted and uniformly acted on her principles and maxims, that caused the evils. Those tyrannical princes, kings, and emperors, like Henry IV.

of Germany, Frederic Barbarossa, Frederic II., Louis of Bavaria, Philip the Fair, Henry and his son John, of England, Charles le Mauvais, and Pedro the Cruel, were not obedient, but most disobedient, sons of the church, Protestants before Luther, who made war on her and incurred her anathema. They oppressed her and their subjects in spite of her reclamations. As a general rule, the civil authority even in Catholic states has always been jealous of the ecclesiastical authority, and restricted as much as it could its free and full exercise. It has seldom shown itself willing to give the church an open field and fair play. In modern times they have done their best to trammel her exertions and restrain her movements. Charles V., who held his office of emperor on condition of being the protector of the church, and especially of the Holy See, favored her enemies by his selfish policy in Germany, made war on the pope, and took the city of Rome, which his troops sacked and occupied for nine months. The kings of the house of Bourbon, though professing great devotion to the church, from Henry IV., who was bred a Huguenot, down to the last of their race, have asserted and maintained against her the independence, and I might say the supremacy, of the temporal power. Louis XIV. was more the head of the church in France than the pope. Wherever the Bourbon family reigned, the church lost her freedom, and Catholic interests were sacrificed. Even Charles X. learned, in the long years of his exile, nothing beyond his Bourbon traditions, and when king lost the affections of the liberals by his Catholicity, and of Catholics by his narrow-minded Gallicanism. The house of Habsburg, with great personal piety, for the most part, has till our own day followed the general policy of the temporal authority. Joseph II., in his mad zeal for reform, almost completed for southern and central Germany what Luther and the princes who favored him had done for northern Germany. The tyranny and oppression of which you complain you must attribute, not to the church, nor to her docile and obedient, but to her indocile and disobedient, children. When and where her voice has been listened to, her precepts obeyed, her principles and maxims faithfully followed, she has fulfilled all her promises, and accomplished all that you or any one else can ask. Where she has failed has been where her authority was despised and resisted; and the evils

she has not redressed, and which are encountered in Catholic states, are chargeable to practical Protestantism, to the practical assertion by her disobedient children of those principles and maxims which you and your friends wish all the world to follow."

"But you evade the point of my objection, Uncle Jack. If your church be what she professes to be, how happens it that there were so many wicked princes and other persons in her bosom? Why did she not reform them, make them good and docile Catholics? I admit all you say; but these very persons to whom you charge all the evils I find recorded in the history of Catholic nations, had all been baptized and brought up Catholics. I do not deny, but assert, their wickedness. My difficulty is, how, if the church be as powerful for good as she pretends, and affords all the helps needed to virtue, they could be so wicked. I have read your Catholic histories of the reformers. According to these histories, the reformers were a set of as great rascals as ever lived, and I have no doubt of the fact. I think you fully prove it. But this relieves no difficulty. The more wicked and unprincipled you prove them, the more to my mind you prove against the church, the more completely do you establish her inefficiency, her inability to effect what is avowedly her purpose. These reformers had all been reared in her bosom; they had all, according to you, been regenerated in baptism, had been born again, received the gift of faith, the grace of the sacraments, and been elevated to the plane of a supernatural destiny. They had received all your church has to give. How, then, if she is able to fulfil her magnificent promises, could such a set of men come out of her communion, or possibly become so grossly depraved as they most undeniably were before they openly abandoned her? Here is my difficulty, and a difficulty which you do not meet. Is not the existence of such men, or such men as the Achillis and the Gavazzis, in the bosom of your church, a practical refutation of her claims?"

"I understood from the outset your difficulty, or the point of your objection, my dear Dick, and had no intention of evading it. The objection, though fatal to Protestantism as a religion, is in the non-Catholic mind practically the gravest objection to the church that can be urged; and I well recollect that I found it, after having rejected Protestantism, the greatest and last obstacle in my own

mind to be overcome in embracing the church. I had lived as a man of the world, as a non-Catholic man of the world, not unfrequently lives, and had strayed far from the path of virtue, and fallen far lower than I care to state. I tried to recover myself, but I found myself too weak. I was sinking, and I had no strength to arrest my fall. I wanted help, something to breathe life into my soul, give strength to my will, and light to my understanding. The church proffered me this help, or told me that in her sacraments, which were channels of grace, I should find precisely what I wanted. But could I trust her? If she communicates through her sacraments the graces she alleges, how comes it that so many who must have received these graces have lost their faith and virtue, and become the vilest and most abandoned of our race, as apostate Catholics usually are? These undeniably wicked men who had been reared in the bosom of the church, who must have approached her sacraments, and therefore received all needful supernatural helps, if such helps the church has to give, were to me for a long time a real stumbling-block, for their existence seemed to me an unanswerable proof that the church does not and cannot give the assistance which I needed and which she promises. But I became able finally to understand that my objection grew out of my Protestant and Puritan education, which had taught me that grace is irresistible and inamissible. Your difficulty is, Given the church as the medium of supernatural grace which supernaturalizes and sanctifies, how can one of her members fall away, or lapse into iniquity and unbelief? Or how can one baptized and reared in the bosom of the church ever be a bad Catholic and a bad man? The answer is easy. Man was created and intended to be a free moral agent, and the church was never intended to take away his free agency, or to deprive him of his free will. Man in the church, as out of her, retains his free will, and therefore the faculty of obeying or of disobeying, as he elects. This free will the church respects, and therefore, whatever assistance she renders, it must be assistance which is compatible with it. She can aid, but not compel, and the power of resistance is always retained by the Catholic. Consequently, the question, How can there be a bad Catholic? is no other than the question, How can there be a bad man, or a sinner at all? There is then no special difficulty in the case. There is only that general

difficulty with regard to the origin of evil, which we have already considered and disposed of.

" You do not readily see this, because, having been reared a Protestant, you have no conception of grace that does not operate irresistibly, or of grace that aids and assists free will without superseding it. Sufficient grace that is ineffectual strikes you as an absurdity, and you relish Voltaire's ridicule of it. But grace can always be resisted. To concur with grace, indeed, demands grace, but to resist grace does not. We are always competent to do that of ourselves alone. The grace we receive in baptism imparts to us the habit of faith and justice or sanctity, but the habit is not the act either of faith or justice. It gives us, as to faith, the power to elicit the act, or actually to believe what God has revealed when duly propounded to the understanding, which is beyond our natural ability; but it does not compel us to elicit that act, and we can refuse to do so. By this refusal—a formal refusal, I mean—we lose the habit, and thus become infidels, or heretics. The point you are to bear in mind is, that the grace or gift of faith does not compel us to believe; it only gives us the power to believe, and a certain facility in believing, what God reveals and the church teaches. We are aided, not forced by it. If we formally refuse, we lose that power and facility, and our understanding becomes darkened. We then lose, not only our love, but even our perception of the truth, as is perhaps always the case with confirmed heretics and apostates. They fall anew under the power of Satan, and become the prey to all his delusions, so that it is possible that they really persuade themselves that their errors are truths, and become so deluded as actually to believe a lie, that, having pleasure in iniquity, they may be damned. This explains how men who have received the gift of faith may lose it, and become heretics and apostates. But generally, perhaps always, the refusal to elicit the act of faith is preceded by the loss of justice. Sanctifying grace, when no obstruction is offered on our part, places us in a state of justice, but it does not compel us to remain in that state. We are still free agents, and therefore may, instead of eliciting acts of holiness, resist the grace of God, and fall into mortal sin. By mortal sin we lose that grace, all that it gave us, and come again under the power of Satan. Thus nothing prevents the Catholic, if he chooses, from rejecting all the graces of the sacraments, all the aid his church affords him, and running a

wild career of incredulity and iniquity. All in the church are not of the church. She is that gospel net which, cast into the sea, gathered fishes of all sorts, both good and bad, and hence we find among Catholics all sorts of persons, good, bad, and indifferent. We should not therefore be surprised to find men passing for Catholics who yet have in reality no more faith than Protestants, and no more virtue than heathens. This makes nothing against the church, if you once understand that grace does not take away free will, and is not inamissible."

"I can understand all that, but it does not remove my whole difficulty. If people can, with the church, lose their faith and their virtue, I do not see what mighty advantage she is to mankind."

"That is chiefly because you are thinking only of good or evil in relation to the natural and temporal order, and do not at all take into the account the supernatural providence of God, and man's supernatural destiny, in the world to come; but also in some respects because you have no conception of free will. Your humanists, who worship a people-god, to use the barbarous expression of your Italian chief, have no just conception of the dignity and freedom of man. You do not, perhaps you cannot, understand the immense superiority of a being endowed with free will over a creature that acts solely from intrinsic necessity. Your highest conception of liberty is freedom from coercion, or from external restraint or compulsion. You never rise above the conception of the animal man. Man is for you only a superior sort of animal, standing at the head of the order of mammalia, and it is only for man as an animal that in all your plans of reform you seek to provide. You recognize in him no rational soul; and you place, as you have avowed, his highest worth in his instinctive and involuntary activity. Hence you place instinctive and impulsive love above duty. With these low and grovelling conceptions of man, it is not easy for you to understand the importance which is to be attached to free will. But you would prize an homage freely and voluntarily offered you by one of your friends, more than an homage offered you through compulsion or necessity. You should know that

God made thee perfect, not immutable ;
And good he made thee, but to persevere
He left it in thy power, ordain'd thy will
By nature free, not over-rul'd by fate

Inextricable, or strict necessity:
Our voluntary service he requires,
Not our necessitated; such with him
Finds no acceptance, nor can find; for how
Can hearts not free be try'd whether they serve
Willing or no, who will but what they must
By destiny, and can no other choose?"

Without free will man would not rise in the scale of being above the ox or the hog, the beaver or the ant, and virtue would not differ in principle from gravitation or chemical affinity. The freedom you talk so much about, and for which you set at defiance the laws of God and man, would be but an unmeaning word. There is freedom conceivable only for a being possessing free will, without which there is only invincible necessity. The glory of man's nature is in his free will, which is the highest expression of his rational nature, partaking at once of intellect and volition. This free will God himself respects, and never does or suffers violence to be done to it. God redeems man, and governs him as endowed with free will. The grace he confers, the aid he vouchsafes in his church, are all granted and operate in accordance with it, and therefore may be resisted. But this does not imply that the church is of no value. If she furnishes the aid needed to enable man to be and do what were impossible without it, you cannot say she is of no importance because a man wilfully rejects it, or refuses to avail himself of it. She does all that can be done without depriving men of their free will, that is, without making them cease to be men. That is all that she ever promised to do, all that is or can be required of her. You have but to listen and obey, and even not that in your own strength, and the end is gained. Your objection is futile, for it is always something that help is at hand."

"Still I want something more."

"Probably you want the impossible, or the absurd."

"I want the church, if church I am to have, not merely to enable men to save themselves, but actually to save them."

"That is, you want the state of probation or trial should be a state of reward and beatitude. You want an order in which men can be free, do as they please, and in which they cannot go wrong, can make no mistake, commit no sin, and suffer no pain. You must go out of this world to find such an order, and seek a human nature different from

ours. What you ask is incompatible with man's present state. The church has never promised the world any thing, except on condition of obedience. She teaches us the truth, tells us what is our true good, points out the way that leads to its possession, entreats us with maternal affection to walk in that way, and affords us all the helps we need in order to do so; but the act of doing it must be *our* act. She does not carry us without our concurrence, without our active assent, in spite of ourselves, and against our will. If she did, you would be among the first to cry out against her, as violating the freedom and dignity of human nature. She does all that can be done with respect for our dignity, or without violence to our free will, which would not be free will if it did or could suffer violence. This is all she has ever promised, and her promise she has always kept. If then there have been moral evils in Catholic nations, if men reared Catholics have abandoned their faith or lived as heathen, and run to fearful excesses of vice and crime, it is not owing to any weakness or inefficiency of hers, but to the perversity of their own wills, to the malice of their own hearts."

" Still I do not see, if your church really imparts the light and strength you pretend, what could induce men enlightened and strengthened by her to abandon her, to act against her precepts, and to become vicious and criminal. They have neither ignorance nor weakness to plead in their excuse."

" That only proves the depth of their malice. You do not seem to have any conception of such a thing as malice, and you imagine that no one can do wrong against his better knowledge, unless through weakness. Hence you have no conception of sin, and in your own mind really deny its possibility. In your philosophy sin is an excusable error, an amiable weakness, a pardonable mistake, and therefore you revolt at the idea of its eternal punishment. But sin is not a mere imperfection; it is not something involuntary, but always a free, deliberate act, and, in so far as it is sin, an act of malice. The man had both the light and the strength to avoid it. It is impossible for us to estimate the degree of malice every mortal sin implies, and you will never have any adequate conception of its turpitude till you have learned at what cost the incarnate Son of God has made satisfaction for it. You are very much mistaken in supposing that men always act as well as they are able, or know how."

"But I should suppose their knowledge and sense of their own interest would prevent their fall."

"You are a very young man, or you would not say that. Men are surely not incapable of going contrary to what they know is for their own interest, both here and hereafter. They do it every day, almost every hour."

"But if I recollect aright, your St. Thomas teaches that the good is the object of the will, and that the will is appetitive of good only."

"The will has for its object good, and wills an object only because it views it as good of some sort, I admit; but not therefore does it never will that which is not true good. St. Thomas teaches that every man naturally desires happiness, which is true; but he may will that which he knows is contrary to his happiness, not precisely because it is contrary to it, but from aversion to that which it is necessary to do in order to gain it. A man wills evil because he hates good, and to refuse what one hates has itself some reason of happiness, inasmuch as it affords a certain gratification. To contradict that which is hateful to us is always a greater or less pleasure, and nothing is more hateful to the malicious than genuine virtue, although they well know its superiority to vice, and that they would be better and happier if they were themselves virtuous. The malicious call evil good, and good evil, not from mistake, but from sheer malice. You yourself would say, with Satan,

'Better to reign in hell than serve in heaven.'

The perverse mind makes to itself a sort of good in its refusal to obey God. Did you never observe how Mammon works out this thought in Milton's *Paradise Lost*? The fallen spirit would dissuade his associates from the further prosecution of the war against the Almighty, as utterly vain. They cannot 'heaven's Lord supreme o'erpower,' and thus regain their lost glory. But

'Suppose he should relent
And publish grace to all, on promise made
Of new subjection; with what eyes could we
Stand in his presence humble, and receive
Strict laws impos'd, to celebrate his throne
With warbled hymns, and to his Godhead sing
Forc'd halleluiyahs; while he lordly sits
Our envy'd Sov'reign, and his altar breathes
Ambrosial odours and ambrosial flowers,
Our servile offerings? This must be our task

In heav'n, this our delight; *how wearisome*
Eternity so spent in worship paid
To whom we hate! Let us not then pursue
 By force impossible, by leave obtain'd
 Unacceptable, though in heaven, our state
 Of splendid vassalage, but rather seek
Our own good from ourselves, and from our own
 Live to ourselves, though in this vast recess,
 Free, and to none accountable, *preferring*
Hard liberty before the easy yoke
Of servile pomp. Our greatness will appear
 Then most conspicuous, when great things of small,
 Useful of hurtful, prosperous of adverse,
 We can create; and, in what place so e'er,
 Thrive under evil, and work ease out of pain
 Through labour and endurance.'

Milton had a happy knack of interpreting the thoughts of devils, for he was himself a superb rebel, and a spirit kindred to Satan. You, my dear Dick, if you will search your own heart, will find yourself sympathizing with the devilish sentiments put into the mouth of Mammon. Now Mammon knew perfectly well that he ought to love God, and that to those who do love him, what he calls 'a wearisome task' is the highest bliss. But he preferred hell to heaven, because he hated God, and was too proud to submit to bear his 'easy yoke.' So it is with men. The pride, the malice of their hearts is such, that to do what they will, to have their own way, and to feel that they resolutely refuse to acknowledge a superior, though bringing with it all the pains of hell, is a good, and for them less painful than humble submission. It is so with you, and with all the chiefs of your party. Even you, with all your gentle manners, warmth of feeling, and amiableness of disposition, can say and do say to yourself, with Satan, at this moment,

'All is not lost; th' unconquerable will,
 And study of revenge, immortal hate
 And courage never to submit or yield
 And what is else not to be overcome;
 That glory never shall his wrath or might
 Extort from me: to bow and sue for grace
 With suppliant knee, and deify his power.'

That were low indeed,
 That were an ignominy and shame beneath
 This downfall.'

Through satanic malice, evil is changed to good, and good to evil; for nothing can seem a greater evil than to bow the suppliant knee and sue for grace to one we hate, and hence it is the will can be appetitive of evil without changing its nature, which is to be appetitive of good.

"The church, I have told you, does not take away free will; let me say also, that baptism does not destroy concupiscence. The flesh remains after the infusion of justifying grace, and we are free, if we choose, at any time to yield to its solicitations. These solicitations are not in themselves sin, and are permitted for our trial, and as occasions of merit. They are sin only by virtue of our voluntary assent to them. Catholics as well as others have these solicitations, and though they know that they ought not to assent to them, and have the power in the sacraments to resist them, they can yield to them. They yield a little, a very little, at first; become slightly negligent of their watch; then they yield a little more, become a little more negligent, and less vigilant in prayer, less frequent in their approach to the sacraments; and then they grow weaker, yield more and more. One concession prepares the way for another, till the soul falls anew under the dominion of the flesh, and we are prepared to do its deeds of iniquity. If you had attempted to lead a truly Christian life, if you had become acquainted with the malice of the natural heart, with the operations of the flesh, and had felt how severe is the internal combat that has to be maintained without a moment's relaxation, you would never have looked upon it as difficult for those who have been enlightened and strengthened by the grace of God, to fall away. But, after all, why speak I thus to you, who hardly believe in God, look on the Gospel with contempt, and regard the church with the profoundest hatred? Yet let what I have said suffice to convince you that, if the church is what she professes to be, and furnishes the helps she promises, she is, in spite of the scandals of bad Catholics, all we need for our true good here as well as hereafter."

"I cannot say that you have fully convinced me of that, my dear uncle, but you have convinced me that more may be said in defence of the church than I had supposed, and that the evils which undeniably subsist in Catholic countries do not necessarily invalidate her claims. So much I am bound in candor to concede. Yet I cannot give up human nature, or regard its instincts and tendencies as an unsafe

guide to what is best for man. Every animal is directed by its natural instincts and tendencies to its end, to its destiny, which is its good, and why not man?"

"Simply because man is something more than an animal, and was never intended to act from mere instinct or natural tendency. Here is the grand mistake which you all commit, and hence the absurdity of your famous Phalansterian maxim,—Attractions proportional to destiny. Man is an animal, if you will, but he is something more; he is a rational soul, and in him the rational morally transforms the animal. He is not to be moved and guided by natural instinct, but by reason. Instinct and natural tendency direct him only to an end that lies in the purely animal order, and he was intended for an end that lies above that order, in the rational order, an end worthy of a rational soul. To 'follow nature,' as you understand it, is the unwise maxim that can be laid down, for you understand it to mean to follow our animal nature, as if man were a pig or an ass. The maxim is true only when applied to the rational nature, and to follow the rational nature is to subject the animal to the rational, and make it serve or conform to the end approved by reason. Here, then, comes in the necessity of self-denial, of self-restraint, or interior government, and also the necessity of divine assistance in maintaining this government.

"Society is, as Plato teaches you, only the individual on a larger scale, and the reason of government in the bosom of the individual is the reason of government in the bosom of society. Your scheme emancipates the beast, and enslaves reason and will, that is, the man. The doctrine you oppose teaches us to emancipate reason and will—the man—from the slavery of the appetites and passions, and to subject the beast. For the same reason that the appetites and passions need to be governed in the individual in order to maintain internal freedom and peace, they need to be governed in society in order to maintain external freedom and peace. Hence, if you speak of rational freedom, you see that government, so far from being opposed to it, is its necessary condition. What you probably are aiming at, though you hardly know it, is the freedom, so to speak, of both the man and the beast, or the conciliation of the freedom or license of the appetites and passions with the freedom of reason and will. But this is not possible. One or the other must serve, and the question for you is which.

Shall the man serve the beast, or the beast the man? shall the flesh rule the spirit, or the spirit the flesh? The whole question comes to this at last, and as you answer this, so will you either assert the supremacy of God or the supremacy of Satan."

CONVERSATION VI.

"It is worse than labor lost, my dear uncle, for you to attempt to arrest the onward march of man and society, and to restore the dark ages, now happily passed away for ever. Your religion in its time was no doubt well enough, and exerted a salutary influence in taming and civilizing the wild barbarians who overthrew the western Roman empire; but the race has outgrown it, and can no longer be served by it. The dead are dead, and cannot be recalled. You mean well, no doubt; you speak in a clear, distinct, and strong voice, but your words fetch no echo from the heart of the age. You put forth great strength, but the age refuses to stop at your resistance, and rolls on in its destined career, as heedless of your efforts as the horses in the fable were of the buzzing and tugging of the fly at the wheel."

"The fly, I believe, Dick, was ridiculed in the fable, not for supposing it could arrest the coach, but for imagining that, by its buzzing and tugging at the wheel, it assisted the horses to draw it through the deep ruts, and is a much better emblem of young Americans like you, than of an old fogey like me. If the human race is carried on, as you suppose, by an irrepressible instinct, an irresistible force, your efforts must count for about as much in its progress as those of the fly at the wheel of the coach."

"But if my efforts to aid progress are ridiculous, it by no means follow that yours, to arrest it, are any the less so."

"That is very true, if, as you assume, I do labor to arrest it. But, my most acute and logical nephew, I deny that I labor to arrest progress, or in any way oppose it. You pretend I do. Here we are at issue. What is the fact? Be so good as to tell me what you mean by progress, and then perhaps we shall be able to determine."

"I mean by progress—the—the continuous advance of the race."

"That is, by progress you mean progress. Progress is progress, no doubt of that; but what *is* progress?"

"It is the continuous development and realization of the latent virtuality of humanity."

"The development and realization of the virtuality of the race to be what? Virtuous or vicious? Good or bad? Wise or foolish?"

"You press me too hard, uncle, with your dry scholasticism, and fail to seize my deeper and truer meaning. Logic kills to dissect, and to insist, in all cases, on clear, distinct, precise, and exact definitions, is to deprive thought of all its freshness, life, and vigor. The human mind is not a mere logic machine. We should give it free play, and let our thoughts gush up and utter themselves in all the life, vivacity, and force of brilliant fancy and creative imagination. The poet, not the logician, is the *maker*; poetry, not dialectics, transforms the world; and poetry delights in the vague, in the obscure, the unintelligible, and dies in the effort to draw sharp outlines, and give distinct and exact definitions. Poetic thought must always shade off into the indefinite, the obscure, the infinite."

"Nonsense, my poor Dick. I am not precisely a poet, but I love and all my life have loved poetry, when poetry it is, and I believe myself a passable judge of its essential qualities. Whatever else poetry may demand, it demands good sense, clear and distinct thought, and as rigid logic, and as much intelligibility, as prose itself. Your modern aesthetic writers, who place the essence of poetry in dark utterances, vague sentiment, or mere sensibility, are as far out in their reckoning as those who placed it in fiction or imitation, and classed it as an imitative art. It is no more imitative than prose, and deals no more in fiction. Its essence is not merely subjective. It is always truth vividly conceived and expressed in its unity and under the form of the beautiful; and if it demands soft and delicate, it still demands clear and well-defined, outlines.

"Yet you greatly mistake me, if you suppose that I am a slave to scholasticism, or the dry and barren forms of logic. What passes for scholasticism is mere analysis, a mere dissection of its subject, and seldom gives us more than a mere skeleton of truth, and the skeleton itself only as disjointed and scattered bones. I love and revere as much as any man can the great scholastics of the middle ages. The *Summa Theologica* of the Angel of the Schools has for me as many miracles as articles, and, when studied as it should be, it gives one the sum of all theology and of all philosophy. But, after all, few study it with sufficient care and diligence to seize its theology in its unity and totality. The method

of treatment is analytic, that of division, which is exhaustive. The subject is first divided into parts, then the parts are divided into questions, and then the questions are subdivided into articles. Nothing in the world can be more convenient for the professor or the learner; but the student, if not on his guard, is liable, in thus studying a subject, to lose sight of unity and synthesis, and to master it only in its details. St. Thomas had himself studied and seen theology in its unity and synthesis, and seldom if ever for a moment loses sight of truth in its unity and integrity; but this cannot always be said of feebler minds, who follow him, and still less of feebler minds yet, who follow *them*, and consult him only on special questions or in special articles, and even that at second or third hand. These often master all theology and philosophy in their details, without ever having a single conception of them in their unity and integrity, in their mutual relations, connections, and dependencies.

"Scholasticism has, undoubtedly, introduced just and accurate distinctions, and favored clearness, exactness, and precision in details, but it has, I think, at the same time, led to a neglect of synthesis, and tended to enfeeble, rather than to invigorate, thought. It has had not a little to do in producing, indirectly, that *frivolezza* so universal in the last century, and not wholly unknown in the present, and which made the philosophical, scientific, and literary world regard as its representative the shallow Voltaire, prince of persiflage, superficial erudition, and still more superficial thought. While insisting on exactness in details, while valuing the analytic method in its place, and continuing and extending the study of the greater scholastics, I would, if it were my business, urge upon those students who wish to qualify themselves to meet the scientific wants of our age, and to act powerfully on the public mind and heart, to go back and study the works of the great fathers of the third, fourth, and fifth centuries, those real masters of the human race, who stood at the summit of human science and of revealed theology; and study these great fathers, not merely in the prefaces and indexes of the Benedictines, but in their works themselves, as handed down to us from their authors. Then we should not have truth in mere detail, or as a mere *hortus siccus*, but in its unity and integrity, as a living, vivifying, and productive whole.

"Revelation is complete, the truth changes not, and the dogma is fixed and unalterable; but modes and processes

of investigation, study, and exposition may change with time, and vary with the varying wants and tastes of the age. The scholastic method was in accordance with the tastes and wants of the epoch when it was adopted, and must always be more or less the method pursued when only scholars are to be addressed, and the object is to act only on professional readers. But times with us have changed. Questions which formerly were discussed only by schoolmen, in the bosom of the schools and monasteries, are now brought before the public at large, and the profoundest principles of theological science have to be discussed for the laity, because the laity, no longer docile, and content to receive in humility the simple teachings of the catechism and the practical instructions of their pastors, have imbibed a habit of questioning every thing, and of denying every thing which they do not comprehend. It has become necessary to be truly theological when we speak *ad populum*, as well as when we speak *ad clerum*. But for the people the scholastic method will not answer, for they have neither the time nor the patience to go through with all the long and fine-spun analyses in which it delights. They turn away unedified, uninstructed, and even disgusted, from its *distinguos*, *concedos*, *negos*, *probos*, *respondeos*, *objectiones*, and *objectiones solvunturs*. To them the truth must be presented, not in its analytic, but in its synthetic form ; not in separate details, but as a whole ; in its living principle, as it is really, not as we make it for the conveniences of study. They whose office it is to teach, and to meet the insurgent errors of the times, which in our days assume almost exclusively a laical form, must be accustomed to contemplate truth in its synthetic character, or they will find themselves impotent before the enemies of truth, as they undeniably were before the terrible errors broached, and so widely and fiercely propagated, in the eighteenth century.

"These are times when something more than a knowledge of details, something more than mere scholastic minds, something more than respectable mediocrity, or men of mere routine, is demanded. We want men of strong, synthetic minds, who grasp truth in its fundamental principles, and have been accustomed to contemplate it in its living unity, and its several parts in their real, ontological relations to one another and to it as a whole,—men who think, who comprehend, not merely remember and repeat,—men of free, original, bold, and vigorous thought, who by their

own mental and spiritual action have made the truth their own, and are able to apply it to the insurgent error as soon as it raises its head above the wave. Such a man Gioberti might have been, had it not been for his pride, his ambition, and his worldly affections; such a man to some extent was the excellent Balmes, and such a man was beginning to be the late brilliant and lamented Donoso Cortés; such a man is the Jesuit Passaglia, and, in spite of his early training and his theory of development, such a man will turn out to be John Henry Newman."

"But how can you, Uncle Jack, a Catholic, bound to believe what and only what you are taught, and whose mind must run in the grooves hollowed out for it ages ago, talk of free, bold, original thought?"

"As well as you or any one else, and better than those who are not Catholics. I demand not free, bold, original thought in the construction of cobweb theories, in the formation of dogmas, or in the explication of inexplicable mysteries. It is not in the sphere of faith that I demand it. The dogma is revealed and imposed by authority, fixed for all time, and is to be received and adhered to without a question. But the mysteries and dogmas of faith have a mutual relation, a logical relation one to another, and to all scientific truth, to all that pertains to the natural order, to society, the state, the family, and to private life. Here, in understanding the relations of the dogmas of faith to one another, and their relations to all not of faith, is the scope for free, bold (not rash), and original thought; for here is a field for proper human science and comprehension, working at once with *data* furnished by the light of revelation, and by the light of nature. This field, if you are able to survey it, you will find is far more extensive than that which is open to those who deny the church and fall back on their private judgment and individual reason. Catholicity, instead of forbidding or hindering free, vigorous, and original thought within what is really open to human thought, encourages it, stimulates it, and affords it all the assistance it needs; and if the contrary would sometimes seem to be warranted by what is met among Catholics, it is to be attributed, not to Catholicity, but to the barren and chilling scholastic methods too exclusively followed. Who would ever pretend that the lawyer, because he neither makes nor as a judge declares the law, has no scope in the practice of his profession for free, vigorous, and original thought?"

"But we have wandered from the point we were considering. You object to my demand for exact definition. I understand the objection. Put you young declaimers and dreamers to your definitions, and your occupation, like Othello's, is gone. All in your minds is vague and floating, and in your horror of scholasticism you have run almost beyond the opposite extreme. I am, as you see, far enough from being wedded to the modes and processes of the scholastics, but I cannot very well talk without talking something, nor intelligibly without knowing what it is I am talking about. So I will ask you again to define to me what you mean by progress."

"I mean by progress development and growth of humanity."

"That is, by progress you mean progress, very likely; but what, once more, *is* progress?"

"It is the growth or augmentation of man's being."

"You grow darker and darker, dear Dick. Pray explain yourself."

"It is not easy to do so, because the doctrine of progress which I hold is very profound, and is at the bottom of the profoundest philosophy of the age. To understand it, we must comprehend the philosophy of the absolute."

"Very well. Let us hear, then, what that very profound philosophy is. Perhaps, if it is not absolutely unintelligible, I may get some notion of it, and if it is, I may suspect that you hardly understand it yourself."

"What I mean by progress is, that there is a continual growth or increase of nature. You, before you became a papist, were accustomed to say, that *being* is in *doing*, and that *to be*, we must *do*."

"It were more correct, I should think, to say, that in order to do, we must be, for what is not cannot act."

"Do not interrupt me. In order to be, we must do, as you once said, and as your old friends, the transcendentalists, still say. Being, in some sense, must, no doubt, precede doing; but being, considered in itself, as anterior to doing, is not actual, but potential,—infinite potentiality, the infinite void of the Buddhists, the *reines Sein* of Hegel, absolutely indistinguishable from non-being,—*das Nichtsein*. It is possible, not real, and becomes real only in coming out of itself into existence,—*das Wesen*; and it becomes *plenum*, full, or the plentitude of real being, only in the pleroma of existence. The doctrine, you see, is very

profound. Plato had some conception of it; Buddha understood it very well, and his followers misapprehending it, have made it the basis of their doctrine of the metempsychosis, or transmigration of souls; several of the Gnostic sects, so profoundly philosophic, and combining as they do all the wisdom of ancient and recent times, and masters alike of the deepest science of the East and of the West, appear to have been familiar with it, and to have symbolized it in their Bythos, married to Sige, from whom issue Horos, Nous, and Aletheia; but the poor and illiterate Christians of the time, like Irenæus of Lyons, regarded it as a vague speculation or as a dangerous heresy, and separated its adherents from the communion of the church, and cursed them as heretics.

"Pure being, *ens purissimum*, *das reine Sein*, being in itself, regarded as distinct from and anterior to existence (*existentia* from *ex-stare*), *das Wesen*, being only void, or possible, becomes full or real only in passing to existence, or as realized and manifested exteriorly in existences. Consequently the growth of existence is a growth of being, in the sense of its realization, or the realization of the ideal, a progress in filling up the void, in rendering it *plenum*, and producing the pleroma, or universal fulness. Progress, then, as we philosophers of the movement understand it, consists in the continuous realization of being. It is progress, because it involves a procession from the possible to the ideal, and from the ideal to the real, and because it tends to the production of the pleroma. It is illimitable, because the being to be realized is infinite, and the infinite has no limits."

"I see nothing very profound in this, save its absurdity. It smells strongly of tobacco-smoke and lager-bier. There is, no doubt, a glimmering of sense in the expression *being* is in *doing*, that to be is to do, for what is not *in actu* is not at all, and hence all theologians say of God he is *actus purissimus*. Also, when taken in the order of the return of existences to God, without absorption, as their final cause, or ultimate end, it may express an important and wholesome practical truth; but, applied, as you apply it, to the procession of existences from God, and understood to mean that nothing is real only in that it produces something, or is a maker, it is false and absurd. It then implies that God is real as distinguished from possible being only in so far as he creates, or is manifested in existences; or, as

Pierre Leroux, the ablest philosopher you have on your side, expresses it, God is *living* God only in his creations or manifestations, and therefore, without those manifestations which we call the universe, he could not be real, but would be simply possible God,—that is, no God at all. God, according to him, is the infinite possibility, or, which with him means the same thing, the infinite virtuality of the universe, and is actual or living God only in existences, and only in so far as his virtuality is realized or actualized in them. To you this may seem profound, and the proof of the marvellous comprehension of your philosophers; to me it is only a striking proof of the pains they take to make themselves fools.

“Just observe, my dear Dick, that your philosophy places first *bythos*, abyss, void, the possible as distinguished from the real. Very good. The possible is simply *in potentia ad actum*, but is not *actus*, and therefore, by your own rule, not being at all, and therefore a sheer nullity, since between not being at all and nullity there is no medium. Hence you have this not very easy problem to solve. How from nothing to get something? or how from the infinite abyss of nothing to get existences? *Ex nihilo nihil fit*. How does your potential, which is null, contrive to pass from its potentiality to actuality, from *das reine Sein* indistinguishable from *das Nichtsein*, to *das Wesen*, or existence? Here is a trifling difficulty which I pray you to clear up. To my old-fogy understanding the real, not the possible, is primary, for without the real to reduce the possible to act, it can never become actual, unless you suppose nothing can make itself something.”

“I see, uncle, that you do not fully comprehend our philosophy. You must know that the procession we speak of is logical, not chronological. It is not a progress *ad extra*, but a progress *ad intra*, to use the barbarous expressions of the schoolmen, and takes place irrespective of space and time,”

“It of course must come to that at last, but without affording you any relief. Your philosophers are divided on this point. Cousin and others, who wish to keep, or to have the appearance of keeping, some terms with the religious world, contend that God is being only in that he is substance, and substance only in that he is cause, and cause only in that he actually causes something *ad extra*, since a cause that does not cause is a dead cause, and as good as no cause

at all; hence that God can be conceived as real God only inasmuch as he produces or creates *ad extra*; therefore that he is a necessary, not a free cause, or free only *a coactione*, from external violence or compulsion, but not from intrinsic necessity;—which denies creation proper, substitutes emanation for creation, and resolves itself at last into sheer pantheism. Hegel adopts rather the view you take, and supposes the whole process to take place, so to speak, within the bosom of universal being itself. Hence he recognized no creation, no procession *ad extra*, and, while asserting universal progress, remained a stanch conservative, in which respect he is followed by the Hegelians of the Right. Others, however, not satisfied with this, regard the procession or progression as *ad extra*, and as a real growth or actualization of being in space and time. These are the Hegelingens, or Hegelians of the Left, as are the mass of the German radicals. These are real atheists, for they recognize as anterior to existences, either logically or chronologically, only possible being, which, regarded in itself, and not as the power or ability of the real, is a nullity.

“The Hegelians of the Right, with whom I am surprised to find you classing yourself, give us only an analysis of being, and really confine themselves to what you have rightly called a logical procession, or a procession *ad intra*. The relations they recognize are all within, and in their view somewhat analogous to the three persons who are asserted in the Godhead without prejudice to the unity of the divine essence. Their analysis of being gives them a trinity; pure being, *das reine Sein*, which is merely possible being; the ideal, or idea; and real or actual existence, *das Wesen*. These three comprehend or constitute a perfect whole, complete, self-existing, and self-sustaining. But these are all in the one whole, and do not break its essential unity or oneness. Hence for them there is no creation, no exterior manifestation, no external universe, and all turns in the bosom of τὸ ‘έν, and hence they assert the identity of thought and being, and resolve the universe into a system of pure logic.

“If you go with these, you must abandon all notion of progress. Cease to trouble your head about reforms, for the whole is, and the whole is the whole, and can be neither the more nor the less so. If you go with the others, you will find yourself reduced to greater straits than the Hebrews in Egypt, who were compelled to make brick without

straw. You must get the real from the possible, without any real to reduce the potential to the actual, that is, something from nothing ; a more hopeless task than that of those celebrated philosophers of Laputa, who were engaged in attempting to extract sunbeams from cucumbers."

"I have no answer to a sneer."

"I am glad, Dick, that you have the grace not to attempt to defend what your own good sense must tell you is indefensible."

CONVERSATION VII.

"But, after all, uncle, you really deny all progress, and contend that the moderns have only retrograded."

"My dear Dick, always mind the categories, and get clear, distinct, and precise ideas. Progress, in the sense you asserted it in our last conversation, I of course deny, because in that sense it is impossible. I deny also the whole philosophical system which you present me as its basis, because that system is composed of abstractions and hard words, and is as baseless as the fabric of a vision. In the sense of a progress of being, growth, enlargement of the quantity of being of any particular individual or species, I deny progress; but a progress in attaining to the end for which we were made, I do not deny. I admit, and in my feeble way labor to make progress, where progress is conceivable, and by such means as are adapted to effect it. If, instead of studying to be profound, you would study to be simple, and would labor to clear up and simplify your own conceptions, there would be less difference between us than you suppose. You have never clearly and distinctly apprehended, and you do not so apprehend, what it is you mean by progress. Sometimes it is a progress in knowledge, sometimes in the physical sciences, sometimes in ideas, theories, systems, sometimes in virtue, sometimes in the quantity of nature, or the species, and sometimes simply in the monuments of the race. Now it is simply progress in achieving our destiny, in attaining to the end for which we have been created, and now it is a growth and enlargement of our substantive being itself. All these meanings are thrown together in glorious confusion, and lie fermenting in your morbid intellect, and produce a very disagreeable mental flatulence. Take a dose of ipecac and jalap, clear out your stomach and bowels, and be careful of your diet henceforth, put yourself upon regimen, and take plenty of

exercise in the open air, and you may hope to recover and maintain your health. But go near no quack, take no patent nostrum, and hold in horror all the boasted panaceas trumpeted forth in flaming advertisements.

"Let us understand ourselves. There are in the universe, in the cosmos, to speak in the manner of the ancients, two cycles, that of the procession of existences by way of creation from God as their first cause, and their return, without absorption, to him as their last end or final cause. In the procession from God the creature is not active, performs no part, and there is no activity but that of God, who by a free act of his omnipotent will, operating according to the ideas of his own infinite and eternal reason, produces the creature from non-existence and causes it to exist. All creatures in this procession from God, in the very fact of their creation, receive a specific and determinate nature, which is fixed and unalterable as long as they exist at all. A progress in their nature would be a progress in creation; and a progress here by the creature's own activity would imply that he has a self-creative power, and has lot and part in creating himself, which is impossible and absurd, for what is not cannot act. In the first cycle, then, there is and can be no progress as effected by the creature.

"Progress, then, must be restricted to the second cosmic cycle, the return of existences or creatures to God, without being absorbed in him, as oriental pantheism teaches, or in gaining or attaining to their ultimate end, or realization of their supreme good. Here and here only is the sphere of human progress, and here progress is not in the growth or enlargement of the human being, but in fulfilling the end, or gaining the end for which the human being exists. Progress is physically motion forwards, and morally it is going towards our end, or approaching it, more or less nearly."

"But, though that is all very clear and precise, it does not satisfy me; for the very end for which we exist is progress. Hence it is that the way is more than the end, the acquiring more than the possessing. The gaining of an end never satisfies, and there are few things that we can gain that are not spurned as soon as gained."

"I understand that. It is so because the ends you refer to are not the last end, and the things gained are not the soul's supreme good, and no more satisfy the soul in its craving for beatitude, than a secondary cause satisfies the intellect in seeking to get at the origin of things. But

progress cannot itself be the end, the supreme good, because progress consists precisely in approaching it. Hence St. Thomas refutes the notion of illimitable or endless progress, by saying, If there is no end, progress is inconceivable ; if there is an end, progress cannot be illimitable, for it must cease when the end is reached. To say there is an end, and yet that it is not attainable, is simply a contradiction in terms. So all your fine rhetoric about the way being more than the end, the acquisition more than the possession, you may abandon to the use of those unenviable spirits who are always learning, and never able to come to the knowledge of the truth, always seeking rest, and never finding it.

"Now to be able to judge whether this or that is really progress, you must first settle the question what is the end to be gained. See how philosophic is that child's catechism, into which I presume you have never looked :—

"'Q. Who made you ?

"'A. God.

"'Q. Why did he make you ?

"'A. That I might know him, love him, and serve him in this life, and be happy for ever with him in the next.'

"Here in the outset you find answered those great questions which torment the whole non-Catholic world ;—whence came we ? why are we here ? whither do we go ?—the origin, purpose, and end of our existence. The first and final cause of our existence is determined in the beginning, and then comes the purpose of our existence, and after that the way or means by which that purpose is to be accomplished. Nothing can be more scientific. Having settled the sphere of progress, having settled the end toward which we are to make progress, we can understand what is or is not progress, and what are or are not the means by which it is to be effected."

"I assent to this view, and say that progress is towards an end, and the end for which man exists, whatever that end be."

"That end you must, then, concede to be attainable, for if the distance between your starting-point and the goal can be shortened, and you advance nearer to it, it can be ultimately reached, if the progress continues ; but if the distance cannot be shortened, there is and can be no progress, for where there is no nearing the goal, there is no progress towards it. Illimitable or everlasting progress is, then, an

absurd conception, and all progress contemplates an end in which there is rest, perfect repose, or the quiet and undisturbed possession of beatitude. They who deny such beatitude deny progress, and they who know not where it is to be found, and are ignorant of the means by which it is to be reached, cannot know what is progress, or whether they are going forwards or backwards, nearing the goal or receding from it."

"I will not at this moment object to what you say, but I suspect you intend to draw from it some conclusions that I am unwilling to accept."

"I have no wish to entrap you into concessions against your will, even if I were able. I leave the point then for your meditation. You have charged me with denying all progress. I have shown you that I do not; that I admit it where only it is possible, in the discharge of our duty, and fulfilling the purpose of our existence."

"But you do not admit any progress in ideas, any progress of society, or general advance of civilization."

"I do not know how you have come to that conclusion. I may not admit that all things which you call progress are progress. I do not believe, with you, that man commenced his career on this globe as an infant, and that the lowest savage state was the primitive state of mankind. I do not believe man was originally a mere gas, an oyster, a polliwog, or even a monkey. I do not believe that he was as weak, as helpless, as ignorant, as the new-born babe, and is and possesses only what has been acquired by his development and own activity. Such a doctrine is absurd, both unphilosophical and unhistorical. Go, study the savage, and you will find in him the marks, not of the primitive, the original man, but of fallen and deteriorated man, cut off from the moral and intellectual life of his race. I have no confidence in your modern science, which begins by analysis, and in studying man takes him not in that in which consists his manhood, but in that which he has in common with the lowest order of existence known, which analyzes his body before his soul, his physical and chemical affections before studying his mental and moral affections, and ends by placing him at the head of the order of mammalia. Man's body may be fed by the bodies below him, but it was formed originally as a whole, and at once. His mind was created with his soul, and not made up by successive conquests from the world around him. The true scientific way of studying

man is, to take him in his perfection as man, and to begin with his humanity; and first in his relation to his Maker, afterwards in his relation to his fellow-men, and last of all, in his relations to nature, animate and inanimate. True science begins with the essential, not with the accidental, and man's essential nature is in his peculiarly human nature. That is the substratum, on which all else is superinduced. Modern science makes the essential nature of man consist in that which is common to him and all existences, and therefore whatever is peculiar to him simply accidental. It therefore can never attain to a true conception of man.

"I believe, when God made man and placed him in the garden, he made him a full-grown man, so to speak, in the full perfection of body and soul, and infused into him language and all the knowledge necessary for his being and well-being as man, in the state in which he was intended to live. He has never had to invent language, or to manufacture intellectual ideas from simple sensible impressions. I do not think Helvetius, who contends that all the difference between him and a horse is that he has hands terminating in flexible fingers, whereas the horse has only hoofs, is to be regarded as a very profound philosopher, any more than is the excellent Cabanis, who defines man to be 'a digestive tube, open at both ends.' In the sense of progress analogous to that from infancy to manhood, I recognize no progress in the race, and none in the sense of progress from the savage state to the civilized. There is no instance known of spontaneous civilization. The most striking characteristic of the savage is the absence of all progress, and of all progressive tendency. Whatever progress is historically verifiable is always a progress in, not to or towards, civilization."

"But the civilized state could not have been the original, unless you suppose that God built a city as well as planted a garden for man's reception."

"If you insist on taking the word *civilization* in its strict etymological sense, I concede that the race did not commence in civilization. People undoubtedly led a pastoral and agricultural life before they dwelt in cities, and the rural system is older than the urban. But it does not follow from this, that the moral and intellectual principles and ideas which constitute the essential elements of what we call civilization were not known and observed from the beginning. Nor is it certain that the adoption of the urban system marks

a progress. The first man we hear of who built a city was Cain, the murderer of his brother; and the next was Nimrod, the mighty hunter, a man of violence, a tyrant, an oppressor, who led the people astray from the patriarchal religion. The Holy Scriptures do not seem to regard the founders of cities with a favorable eye, and we know that, if great cities contain much good, they contain also much evil, and are sources of corruption.

"But let that pass. Certain it is that there is no progress outside of what are called civilized nations. That in these nations there is often a relative progress, and often both relative and positive decline, I do not deny. In what you call civilization, that is, in material civilization, in material splendor, wealth, political organization, and power, in what pertains exclusively to the natural order, I doubt, as you often hear me say, if any modern nation surpasses, or even equals, some of the more renowned nations of antiquity. But, taking our point of departure in Europe in the beginning of the sixth century, there has, no doubt, been a progress, and the European nations in the nineteenth century, in a good as well as a bad sense, are far more highly civilized than were the barbarians who planted themselves on the ruins of the Roman empire, although religion, politics, jurisprudence, morals, the whole moral and spiritual part of civilization, were as well understood then as now, though not by the many, yet by the few.

"There is another sense, also, in which I admit a progress from the mediæval ages to the modern social and political system. I am no blind admirer of what is called the feudal system, yet I think it superior either to modern centralized monarchy, or to modern centralized democracy; and though I certainly would not labor to restore it, I may perhaps be permitted to regret that it was not preserved. But when one change is introduced, another becomes necessary, and the introduction of that second change relatively to the end contemplated by the first is a progress. Thus the measures which have been taken to centralize government, to introduce unity and harmony into legislation and the several branches of administration, are in this same sense to be regarded as progressive measures. In this sense most modern governments have made considerable progress, and are still advancing. Human institutions, owing to the vicissitudes of time and circumstances, grow old, cease after a while to be in harmony with the new state of things which comes

up, and what was wise and salutary in its origin finally becomes unwise and injurious. To cast off such institutions, and introduce new ones in harmony with the new wants, is relatively a progress, although the new wants themselves may mark a decline rather than a progress of society. For instance, when you introduced virtual universal suffrage and eligibility, it was necessary to abolish primogeniture and entail, and render the transfer of real estate simple and easy. When you had removed all moral checks from the feudal lords, it was necessary to subject them to the law, and to deprive them of their civil and criminal jurisdiction over their vassals, and to abolish the old baronial courts and dungeons. When crime had multiplied a thousand-fold, and imprisonment was considered rather as a penitentiary discipline than a punishment, it became necessary to multiply prisons, and to pay more attention in their construction to the health and comforts of the inmates. Prisons are now a sort of hospitals for morally diseased patients, and since society regards those inmates as patients rather than criminals, it is a progress, no doubt, to treat them as such. Still society may not, upon the whole, be in a better condition when it builds prison-hospitals than it was when, instead of them, it built churches and monasteries.

"In the fifteenth century men turned their attention with new ardor to the conquest, possession, and enjoyment of the good things of this world. Assuming that end as the end to be gained, several European nations have since then made very great progress. Physical conveniences and comforts have been much multiplied, and certainly luxuries have been placed within the reach, so far as these nations are themselves concerned, of a much larger number. But even in this respect, striking out the gain which has been effected by the discovery and colonization of the New World and the South Pacific Islands, it may be a question whether England, for instance, has gained so much as the nations which she has victimized have lost. In this sense, the creation of large industries, the extension of commerce, the construction of roads and canals, the introduction of railroads and steamships, labor-saving machinery, and the lightning telegraph, may be regarded as so many giant strides in the onward march of the civilized world. But under all this lies the question, whether the mass of the people are really better off, whether they find it easier to supply their physical wants than they did four hundred

years ago, whether they are really happier and more contented. And under this lies another question, whether in a moral point of view, that is, in the real business of life, gaining the end for which they were created, they have really made any advance. This, after all, is the main question, and here the difference, I apprehend, if difference there is, is not in favor of the present."

"But you make no account of the progress of ideas, in the understanding and vindication of human rights."

"Certainly not, any more than I do of the varying fashions in dress, for the most excellent reason, that in these respects, though there have been changes, I am not aware that there has been any progress. There is a vast amount of shallow and disgusting cant in the community, in books, periodicals, newspapers, and conversation, on this subject. It seems to be taken for granted that all changes are improvements. Everywhere we are boasting of progress, everywhere applauding ourselves for the new and important conquests we are daily obtaining over nature, and we look with pity and contempt upon all who lived before us. And this is not confined to non-Catholics. These boasts are caught up and published by Catholic journals, as well as by others. I read in a Catholic paper, the other day, a selected item, intended to show how scarce books must have been, and therefore how deep the ignorance, in the middle ages, by stating the enormous price which was paid in a certain instance for a single book. It never occurred to the editor, or may be the Protestant foreman in his office, that the case mentioned was an extraordinary one, and says nothing of the ordinary price of books at the time, or that even higher prices have been paid in our own day for a particular edition of a work to which bibliomaniacs attach a factitious value. A thousand guineas have been paid in our times for a single copy of an edition of a work which in another edition may be bought for a few shillings any day in the market. People generally accept without inquiry statements which accord with their convictions or prejudices, and are sceptical only with regard to those which do not so accord.

"In consequence of the general prejudice, very easily accounted for, or the prevailing impression, that there has been a mighty progress in these late centuries, youth take it for granted that it is so, and even men of some learning and pretension take no pains to examine whether it be so or not. We always accept what is popular, unless we have

strong reasons for rejecting it, and those reasons we do not seek, and we remain ignorant of them unless they force themselves upon our notice. From Erasmus to the Schlegels it was customary to speak of the middle ages as barbarous, and to laud to the skies ancient Greece and Rome. Catholics blushed at their own antiquity, and pusillanimously gave it up, or humbly apologized for it, in all except pure dogma, as indefensible, or as chargeable to the times or the opinions of the age. They grew ashamed of their old Gothic cathedrals, and Gothic architecture in general. They could not abide the popular literature which had charmed their ancestors, and conceded all but dogma to the proud, arrogant, but equally superficial and less erudite, Protestant. Now you know this has all changed, and in the higher literary circles we have no longer to defend or to apologize for the middle ages, but to moderate the excessive admiration of them. Mediæval art has become the fashion, and its obvious defects, even its monstrosities, are servilely copied and praised as exquisite beauties. Even traces of heathenism are detected in Raphael, and the most flourishing period of Italian art is looked upon as the commencement of a decline, while we go into ecstasies over the lean and pale creations of the school of Overbeck.

"We change our ideas as we do the fashion of our coats or our hats, and all that is according to the reigning fashion is judged beautiful and *comme il faut*. Six years ago, it was hardly safe for a man in France not to profess democracy, or at least republicanism. Even the present emperor was a republican, a democrat, almost a socialist. The most eminent prelates accepted the republic, and a very considerable school among the clergy preached the identity of Christianity and democracy, and seemed bent upon erecting democracy into a dogma of faith. Now no democratic voice can be heard in France; democracy is no longer to-day a Parisian *mode*, and one of the greatest and best men in the empire, the greatest living glory of France, is subjected to a vexatious prosecution, if nothing more, for a private letter to a neighbor, in which he expresses his firm dislike of a political *régime* that offers no guaranty for any sort of liberty, and which was maliciously published without his knowledge or consent. Thousands who abhor Russia because her government is an autocracy, admire Louis Napoleon, who is equally an autocrat, and pray for his success in sustaining the Grand Turk, the most godless

despot on earth, and whose government is, and has been for four hundred years, a blighting curse on the fairest regions of the globe, and, till its power was broken by Russian bravery and perseverance, remained a formidable enemy to Christian Europe. When I was a young man, the name *democrat* was a reproach in the United States, repelled with scorn and indignation by our most liberal politicians; but it is now a term of honor, a passport to popular favor, and whoever would be elected to office must profess to be a democrat, although he despises democracy in his heart, and is a thorough-going aristocrat in its worst sense in his practice.

"The rights of man were as well understood, as clearly and as accurately defined, as well as the nature, office, and sphere of authority, by the great mediæval doctors, as they have been in our day and country. You fancy the church favors monarchy. You have but to study the acts and monuments of the greatest pontiffs who have sat in the chair of Peter to know better. You hold the memory of Gregory VII. in horror, and yet he suffered and died in exile, because he opposed temporal princes in their tyranny, and dared raise his voice and use his authority in behalf of the wronged and oppressed. He told kings and princes of his time, that their power originated in violence, in successful robbery, and came from hell, not heaven; and yet you democrats, echoing the wrath of kings and their courtiers, declaim against him, and curse his memory. You speak of the progress of liberty. Confine your remarks to Europe, and the progress of liberty for four hundred years has been only a progress backwards. In no European country has it advanced. In England, the freest nation in Europe, there is not so large a liberty, and there is not so mild and humane a system of laws, as prior to the Norman conquest. In the northern nations, the ancient Scandinavia, the old estates have been suppressed, and the guarantees of the liberty of the subject have been swept away. The free institutions of Spain, far more republican in the beginning of the fifteenth century than those of England to-day, have nearly all successively disappeared. Richelieu, Mazarin, Louis XIV., the revolution, and the Bonapartes have succeeded in degrading France from a free, constitutional state to an unlimited monarchy, where all depends on the will or caprice of a single man. In Italy and Germany the old free institutions, operating as so many guaranties

of the rights of the subject, have nearly all disappeared, as they have in Russia, while Poland has been struck from the list of nations. Do not then mock me with your senseless babble about the progress of liberty. I would to God I could see some signs of such progress."

" You forget that the republican movement in 1848 in France had no more unrelenting opponent than yourself."

" I forget nothing of the sort. I urged on my friends in France the importance of sustaining the republic, and never have you or any one else heard one word from me in favor of the change from the republic to the empire. In no instance was it republicanism that I opposed. What I opposed was revolutionism, socialism, anarchy, infidelity, and irreligion. I opposed your party, not because you were in favor of republican institutions, or because you were the party of liberty, but because your movement, if successful, would have led to anarchy and barbarism; if unsuccessful, would result, as we see it has resulted, in strengthening the hands of the sovereigns, and rendering their power more absolute. In your wild dreams, or in the whirlwind of your revolutionary madness, you forgot the necessities of European societies, and the indispensable conditions of good government."

" At any rate, you forget our own country. Can you deny that there has been here a gain for liberty?"

" As the result of national progress, I deny it, for the liberty we enjoy has not been obtained by a development and growth of anterior institutions, nor by political and social changes in our own original constitution. Understand me well. I deny not the liberty of my country as a fact, I deny it only as the result of progress. We were free from the beginning, and we have at best only maintained our freedom. Tyranny never flourished on our soil, and when a transatlantic power undertook to plant it here, we, though but a handful, flew to arms, and heroically and successfully resisted, as I trust in God we always shall resist. I do not believe a tithe of what you and your party say against the European governments, but I do not like those governments any better than you do, and if I could see any honest and practicable way of enlarging the freedom or lessening the burdens of the European populations, without causing them a greater evil than that which they now suffer, I would willingly sacrifice my life for them. But in our country, there is no question of conquering liberty, or of introducing

it; for liberty is here, as large a liberty, so far as the constitution and laws are concerned, as is compatible with the existence of necessary and wholesome authority. The question here is not as to introducing liberty, but as to preserving it. Understand this, and you will understand my position, and that it is any thing but hostile to liberty or the institutions of my country, which I love and honor far more than you do."

CONVERSATION VIII.

"But how am I to reconcile what you said, my dear uncle, in our last conversation, with your violent tirades against the democracy of the country."

"My dear Dick, it is one of the most difficult things in the world to make a despot understand how we can oppose despotism without opposing authority, or a democrat understand how we can oppose democracy without opposing liberty. There are three simple forms of government, monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy. Each of these forms, once adopted, tends to become exclusive, and each, when exclusive, is despotic, as Mr. Calhoun, our greatest American statesman, used so often to assert, and despotism, whether of the one, of the few, or of the many, is alike hostile to true liberty. In common with all the great authorities on the question, I regard good government, civil government I mean, as a matter of compromise between these three simple original forms; and the wisdom of a civil constitution consists in their nice adjustment, in so balancing one by another as not to embarrass the efficiency of the administration, but yet so as to secure an effective guaranty of the just freedom of the subject. Here I stand on true American ground, and in accordance with the men who won our national independence, and originally framed our several constitutions. Looking at our civil and political institutions in the light of their original character and intent, they seem to me the wisest and best that humanity can expect, and hence it becomes the religious duty of every American to preserve these institutions intact in that original character and intent.

"But I see, or seem to see, a strong and apparently overwhelming tendency in the country, among politicians especially, to render the democratic element exclusive, and to convert the government of the country into a pure democracy, which would, if we had powerful neighbors to con-

tend with, very soon resolve itself into a pure military despotism. Every thing tends to strengthen this tendency. Demagogues and parties appeal to it, the press encourages it, and it is more than any man's political reputation is worth to oppose it. He might as well attempt, by rushing before it, to arrest the railroad-engine going at full speed. Here I think I see a most grave peril for our republic.

"I have done something to admonish my Catholic brethren of this peril, and the great body of them are now on their guard against it, and prepared to sacrifice their lives to preserve American institutions. When you consider their numbers, every day increasing, as also their growing intelligence, wealth, and moral weight, you might see that, if united with the more sober and conservative portion of non-Catholics, they would be able to do much to check this dangerous tendency, and prevent you radicals from ruining the noble institutions of the country. Liberty is never preserved but at the price of eternal vigilance, and what I have wished to impress upon my countrymen is, that the danger to our liberty does not come from the side of conservatism, but from that of radicalism. But, unhappily, it is precisely here that they do not, and will not, understand me. Because I oppose radicalism, they insist that I oppose liberty, and am hostile to the institutions of my country. I would not mind this on my own account, but it prevents my warnings from being heard or heeded, and therefore I regret it.

"This is not all. While I and my friends are doing all in our power to enlist the whole Catholic body on the side of our institutions, and thus bring to them a most powerful support, the non-Catholic portion of my countrymen, even the conservative as well as the radical, sympathize only with the small party of nominal Catholics who are governed by decided radical and revolutionary tendencies, and suffer the most uncalled for and cruel movement to go on against us, as if we were enemies to the government, and ought not to be suffered to live in the country. You know that it is against Catholics who agree with me in these matters that the blows are aimed, while they whose declamations, rant, and imprudent conduct provoke the hostility to Catholics, especially to foreigners, are protected and promoted by the Protestant sentiment of the country. This, as Fouché would say, is worse than a crime, it is a blunder."

"You mistake the reason of this, uncle. You know that

we Protestants are perfectly liberal in our views to all religions, in so far as they relate only to the world to come. There is only one point in Catholicity that we care the snap of our finger about. You may believe all Catholic dogmas, and observe all Catholic practices, and be never the worse in our eyes, if you will only not be papists. If you choose to call the pope the head of your church, we care not, if you will only be satisfied with allowing him a primacy of order and honor, and not claim for him a real and effective power over the civil and political conduct of Catholics. These nominal Catholics, as you call them, engage our sympathy because we see that they are independent, men who dare think and act for themselves, according to the honest convictions of their own minds, without asking the pope's leave, and therefore we know that they will never desert or turn against the country at his order. They are not papists, and therefore are, in our estimation, as good as Protestants. But you and the main body of American Catholics are downright papists, and hold the pope to be the vicegerent of God on earth. You are bound hand and foot, soul and body, to the pope, and believe it your duty to obey his orders in preference to all others, even those of your country. We can tolerate Catholics who are not papists, but not you. You are the more consistent Catholics, perhaps, but therefore only the more dangerous. But it is not on account of your religion as it regards another world that we oppose you, and organize parties and associations against you, but on account of your political subjection to a foreign prince."

"The old story, inherited from English ancestors in the time of 'good Queen Bess,' and you really believe it, I suppose?"

"Believe it! why, as for myself, I cannot precisely say that I do; but rely upon it, that no small portion of our countrymen believe it, and you can never get them to believe otherwise."

"Do you place, then, no confidence in what your good friends, the Gallicans, tell you? They, you know, say the pope has no authority over temporals, and they tell you, in a bold and defiant tone, that in politics they recognize no spiritual authority, and that, were the pope to require of them to do any thing against their country, that is, what they think would be against their country, they would be the first to bind on their knapsack and shoulder their mus-

ket, and rush to the battle-field to resist him ? Place you no reliance on their hypothetical abuse of the pope ? And have their reiterated and most solemn declarations done nothing to reassure you ? ”

“ Pshaw ! you know that we are not to be come over with that sort of palaver. Cannot we read history, and do we not know that popes have claimed authority over kings and princes, and that, as good papists, you must obey the pope ? ”

“ I know, my dear Dick, that there has seldom been a time, when there was a call for them, that plenty of nominal Catholics have not been found to act as these say they would ; and that, I think, might give you some assurance, even if you place no reliance on their professions and declarations.”

“ But you consider they have done so only at the expense of their duty as Catholics.”

“ Well, my patriotic nephew, I trust that you do not doubt that I am a thorough-going papist. Now I tell you that between my duty as a papist and my duty as a patriot, there is and can be no conflict. I owe no duties to my country but such as are prescribed by the law of God ; and the only authority the pope has over me as a citizen is his authority as the spiritual guardian and judge of that law as binding on my conscience. He, at the very lowest, I think, is as likely to interpret and apply that law justly, as is Franklin Pierce, or Chief Justice Taney, or as I should be by my own private judgment. My political sovereign has no right to demand my obedience to any order contrary to the law of God, and he has not been constituted my judge to interpret authoritatively that law for me, or for any one else. He is not my ghostly father, nor my spiritual director. Said not our Puritan ancestors as much when they dissented from the English church as by law established ? Said not the founders of the Free Kirk of Scotland the same thing, when they refused to acknowledge the authority of the queen and parliament in spirituals ? My political sovereign is not the director of my conscience. My conscience is accountable to no civil tribunal ; it is accountable to God alone, and is accountable to the pope even in spiritual matters only as he is the divinely commissioned guardian and administrator of the law of God. If he tells me that he simply as a man, or as a temporal prince, since I am not under his temporal jurisdiction, wishes me to do this or that, I am free to refuse. If, however, he tells me as pope, speaking officially

as judge of the law of God, that it commands me to do this, or forbids me to do that, then indeed, but only then, am I bound to obedience. Hence it is clear that his so much dreaded authority extends only to the morality, the right or the wrong, of acts in the temporal order."

"But you forget that that is precisely what we object to, If the pope tells you such a measure, the Nebraska Bill, for instance, is wrong; then you must oppose it."

"The pope can tell me that it is wrong only in case, as it does not happen to be, it is repugnant to the constitution or to the law of God, and if so, I certainly ought to oppose it; for as a good citizen I am bound to oppose whatever is unconstitutional and repugnant to the divine law. Whether, in deciding the question of the constitutionality or morality of a civil measure, I rely on the judgment of the pope or on my own judgment, is no affair of the government, for this decision touches conscience, and neither the government nor my fellow-citizens have, or ought to have, any authority over my conscience. If you had any conception of true liberty, you would understand that here precisely is its foundation. Do you not see, that, in asserting the freedom of conscience, and denying to the civil power all authority over it, all right to interfere with it, and restricting the authority of the state to the sphere within the limits of the divine law, or if you please, the moral law, I am asserting true liberty, and erecting the most formidable dike to civil tyranny?

"You claim to be friends of liberty, especially of civil liberty. Well, know you not that liberty is impossible where the authority of the state, the king, the prince, or sovereign, is absolute and unlimited? Know you not that the only way to secure it is to place an effective check on power, restraining it within a certain sphere, a certain province, and having a sufficient guaranty against its coming out of that sphere or province? Know you not that government tyrannizes over, interferes with, the liberty of the subject only when it transcends its proper sphere, and that, whenever it does so, it transgresses the law of God? Well, then, to secure liberty, some effective power is needed by the subject to protect him in the enjoyment of his rights against the encroachments of authority, and to absolve him from his duty of obedience whenever authority commands him to do that which is morally wrong? But the individual is not in himself

strong enough to find this in his own personal convictions of right and wrong. The state can overwhelm him, crush him, if he resists its orders, however unjust and oppressive. What, then, is the effect of this dreaded papal power? Why, it simply adds the combined strength of the church to the individual, to protect him in his rights, and to keep the state within its legitimate sphere. As a friend of freedom, you should, then, support, instead of opposing it.

"The truth is, my dear Dick, that you and your friends know not what you do. You are in contradiction with yourselves. You profess to speak in the name of liberty; you are moving heaven and earth to extend the area of freedom, and to secure to man the free and full enjoyment of his rights, in face of government and society. But, on the other hand, you rake up all the objections of corrupt and tyrannical courts against the church, and, following in the footsteps of the most lustful, cruel, and tyrannical kings of Christendom, labor to establish the absolute and unlimited authority of the state, which is the grave of all real freedom. You build up with one hand what you pull down with the other; assert freedom, and take away its indispensable conditions; struggle for it, and insist on opening the way to absolute civil despotism. This is worse than madness."

"All this is very plausible in theory, but how is it in practice? If the church is the guardian and protector of liberty, how happens it that we find her everywhere leagued with tyrants, and upholding despotism?"

"Be sure of your facts before proceeding to their explication. I deny your supposition. You nowhere find the church leagued with tyrants and upholding despotism. The church has never accepted the doctrine of your friends the Gallicans, nor is she to be held responsible for the political doctrines of Bossuet, who so often unhappily sunk the Catholic bishop in the French courtier. Was the church leagued with tyrants when she thundered her anathemas against the cruel, bloodthirsty, and tyrannical iconoclast emperors of Byzantium, when she withstood Henry IV., falsely called emperor, Frederic Barbarossa, Frederic II. of Germany, Louis of Bavaria, Philip Augustus, Philip the Fair, Louis XIV., and Napoleon I., of France, William the Conqueror, Henry II., Edward III., Henry VIII., and Elizabeth, of England,—ingrained tyrants all?"

"But in modern times she is found on the side of the governments against the people."

On the side of the governments to a certain extent, yes ; against the people, no. Understand, if your wild radicalism, which is only the other side of despotism, has not deprived you entirely of the good sense you inherited from your mother, that two things are equally necessary,—authority and liberty. Authority may degenerate into despotism, and liberty into license. Two things, then, are to be maintained,—liberty and authority ; and two things to be avoided or guarded against,—license and despotism. When authority tends to despotism, the church opposes it, and seeks to restrain it within its legitimate bounds ; when liberty tends to license, it opposes it, and seeks to restrain the people in subjection to just authority. As a matter of fact, the church did not oppose the French revolution because it sought liberty or tended to democracy ; it opposed it not in the beginning, and not at all till it transcended the civil order and invaded the spiritual, and even then only in defence of the inalienable rights of conscience and individual freedom. Its league with the monarchs against the people, imagined by the fanciful apostate De La Mennais, is all in your eye. No such league exists, or ever existed. The truth is, the church, though she submits to all forms of government, and leaves each nation free to establish the form it chooses, is opposed to absolutism in the state, and inclines to an effective constitutional order, and I think she would rather deal with the people than with kings. This much is certain, that, where she has had a predominating voice in the founding of states, she has resisted the introduction of absolutism, and has given the constitution substantially a republican character. It must not be forgotten that Pope Adrian I, introduced and established, through his legates, the noble old constitution of Saxon England, which, though suffering much from the Norman kings, the Tudors, and the Stuarts, to a great extent still survives, and makes the glory of the Anglo-Saxon race in both hemispheres, and what is worthy of note, survives in greater purity and vigor with us Anglo-Americans than in the mother country. A profound study of our institutions and of history would disclose the fact, that, in so far as we have in our political system deviated from other nations, we have only adopted principles that the popes for more than a thousand years labored in vain to induce the European nations to adopt, and, on the other hand, that we have more fully incorporated into our institutions the spirit of the papal recommendations and constitutions than any other nation on the earth."

"How do you account for that, seeing that the country has always been most thoroughly antipapal?"

"By the fact that our institutions originated with the people, whose political common sense had been formed by the papal instructions and teaching for over a thousand years. These instructions were all favorable to the people, to liberty, and to good order, and were generally displeasing to authority, and rejected by it. They sunk into the hearts of the people, and became their doctrine in distinction from the doctrine of the court, and too often of courtly prelates. The liberty we enjoy goes back to old Anglo-Saxon times,—times never really forgotten by the English people. Always, after the Conquest, is it, in the struggle with the Norman rulers, a demand for the revival of the Anglo-Saxon laws, the laws of Edward the Confessor, as they were called, because he was the last of the Anglo-Saxon kings. The memory of these laws, with the great principles asserted by the sovereign pontiffs, survived in the minds and hearts of the English people down to the time when our ancestors emigrated to this western hemisphere, and formed, as it were, their civil and political common sense."

"Why, then, do you not place more confidence in the people?"

"I would, if the people were now what they were then. But the people, during the last seventy years, have been corrupted, and induced to abandon their traditional common sense for a Jacobinical common sense, which supposes the people are the original and immediate source of power, and that their innate wisdom is always to be regarded as the wisdom of God, from which there is no appeal. Yet it is not the people themselves that I distrust. When they are well informed, and not misled by miserable sophists and demagogues, I have great reliance on their good sense, and a very high respect for their decisions. The people at the epoch of our revolution were much more trustworthy than were their rulers, and would be now, if they had not been too much flattered, and made to believe that the work for them to do is to extend popular liberty, instead of preserving it. Having been made, to a fearful extent, to believe that their security is in enlarging the popular basis of our institutions, they have become fit tools for pushing liberty to license, and of substituting the mob for the state, the caucus for the convention."

"And whence hope you a remedy?"

"Through the people themselves, if you will, listening to wiser counsels, and recovering their former good sense. The first thing to be done is to brand with infamy the political atheism so boldly preached by tyrannical courts, and so fiercely and widely propagated by modern revolutionists, and enable the people to understand and feel that they hold their power as a trust, and are as much bound to conform to the law of God in their collective as in their individual capacity. The next thing for them to understand is, that a check on the power of the political sovereign, whether that sovereign be the will of the one, the few, or the many, is absolutely essential alike to good government and to liberty, and therefore that they must abdicate their own fancied omnipotence, and consent to wholesome restraints even on their own power. They must learn that it is an evil to govern too much, as well as to govern too little, and that a broad margin should always be left to the individual. We must have a free government, that is, a government that respects the freedom of the individual, and leaves him, not merely free to do good, but even free to do evil. Where the government extends its supervision over every act of a man's life, and leaves him scope only to do good, it exerts a most pernicious influence ; it strikes a blow at all free and vigorous action, and reduces the whole population to a state of torpor. Under such *paternal* government, all stagnates and becomes putrid, as we see in the despotic East. There is no manliness, no vigor, no heroic activity. We are in all, except in commerce, trade, and industry, fast approaching such a state of things by the tyranny of public and sectarian opinion, and in our attempts at sumptuary legislation. If the legislature does not soon and firmly resist the tendency of our so-called philanthropists to embody their silly crotchets in legislative enactments, our individual freedom and independence before a great while will cease to exist even in name. I want government, strong and efficient government, when needed ; but I want it to intervene as little as is compatible with the peace and good order of society. I am opposed to revolutionism, to radicalism, let it come in what shape it may, but I am equally opposed to cæsarism. When democracy, a free press, and publicity were unduly magnified, I opposed the exaggeration ; but I am not to be driven from my principles now France has become an absolute monarchy, any more than I was when she was deafening the world a few years

ago with her shouts of *Vive la République démocratique et sociale!* I am a constitutionalist, and demand for the body of the nation a real and effective voice in the government, a real and not an illusory check on the administration, a free press responsible for its abuse, publicity, and free discussion of public men and public measures. I know all these may be abused, as there is no good thing that may not be, but I accept them with all their liability to abuse, as essential to the life, progress, and well-being of modern society, especially in my own country."

"But in religion you allow no freedom."

"Just as much as the mathematician allows in his axioms and definitions. In what is purely human in religion, I assert and maintain the same freedom that I demand in politics. In what is purely divine, I freely accept what God reveals, and in what is mixed, I leave the discussion and decision to those whom God has placed over me to be my pastors and teachers. For the church I demand freedom, full, entire freedom; and I am not so young or so foolish as to suppose that her full and entire freedom can be maintained without conceding the full and entire liberty, before the law, of contradiction. Before the state, the sects must be as free as she, and therefore, while I would allow them no special political privileges, I demand none for her. Whatever may be the abstract rights of the church, or whatever may be in other circumstances the duty of the civil power acting under her authority, certain it is that the only practicable rule in most modern states, if not in all, is to concede the liberty of contradiction, and to allow to others the liberty you ask for yourself. Kings are not now nursing fathers, or queens nursing mothers, of religion. The most we can ask of the state, in our country at least, is to let us alone, and not make or administer laws against us. As a Catholic, I am willing to accept this order of things. The church can stand without being propped up by the state. It is the state that needs her, not she that needs the state. We Catholics demand for our religion simply the same facilities that are allowed the sects, and no more. We demand in the name of our right as citizens and inhabitants of the country, the protection of the laws against external violence. We admit the right of the state to arrest us, if, under the pretext of our religion, we become disorderly and disturbers of the public peace, and we demand that it shall arrest those who, under pretext of devotion to their religion, become

the same. We demand even-handed justice. Our rights are equal to the rights of any other class of citizens, and should be held equally inviolable. If we trespass on their rights, punish us ; if they trespass on ours, punish them. But do not, when their crazy and fanatical street preachers, followed by gangs of ruffians, go into the quarters inhabited almost exclusively by poor Catholics, and get up a row, throw all the blame upon these poor Catholics, and arrest only some poor Irish Catholic, who, provoked by the insults offered to his religion and country beyond what flesh and blood can bear, attempts by force to abate the nuisance. If we go to hear your blackguards, let us be held to keep the peace ; but if your blackguards come to us, into our quarters, to cram their nauseous stuff down our throats, and to compel us to hear all that we hold dear and sacred vituperated, reviled, and blasphemed, we maintain that it is your duty to hold them to keep the peace. You have no right to force your Protestantism upon us, as we have none to force our Catholicity upon you. Silence, then, these street preachers, not because they are Protestants, but because they are blackguards and peacebreakers, and do the same by our street preachers of like character, if you ever find us having such. Be just, and you will never hear us complain."

CONVERSATION IX.

"I am far from being as hostile to the Catholic religion as you suppose, my dear uncle ; I am quite willing to tolerate it as explained by Gallicans, for, so explained, it can never interfere with the power or action of the temporal authority. We Protestants have no wish to step in between a man and his God, and we recognize the right of every one to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience. As long as your church confines herself to purely spiritual matters, to preaching her doctrines and administering her sacraments to those who choose to adhere to her communion, as Marsilius of Padua and John of Jandun contended she should, we are required by our doctrine of religious liberty to tolerate her ; but not when she claims to be a government, a kingdom set up on the earth, superior to the temporal power, and to have authority, even indirect, over the whole temporal order. She thus becomes political as well as religious, and her existence is incompatible with the

distinct existence and the autonomy of the state. She then must be regarded either as an *imperium in imperio*, or as being at once, indistinctly, both church and state. She absorbs the temporal in the spiritual, and leaves no state standing. It is not against Catholicity, but against ultramontanism, which pushes the papal power to a sort of universal monarchy, that we make war, and as Gallicans make war also against that, we have no hostility to them, and are naturally drawn into a friendly alliance with them."

"Even Gallicans, my dear Dick, repudiate, or profess to repudiate, the heresy of Marsilius of Padua and John of Jandun, and will not consider themselves honored by the preferences of 'Young America.'"

"You do us less than justice, and are very imprudent. You certainly wish to convert us; but how can you hope to do it without beginning by conciliating us?"

"I certainly wish your conversion to the church, not that of the church to you. I wish to treat you as men, who have the full possession of your natural faculties, and have no wish to begin by giving you sugar-plums, or a dose of chloroform. What I want is, that you should embrace the truth as God has revealed it, and submit yourselves to the authority which he has instituted for your government. I have no wish to aggregate you to the external communion of the church without any change in your present moral dispositions and beliefs or no-beliefs. To profit by the church you must be *of* her communion, not merely *in* it. The real question is, not what will best conciliate non-Catholics, but what is the church which God has instituted, and the truth she teaches? If God has really established his church as a governing as well as a teaching church, with coercive as well as simply directive power, to govern all men and nations in all things pertaining to spiritual and eternal good, the only real end for which, *in hac providentia*, they exist, you must accept her in that character, or otherwise you do not accept her at all.

"Even your Gallican friends, though in my judgment they assert principles which, if logically carried out, would result in the Marsilian heresy, assert, in common with the papists, that the church is a government, a kingdom set up on the earth and clothed with authority to govern all men and nations in all things pertaining to salvation, and they could not be Catholics if they did not. The difference between them and ultramontanes, or, as I prefer to say,

papists, does not consist in the formal assertion by the one and the formal denial by the other, of the church as a kingdom or goverment, but in regard to the relation in which they respectively suppose she stands to the state. The difference may be collected from the charges which they bring each against the other. The Gallican charges the papist with absorbing the state, or making the church herself the state ; the papist charges the Gallican with subordinating, in principal, the spiritual to the temporal, which would lead to the assertion of man as God, or of the two governments as absolutely distinct, separate, and independent in regard to each other, which involves the Manichean dualism."

"But that last charge might be easily repelled. Why might not the Gallican reply, that the one and the same God has established two governments, each independent and supreme in its own order,—the church for the government of *spirituals*, and the state for the government of *temporals*? "

"Because he would thus assert only what the papist himself concedes. The papist even asserts and maintains as strenuously as the Gallican, that God has instituted two distinct governments for human society, each holding all its powers from him, and each independent and supreme in its own order, as Pope Gelasius says in his letter to the Emperor Anastasius. The difference between the Gallican and the papist is not here, and the Gallican, to have something to oppose to the papist, must go further, and assert each government to be independent and supreme in relation to the other, and therefore, either that the state in certain matters has spiritual jurisdiction, which is a manifest denial of the principle he contends for, or else that the temporal is separate from the spiritual and independent of it, which is Manicheism."

"I do not see that. You concede the two governments ; how, then, can you maintain that the assertion of the independence of each involves the Manichean dualism ? "

"I concede, nay, I assert, two distinct governments, each independent and supreme in its own order, but as bearing that relation one to the other which naturally exists between the spiritual and the temporal. The temporal order represented by the state is naturally subordinated to the spiritual order represented by the church. The spiritual stands for the divine, for God the creator, and the temporal for the

creature; and the creature in the very nature of things is and cannot but be subordinated to the creator. As the creature is subordinated to the creator, so must the temporal be subordinated to the spiritual, and therefore the temporal authority to the spiritual authority, or the state to the church. So reasons the papist. Now this the Gallican must either concede or deny. If he concedes it, *and still asserts* the absolute independence and supremacy of the state, he must claim for the state, in itself and independently of the church, the authority to direct temporals to spiritual and eternal good, to which by the law of God they are all to be referred, which is to contradict himself and to claim for the state, *pro tanto* at least, spiritual authority, and to deny the independence and supremacy of the church in all things spiritual. If, on the other hand, he denies the natural subordination of the temporal to the spiritual, he must assert its independence of God. Then he must maintain that it is not God's creature; and then, that it has had another origin than God, and depends on a principle independent of him, therefore on another principle, external and independent, than that on which the spiritual order depends. Therefore there must have been two original, eternal, distinct, and independent principles, which, as I understand it, is precisely the Manichean dualism.

"The Gallican has no tendency to Manicheism in that he simply asserts two distinct orders, one spiritual, the other temporal, or two distinct governments, each independent and supreme in its own order. He so tends only when he asserts their mutual independence in regard to each other, and denies the subordination, not in excellence and dignity alone, but in authority also, of the temporal to the spiritual. What I regard as the error of the Gallican arises from a disregard of the natural relation of the two orders. Temporals are naturally subordinated to the spiritual, as the body to the soul, and are always to be referred to a spiritual end. This is as true under the natural as under the revealed law. In the natural order as well as in the supernatural, God is the final cause, and man is morally bound to refer all his actions to him as to their ultimate end; therefore to an end not temporal, but spiritual. The revealed law does not abrogate the natural law, but presupposes and confirms it. All theologians agree that man is bound by the law of nature to worship God, and even to worship him according to the requirements of a supernaturally revealed law, if God gives

such a law, as soon as it is promulgated and sufficiently made known. God can, unquestionably, establish two powers for the government of human society; but these two powers must have the same relation to one another that is borne by the two orders which they respectively represent.

"The mistake is not in regarding the two orders as distinct, for that they are; but in regarding them as separate, for that they are not. All spirituals in this world have temporal relations, and all temporals have spiritual relations, inasmuch as they are and must be related to a spiritual end. To govern temporals in their relation to this spiritual end is necessarily a spiritual function, and if you claim it for the state, you claim for the state, up to a certain point, spiritual jurisdiction, which all Catholic theologians, so far as I am aware, agree in denying. They are unanimous, I believe, in asserting, that, under the New Law, the state has no spiritual jurisdiction whatever. Either, then, the Gallican must, in violation of the principles he professes to concede, and which as a Catholic he must hold, suffer the temporal government to exercise spiritual functions, or with the papist extend the authority of the church over temporals *in the respect in which they are to be referred to a spiritual end*, or, as theologians say, to spiritual and eternal good."

"But as you say that all temporals have spiritual relations, under your doctrine the power of the church would extend to every thing, and you would claim for her all the functions of government, both spiritual and temporal. She would thus be the only real government of society, would absorb the state and leave it no autonomy. Here is the objection which both Gallicans and we Protestants bring against you, and unless you can show that it is unfounded, you must stand condemned."

"I understand you. The papist, as I have told you, asserts two distinct orders, one spiritual and the other temporal, and two distinct governments, one the church and the other the state, each independent and supreme in its own order, for governing them. Therefore he says, 'Render unto Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's, and unto God the things which are God's.'"

"Wherein, then, do you differ from the Gallicans?"

"In nothing, if they consistently carry out one set of their principles; but when they do not, we differ from them in the respect that, while we assert the independence and supremacy of the state in its own order, we deny its indepen-

dence and supremacy in relation to the spiritual order. In relation to that order, we hold that it is subordinate and dependent."

"But you seem to me now to contradict yourself. After having asserted the independence and supremacy of the state in its own order, now you assert its subordination and dependence in regard to the spiritual order."

"Things are not always what they seem to those who understand them not. I assert that the state is independent and supreme in its own order, by which I mean that in the temporal order, which is its own order, the state has no superior, and holds its power from no other,—the only sense in which any man, not an atheist, can pretend that the state is independent and supreme. The state holds its powers from God, for *non est potestas nisi a Deo*, therefore depends on him, is subject to his law, and of course, in relation to him who is King of kings and Lord of lords, is not independent and supreme. If we would not fall into absolute political atheism, the sense in which we must understand the independence and supremacy of the state is, as Suarez defines it, that it holds from no other and has no superior in its own order, while in relation to another and superior order it is subordinate and dependent. 'Quia vero felicitas temporalis, et civilis ad spiritualem, et æternam referenda est, ideo fieri potest, ut materia ipsa potestatis civilis aliter dirigenda, et gubernanda sit in ordine ad spirituale bonum quam sola civilis ratio postulare videatur. Et tunc quamvis temporalis princeps, ejusque potestas in suis actibus *directe* non pendeat ab alia potestate ejusdem ordinis et quæ eundem finem tantum respiciat, nihilominus fieri potest, ut necesse sit, ipsum dirigi, adjuvari, vel corrigi in sua materia superiori potestate gubernante homines in ordine ad excellentiorem finem, et æternum.'*

"The contradiction you imagine does not exist, because the independence and supremacy of the state denied are not in the same order with the independence and supremacy asserted. Even the authority of the spiritual over the temporal, which I assert, is only *indirect*, and the dependence of the state on the church is not direct, that is, for the sake of temporals as such, or as directed to a subordinate and temporal end, as Suarez says in continuation of the

* *Defensio fidei Catholicae et Apostolicae adversus Anglicanae sectæ errores*. Lib. III, *De Primatu Summi Pontificis*, Cap. V, Tom. xxi, p. 123.

passage I have just cited : ‘*Illa dependentia vocatur indirecta*, quia illa superior potestas circa temporalia *non per se*, aut propter se, sed quasi *indirecte et propter aliud* interdum versatur.’”

“But, my dear uncle, this distinction Gallicans will tell you is of no value. If the spiritual power extends to the government of the whole temporal order, it evidently matters nothing in what respect this is done, or by what name it is called. It is the substantial claim that is important. The title or classification of the power is of no consequence:—

‘A rose

By any other name will smell as sweet.’”

“Not by the name of skunk’s cabbage, I am inclined to believe, Shakespeare to the contrary notwithstanding. But the Gallican, if he goes so far as to say this, forgets his philosophy.”

“That is severe.”

“None too severe, if he should express himself in the sense you suppose. Suarez believes, as we have seen, the distinction very real, and he is as high authority as any Gallican or *quasi* Gallican you can cite. Even you yourself ought to be ashamed to bring forward such an objection, either as your own or another’s. What, indeed, is its assumption? It is, that to assert the plenary authority of the church over temporals in the respect that they are *not* temporals, but spirituals, that is in the respect that they are related to a spiritual end, is identically the same thing as to assert her plenary authority over them in every respect. Authority governing a matter in relation to one end is authority to govern it in relation to every end! The objection itself denies all distinction between the temporal order and the spiritual, for it proceeds on the assumption, that to govern temporals in relation to a spiritual end is the same thing as to govern them in relation to a temporal end, which can be true only on the supposition that the spiritual and the temporal are identical.

“The assertion of the authority of the church over temporals in the respect that they are spiritually related, is simply her authority to direct and govern them as to their morality. No Catholic, unless carried away by the heat of controversy or a mistimed zeal, will pretend that the church has not, under God, plenary authority with regard to the morality of all human actions, whether of states or of individuals.”

viduals. This Pope Innocent III. in his letter to Philip Augustus, king of France, very distinctly asserts. ‘We do not intend,’ he says, ‘to judge of the fee; that belongs to the king of France. But we have the right to judge of the sin, and it is our duty to exercise it against the offender, be he who he may.’ *Non intendimus judicare de feudo, sed decernere de peccato, cuius ad nos pertinet sine dubitatione censura, quam in quemlibet exercere possumus, et debemus.** Here is the distinction I contend for, since the holy pontiff, while he disclaims all intention of judging the temporality, as related to a temporal end, claims it as his right and his duty to judge it in the respect that it is related to a spiritual end.

“But this is perhaps too old an authority. Take, then, a recent authority, a living authority, the illustrious Cardinal Gousset, archbishop of Rheims, a man highly esteemed at Rome, and venerated through all France. He teaches in his *Observations sur le Premier Article de la Déclaration de 1682*, if I understand him, the very doctrine I contend for, and I will ask you to listen to what he says:—

“‘This article begins by laying it down that “St. Peter and his successors, that the church herself, has received power from God only over spiritual things and concerning salvation, and not over things temporal and civil,” and proceeds to prove it by Scripture. But no pope, no Catholic doctor, has ever denied the real distinction between the spiritual power and the temporal, nor their independence in what pertains respectively to their own sphere. The church intervenes in respect to the acts of a government only when those acts are contrary to justice, to morality, or to religion; even then she intervenes only in her quality of interpreter of the divine laws, natural and positive, and as governor or director [*régulatrice*] of what has a relation to conscience, to eternal salvation, and consequently to the spiritual order. It was quite unnecessary to remind us that the *kingdom of Christ* is not of this world, or rather that it *does not come from this world*, for it has for its mission to govern the things of this world only in the order of salvation, *Regnum meum non est de hoc mundo*;—quite unnecessary to remind us, that we are to “render unto Cæsar the things which are Cæsar’s, and to God the things which are God’s”; that “every soul must be submissive to the higher powers;” that “there is no power but from God;” and that “whoso resists the power, resists the ordination of God.” This has never been disputed in the church of Jesus Christ. Assuredly the Christian world had not awaited the Declaration of 1682, drawn up by order

**Apud Suarez., Ibid. Cap. XXIII., p. 172.*

of Louis XIV., to know the sense of the Gospel and the Epistles of St. Paul.

"After having cited the Holy Scriptures, the Assembly adds: "We therefore declare, that kings and sovereigns are subjected by the order of God to no ecclesiastical power in things temporal; that they cannot be deposed, either directly or indirectly, by the authority of the keys of the church, nor their subjects be absolved from their oath of allegiance." This consequence, which does not appear to be deduced from the principles set forth, that is from the distinction between the two powers consecrated by Scripture, consists of two parts. The first is, that "kings and sovereigns are subjected by the order of God to no ecclesiastical authority in things temporal." This proposition taken literally and in all its extent is false and erroneous, and cannot be maintained without falling into the error of the modern innovators, which reduces the power of the church to acts purely spiritual and internal; which destroys entirely her authority. *A Catholic can never admit that they who govern a kingdom or a republic are subject to no ecclesiastical authority in temporals.* In point of fact, the exercise of the civil power is itself only a series of moral actions, and sovereigns may commit offences against morality in those actions which regard the government of the state, as well as in their private actions. Now in *all these actions*, which for the most part have for their object temporal things, they are, if Christians, subjected to the church,—*not by reason of the relation of these actions to temporal well-being, but by reason of their relation to eternal happiness.* [Here is the precise distinction which you ridicule, and sneer at me for making.] What! cannot the church attempt, when she judges it expedient, to arrest by spiritual pains the tyrant who oppresses his people? Who dare make it a crime in St. Ambrose, archbishop of Milan, that he forbade the Emperor Theodosius to enter the church, and subjected him to public penance for the massacre at Thessalonica, which he had ordered? But let us rather acknowledge a defect in the compilation of the article, than ascribe to the bishops of the Assembly of 1682 sentiments which they did not hold. Bossuet, who drew up the declaration, says himself, in the discourse which he pronounced at the opening of the Assembly, *All is subjected to the keys, all, both KINGS and peoples.*

"The second part of the conclusion is, that "kings and sovereigns cannot be deposed, either directly or indirectly, by the keys of the church, nor their subjects absolved from their oath of allegiance." We remark here, that the popes have never pretended to possess as to temporals any other than a spiritual power, and they have used that spiritual power only in favor and on the demand of the people oppressed by the tyranny of their sovereign. Never have they claimed temporal jurisdiction [*un droit réel*] over the temporality of kings, which has so many times been falsely laid to their charge. A pretext for rendering them odious was desired, and this was chosen. "There is no argument," says Fénelon, "by which critics have excited a more violent hatred against

the authority of the Apostolic See, than those which they draw from the bull *Unam Sanctam* of Boniface VIII. They allege that this pope has defined in that bull, that the sovereign pontiff in his quality of universal monarch may give or take away the kingdoms of the earth at his will. But Boniface himself, against whom this accusation is brought on account of his difficulties with Philip the Fair, justifies himself in a discourse before the Consistory, and says: ‘These forty years we have been versed in the laws, and have known that there exist two powers ordained of God. Who then can believe that such a folly, such a madness, ever entered our head?’ The cardinals also, in a letter written from Anagni to the dukes, counts, and nobility of France, justify the pope in these words: ‘We wish you to hold for certain that the sovereign pontiff, our lord, has never written to the said king that he must be subjected to him in the temporal of his kingdom, or that he holds his kingdom from him.’”

“‘ Gerson certainly cannot be accused of exaggerating the rights of the papal power; and yet he has expressed himself in the same sense. Here are his words: “It must not be said that kings and princes hold their lands and heritage from the church, in such sense that the pope has over them a civil and judicial jurisdiction, as some falsely accuse Boniface VIII. of having meant. However, all men, princes and others, are subjected to the pope *in so far as they abuse their jurisdiction, or use their temporalities and their sovereignty against the divine and natural law*, and this superior power of the pope may be called directive and ordinary, rather than civil and judicial,—*et potest superioritas illa nominari potestas directiva et ordinativa potius quam civilis et juridica.*”*

“‘ Indeed, as Fénelon again says, “It was a received principle among Catholic nations, and profoundly engraved in their hearts, that the supreme power could be confided only to a Catholic, and that it was a law, or condition of the (tacit) compact between the people and their prince, that they were bound to obey him only inasmuch as he should himself obey the Catholic religion. In virtue of this law, all thought that the nation was absolved from its oath of fidelity, when in contempt of this fact the prince turned against religion.” Yet, lest they might be misled by an illusion, and wishing, besides, to avoid the horrors of civil war, they recurred to the pope,—the legitimate interpreter of the oath, which is a religious act, and of all pacts considered in their relations to morality and conscience. “Thus,” adds the immortal archbishop of Cambray, “the church does not deprive or institute lay princes; she simply responds to the people who consult her on a matter which by reason of the oath and the compact touches conscience,” *Itaque Ecclesia neque destituebat neque instituebat laicos principes, sed tantum consulentibus gentibus respondebat quid ratione contractus et sacramenti conscientiam attineret;* adducing afterwards the example of the first general council

* *Sermo de Pace et Unione Græcorum*, Consid. V.

of Lyons, in regard to these words of Innocent IV., who declared the Emperor Frederic II. had forfeited the empire : “ *We declare that all those who were bound to him by the oath of fidelity,* ” &c. The same eminent prelate remarks, that it is as if the pontiff had said, “ We declare the emperor, on account of his crimes and impiety, unworthy to govern a Catholic people.” This is in fact what this pontiff did say himself:—*Propter suas iniquitates a Deo ne regnet vel imperet est abjectus; suis ligatum peccatis et abjectum, omnique honore vel dignitate privatum a Domino ostendimus, denuntiamus, ac nihilominus sententiando pronuntiamus.*

“ ‘ In fine, the first of the Four Articles terminates by the declaration, that the doctrine which it expresses “ is necessary to the public tranquillity, and not less advantageous to the church than to the state ; and that it ought to be inviolably followed as conformed to the Word of God, the tradition of the holy fathers, and the example of the saints.” Aside from the anathema from which the assembly should have abstained, it is impossible to condemn, in a manner more express, not merely the opinion of the doctors who do not happen to think with the authors of the declaration, but also the acts of the popes and councils who have believed that subjects may be released from their oath of allegiance to princes when they abuse their power, or when the common good of a nation imperatively demands a change of dynasty or of government.

“ ‘ It is said that the doctrine contained in the first article is necessary to the public tranquillity and the good of the state; but of two things, one: either the supreme power once acquired is inadmissible, or it is not. The former hypothesis, although maintained by some Gallican authors, is evidently untenable ; it is anti-social, absurd, revolting ; no, we can never admit that a prince, whoever he may be, may use or abuse the lives and property of his subjects with impunity. In the latter case, who is to pronounce on the differences which may arise between the people and the depositaries of power? Force, you say. But what is there not to fear from the prince, or from the people, when either reigns only in the name of the law of the strongest? As it regards kings, can they seriously believe their crowns in danger, because the vicar of Jesus Christ recalls them to their duties and to their oaths? There is no middle course. It is necessary, either that they be absolutely independent in the exercise of their power, which can be asserted, after God, only of the church, because she, and she only, has the promises of God himself; or, renouncing the intervention of the spiritual power, that they depend on their subjects. But, in this latter case, what is to be expected? Bossuet, who drew up the article in question, shall answer. “ It is clearer than the light of day,” says he, “ that, if it is necessary to compare the two opinions, that which subjects temporal sovereigns to the pope (in the sense we have just explained it), and that which subjects their power to the people, in whom predominate passion, caprice, ignorance, and wrath, the latter would be unquestionably the most to be deprecated. Experience has shown this in our own age, which has offered us among

those who have abandoned their sovereigns to the caprices of the multitude more and more tragical examples against the persons of kings, than can be found during six or seven hundred years among the nations who on this point have recognized the authority of Rome." We cite this passage from Bossuet, simply to show, in view of the impossibility of asserting the absolute independence of sovereigns or those who govern, that Louis XIV. had no cause for provoking the declaration of 1682, and that the bishops of France had no reason for conceding him what he asked.''**

"I have listened, my dear uncle, with both my ears ; but I do not see any practical difference between the doctrine of Cardinal Gousset and that of M. Gosselin, which I understand you to reject."

"It shows that my distinction between governing temporals in the respect that they are spiritually related, and governing them as related to a temporal end, has high authority. The difference, moreover, is very obvious, as well as important. M. Gosselin contends that the power exercised over temporal sovereigns by the popes was a concession made to them by Catholic princes and nations ; the illustrious cardinal holds it to be spiritual, within the ordinary spiritual jurisdiction of the sovereign pontiff ; a power which he holds and exercises, not as temporal sovereign, or as sovereign in temporals, but as the vicar of Jesus Christ ; therefore *jure divino*, and not, as M. Gosselin maintains, if I understand him, simply *jure humano*."

"But the cardinal does not sustain you in your doctrine, as to the deposing power, for he cites with approbation Fénelon, who denies that the pope either deprives or institutes lay princes."

"As supreme temporal lord, or by virtue of an act of his own will, at his own pleasure, agreed ; but as the interpreter and judge of the law under which the prince holds and to which he is bound to conform, he does not deny it, but in effect asserts it. The doctrine of Fénelon is, that the pope cannot deprive or institute a lay prince by an act of his own will and pleasure ; and that he can only declare a prince deprived, when he is so by the law under which the prince holds ; and then it is not the pope who deprives him, but the law, of which the pope is simply the divinely appointed minister, or judge. The pope has no proper civil jurisdiction, and can intervene in reference to the action of

* *Théologie Dogmatique*, Tom. I., pp. 732-737.

the temporal government only when a moral or spiritual question arises, and there is a reason under the divine and natural laws for his intervention in his quality of sovereign pontiff, or as the vicar of Jesus Christ. This is the sense in which I understand Fénelon, and as he concedes that the pope may as *spiritual* sovereign declare a prince fallen from his dignity, and his subjects absolved from their allegiance, he evidently concedes the deposing power in the only sense in which I or my friend of *Brownson's Review* have ever asserted it. His eminence, Cardinal Gousset, certainly goes as far, as is evident from the principles he establishes in his remarks on the first part of the first article of the declaration of 1682, and in his claiming for the pope the authority to pronounce judgment in the case of disputes between the people and their temporal sovereign."

"After all, the cardinal asserts only a directive and ordi-native authority in regard to temporal sovereigns, as Gerson does ; and if you go no further, what more do you assert than the directive power conceded by M. Gosselin and his school ?"

"That the words cited from Gerson are as strong as the cardinal would prefer may be doubted, for they are the words of an opponent, and cited as a concession ; but, how-ever that may be, he evidently holds it to be a real and ef-fective power. Whether I assert more or not than M. Gosselin conceded by the *potestas directiva*, depends on how much or how little he understands by it, and that I am not able to determine. When he opposes it to the indirect authority asserted by Bellarmine and Suarez, he seems to make it simply directive, merely advisory and monitory ; but when he has to explain away the letters of St. Gregory VII., the *Unam Sanctam* of Boniface VIII., and certain tough passages from St. Bernard, Hugh of St. Victor, and other high authorities, he seems to mean by it almost, if not quite, as much as I contend for. If this directive power be merely advisory and monitory, it would be no more than might be exercised by any bishop, priest, or even layman, any one of whom has the right to advise, exhort, entreat, or ad-monish the temporal authority ; and I have often done as much myself, though without much effect, I confess. The power, to be a real effective power, must be coercive as well as directive, and every Catholic must concede that the church has a coercive power, and therefore with regard to kings and princes, in *spirituals*, or *temporals* in the respect that they

are related or to be referred to a spiritual end. The denial of all coercive power to the church is a step beyond the heresy of Marsilius of Padua, for he conceded, it is said, that the church might coerce even princes with spiritual pains and censures, but was declared a heretic because he denied to her the right to go further. Kings and princes are as much subject to the authority of the church as private persons, and, as Cardinal Gousset maintains, in their public as well as in their private acts ; and she must have the same power of coercing them that she has of coercing others, and in their public as well as in their private capacity, unless, which cannot be done, some rule be pleaded exempting them. Hence Suarez asks three questions : ‘*Prima est, An summus pontifex personas regum et principum temporalium habeat sibi spiritualiter subjectas ? Secunda, An pontifex habeat sibi subjectam non solum personam regis, sed etiam ejus potestatem temporalem quantumvis supremam, ita ut possit illius actus præcipiendo dirigere, exigere, supplere, vel impedire ? Tertia his consequens est, An pontifex ratione suæ spiritualis potestatis possit, Christianos principes non solum dirigere præcipiendo, sed etiam cogere puniendo etiam usque ad regni privationem, si opus fuerit ?*’*†

“ Suarez answers at full length these three questions in the affirmative. The last question is the one on which the principal controversy hinges ; and the affirmative answer to this he says, flows as a logical consequence from the affirmative answer to the other two.

“ ‘ Quia vis directiva sine coactiva inefficax est, teste Philosopho ; ergo si pontifex habet potestatem directivam in principes temporales, etiam habet coactivam si justæ directioni per legem vel præceptum obedire noluerint. Probatur consequentia, nam quæ a Deo sunt, ordinata sunt et optime instituta ; ergo si pontifici dedit potestatem directivam, dedit coactivam, quoniam institutio aliter facta esset imperfecta, et inefficax. Unde contraria ratione docent theologi non habere ecclesiam potestatem actus mere internos præcipendi, quia de illis judicium ferre non potest, et consequenter neque pro illis poenam imponere, quod ad vim coactivam pertinet, ut author est D. Thomas.‡ Ergo a converso, cum pontifex possit imperando efficaciter dirigere potestatem temporalem in actibus suis, potest etiam cogere, et punire principes sibi non obtemperantes in iis quæ juste præcipit.’ §

* *De Primatu Summi Pontificis*, Lib. III., Cap. 21.

† *Ethic.* Lib. X., Cap. ult.

‡ *Primæ Secundæ*, Q. 91, A. 4, et 100, A. 9.

§ *De Primatu Summi Pontificis*, Lib. III., Cap. 23.

"Suarez, Doctor Eximius, is at least respectable authority, especially when backed by Cardinal Bellarmine, and the practice of the church in every age. Father Perrone maintains as of Catholic faith the proposition, '*Ecclesia divinitus accepit potestatem independentem atque supremam sanciendi per leges exteriorem disciplinam, cogendique fideles ad earum observationem, et coercendi salutaribus pœnis devios et contumaces.*'

"Pope John XXII. says, in his condemnation of the third heretical assertion of Marsilius of Padua and John of Jan-dun, that 'Christian emperors acknowledge that, instead of being judges of the pontiff, *they are judged by him.*' These heretics maintained as their fifth assertion, that 'neither the pope nor the whole church together can punish any person, however wicked he may be, with a coactive punishment, without the authorization of the emperor.' The same pope condemns this as a heresy, and says, that 'it is contrary to the doctrine of the gospel, for our Lord said to Peter, What-soever thou shalt bind on earth shall be bound in heaven. Now not merely those who are willing are bound, but also and chiefly those who are unwilling. Moreover, the church has the power of constraining by excommunication, which excludes not merely from the sacraments, but also from the society of the faithful. Peter did not wait for the consent of the emperor to strike Ananias and Saphira with death, nor Paul to smite Elymas with blindness, or to deliver over the incestuous Corinthian to Satan for the destruction of the flesh and the salvation of his soul. Hear also the same apostle saying to the Corinthians: "What will you? Shall I come to you with a *rod*, or in charity, and in the spirit of kindness?" In which he very expressly assumes that he has a coactive power. He assumes the same when he writes, "For the weapons of our warfare are not carnal, but powerful through God (that is to say, given by God) to the destruction of fortresses, subverting counsels, and every height that exalteth itself against the knowledge of God. . . We have in readiness wherewith to punish all disobedience." Whence it is evident that Paul received a power, even a coactive power, not from the emperor, but from God.'*

"I could cite authorities without number to the same effect, but authorities are nothing to young America. I

* Rohrbacher, *Histoire Univ. de l'Église Cath.*, Tom. XX. pp. 124, 125.

will only add, that the point is one that a Catholic cannot deny; for the contrary is a condemned heresy, as the following from the constitution *Auctorem Fidei* of Pius VI., condemning the pseudo-synod of Pistoja, sufficiently establishes. I will read you titles IV. and V. of this constitution.

“‘IV. *Propositio, affirmans abusum fore auctoritatis Ecclesiae transferendo illam ultra limites doctrinæ ac morum et eam extendendo ad res exteriæ, et per vim exigendo id quod pendet a persuasione et corde, tum etiam, multo minus ad eam pertinere, exigere per vim exteriæ subjectionem suis decretis; quatenus indeterminatis illis verbis extendendo ad res exteriæ, notet velut abusum auctoritatis Ecclesiae, usum ejus potestatis acceptæ a Deo, qua usi sunt et ipsimet Apostoli in disciplina exteriæ constituenda et sancienda;* HÆRETICA.

“‘V. *Qua parte insinuat, Ecclesiam non habere auctoritatem subjectionis suis decretis exigendæ aliter quam per media quæ pendent a persuasione; quatenus intendat ecclesiam non habere collatam sibi a Deo potestatem non solum dirigendi per consilia et suasiones, sed etiam jubendi per leges, ac devios contumacesque exteriæ judicio ac salubribus pœnis coercendi atque cogendi;* ex. Bened. XIV. in Brevi, “*Ad assiduas,*” anni 1755, primatibus, archiepiscopis et episcopis regni Poloniæ; *Inducens in systema alias damnatum ut hæreticum.*”

“But in proving that, you do not prove that the pope may, even according to Catholic doctrine, deprive temporal princes of their authority.”

“I prove by it, first, that the authority conceded to the church by the institution of Christ is not simply directive, but also coercive; that is, she has authority to enforce *in foro externo* obedience to her decrees ‘salubribus pœnis.’ I prove by it, in the second place, that, if temporal princes, as to the morality of their public as well as their private acts, come within her ordinary spiritual jurisdiction, she has with regard to them not merely a directive, but also her ordinary coercive power, and therefore may *de jure divino* judge and punish them, according to the nature or magnitude of their offence. This is all I had to prove. If temporal princes in the government of their estates are exempted from the obligation to conform to the divine and natural law, and therefore as to the morality of their acts from the ordinary spiritual jurisdiction of the church, it is for those who so contend that they are to prove it. I say with Bossuet, *Tout est soumis aux clefs de Pierre, tout, rois et peuples.*”

“But would not a Catholic remind you that there is a

distinction between the internal court and the external court of the church, and that these two are not coextensive in their jurisdiction?"

"He must think me a novice indeed, if he thinks it necessary to remind me of so well known a distinction. Of course she does not and cannot *in foro externo* take cognizance of private sins, secret sins, or internal acts, which come to her knowledge only in the confessional; but public sins, open and public offences, and especially such as by their very nature are public, fall necessarily within the jurisdiction of the external court. Such certainly are the public acts of public powers, which, if judged at all as public acts, must be judged *in foro externo*. Therefore the distinction, though very real and very important, has no application to the case before us."

"But why then has your friend, the editor of *Brownson's Quarterly Review*, labored to prove that the church may judge temporal princes in their public acts, by proving that she has authority over all temporals, at least so far as they are spiritually related?"

"My friend, I presume, is able to answer for himself, and I do not pretend to know his secret reasons. I suppose, however, that in his articles on this subject his main design has been to prove the extent and superiority, not in dignity only, but also in authority, of the spiritual order, and the subordination of the temporal to the spiritual, and therefore to the church as the representative of the spiritual on earth. I suppose his real purpose has been to refute that pernicious maxim, so popular in our days, that 'Religion has nothing to do with politics,' by showing that it has something and a great deal to do with them, because all our acts are to be referred to a spiritual end. If this be so, then politics, as related to such end, as to their morality, necessarily fall under the authority of religion and within the ordinary spiritual jurisdiction of the church. As incidental to this main purpose, not as an incident of a still vaster power, as some have interpreted it, he treated the power of the church with regard to temporal princes, and showed, that, if the power of the church extended to all temporals in that they are related to a spiritual end, it must extend to princes in their public as well as in their private acts, and that she must have the same power of spiritual jurisdiction over them that she has over private persons, and therefore the same right to judge and punish

them, without troubling himself with the irrelevant question, from his point of view, whether it was to be *in foro interno* or *in foro externo*. He did not fall into the sad blunder of concluding, from the fact that she takes cognizance of all offences against natural and positive law *in foro interno*, or the tribunal of penance, that she can take cognizance of all *in foro externo*. From the fact that *in foro interno* she takes cognizance of all offences, he concluded that her spiritual authority as judge extends to all, and from the fact that it extends to all, he concluded that it extends to offences of temporal princes, on the principle that the whole includes the parts, and therefore that she had authority to judge and punish them according to the nature of their offences, *in foro externo* when their offences were of a public and external character, and could be reached only by a public sentence, and *in foro interno* when they were not. The doctrine I contend for is the very moderate doctrine which is contained in the passages I have read you from Suarez and the cardinal archbishop of Rheims,—a doctrine which it is certainly lawful to hold and in a lawful manner to defend, and which it is in my judgment absolutely necessary to defend, if we would defend in any satisfactory manner the teachings of the great Catholic doctors of past times and the uniform practice of the church in all ages. There are, however, different points of view from which the doctrine may be defended. We may defend it with a view of vindicating the church from the charge of absorbing the state, as I am now doing, or it may be defended in opposition to those who assert formal or virtual political atheism, as is apparently the case with the editor of *Brownson's Review*; that is, either as an explanation or an apologetic defence of the claims of the church in relation to the state, or as the assertion of the positive rights of the spiritual in relation to the temporal. The language used, and the form of the statements made, will, although the doctrine remains the same, vary not a little as one or the other of these points of view is adopted by the writer, and those who write from the latter will almost invariably seem, to those who are intent only on the former, to go too far. The one wishes to make the rights and prerogatives of the church fully accepted by her children, who seem to him in danger of forgetting them; the other wishes to persuade the enemies of the church that they may very safely tolerate her, notwithstanding the claims which in this respect have been

put forth for her. The former would vindicate her power, because it is practically needed ; the latter would disarm prejudice, and relieve the church of the odium cast upon her by her enemies. Both, I apprehend, are governed by proper motives. Either is a good object, but in seeking either exclusively there is danger. The apologist, in his zeal to explain away an offensive doctrine, may obscure in the minds of the faithful, perhaps even in his own, the truth itself, and though not killing faith may render it weak and sickly,—a result which I think has at times followed the attempt to manage the susceptibilities of Cæsar. On the other hand, the papist, in his zeal to bring out in all their clearness, distinctness, and strength the rights and prerogatives of the church, and therefore of the pope as her visible head, may, if not on his guard, give gratuitous offence, and excite unnecessary hostility against the papacy. Yet what he aims at doing is necessary to be done, and if he does his best not to be gratuitously offensive, he cannot be justly censured.

" My friend, the editor of *Brownson's Review*, evidently believes that, in these times, it is more necessary to assert the authority of the church in regard to temporals, in order to lead back the age to morality in politics, than it is to labor to explain away that authority, or to make it appear as a matter of small moment ; although, if attentively read and understood, I think it will be found that he sufficiently qualifies his strong statements, and qualifies them as far as possible without wholly defeating his purpose. The misfortune is, that his readers, overlooking or disapproving the object he has specially in view, being themselves chiefly anxious, it may be, to disarm prejudice, pay no attention to the explanations and qualifications he never fails to offer, so far as I am aware, and which, if duly considered, would quiet the most susceptible among his Catholic brethren.

" For my own part, I agree with him in both his doctrine and his policy. Moreover, as a Catholic, I believe my church one in time as well as in space ; her honor in any past age is as near and as dear to me as her honor in the present. I cannot concede that she modifies her doctrines as time proceeds, that she does not know her powers as well in one age as in another, or that her practice in any age can be held by a Catholic as reprehensible, or as justifiable only by the opinions of the times. I do not believe that Rome has ever abandoned a doctrine which she has once held or

favored, or that she has ever disavowed a spiritual claim which she has ever once insisted upon. The history of the church is before the world, and must be accepted in what is unpopular to-day as well as in what is popular. While, therefore, I concede, nay, contend, that the state is independent and supreme, in the sense that it has no superior and holds from no other, in its own order, I shall insist that it is subordinate and dependent in relation to the spiritual power.”*

CONVERSATION X.

“What you have said, my dear uncle, may, for aught I know, suffice for the question concerning the temporal authority of the church, as between you and your Gallican brethren, but that does not suffice for me. I prefer the views of the Gallicans to those of the papists, because I think them more liberal, more advanced, and approaching

* We have been blamed for bringing out this doctrine, which we are told is now defended by no Catholic theologian, and is abandoned even by Rome. But we have not been the first or the only one in recent times to insist on it. The doctrine as we defend it, as we have repeatedly explained it, is distinctly set forth in the extract which “Uncle Jack” has introduced from the learned and highly esteemed *Théologie Dogmatique* of the illustrious cardinal archbishop of Rheims, the firm supporter of that decidedly papistical journal, *L’Univers Catholique*. It is also set forth in that truly Catholic work, *Histoire Universelle de l’Église Catholique*, by the learned and able Abbé Rohrbacher, a Doctor in Theology of the University of Louvain. It is the central doctrine of that remarkable work, and we may almost say that the history was written expressly for the purpose of illustrating and defending it; it appears prominently in nearly every one of the twenty-nine volumes of which the work consists, and the author lets no opportunity pass of bringing it out, or of combating the contrary doctrine. It was under the inspiration of this history, by a living author, and the second and revised edition of which was completed only last year, that we wrote our articles on the relations of the two powers, and in which we have done nothing more than to reproduce its doctrine and reasoning. In what estimation this work is held at Rome may be gathered from the *Preface* to the first volume of the second edition, an extract from which we subjoin.

“A more precious encouragement still,” says the author, “is that of the learned and illustrious Cardinal Mai, Prefect of the Congregation of the Index, to which the *Universal History of the Catholic Church* had been denounced in a series of attacks by a journal of Liège, which had begun by commanding it. The Marquis de Narpe, whom all the Catholics of France know and esteem, wrote, therefore, from Rome, on the 6th of February, 1846: ‘I have also been to see Cardinal Mai, the most important of all, because he presides over the Congregation of the Index. He received me in a manner still more affable. “I am acquainted,” said he to me, “with the whole affair. The denunciations have been sent to me. I have read all, and have found nothing that merits the least blame in

Protestantism; but whether they or papists are the truer Catholics is to me a matter of perfect indifference. What I want is, that you should show that the authority you claim for the church does not destroy the autonomy of the state, and absorb the civil power in the spiritual."

"I have done that already."

"You have asserted it, but you have not shown it to my satisfaction."

"Bear in mind, then, that the power which I assert for the church over temporals is spiritual, not temporal. *I claim for her no temporal or civil jurisdiction.* The power which I maintain for the sovereign pontiff, as vicar of Jesus Christ, or by the institution of Christ, does not lie in the same order with the civil power. The prince does not hold from him as suzerain, and is not accountable to him as lord paramount in the temporal order. The papal power is not a temporal power or jurisdiction over the temporal of princes and states, but simply a spiritual jurisdiction.

the work of the respectable abbé, whom we highly esteem (*que nous vénérons*). Tell him, from me, not to be disquieted; that I have written to the bishop of Liège that these chicaneries must be put a stop to. Tell him to be of good courage so as to complete his work, of which we feel all the importance. I will read the new pieces you bring me, but repeat to him that he need not feel any uneasiness, and that he may communicate with the bishop of Liège, whom, I have reason to believe, he will find equally well disposed." M. le Marquis de Narb wrote again from Rome, the 16th of February, 1847: 'Cardinal Mai has spoken to me with the same interest of the great and admirable work of our dear Abbé Rohrbacher. "I continue to read it," said he to me. "Will it soon be completed?" I believe it is nearly finished. "So much the better," he added. "He ought now to experience no longer any opposition, for I have written to the bishop of Liège to put a stop to it, and to come to an understanding with him. We have not up to the present found a word in it to blame." Will your Eminence authorize me to say that to him? "Yes, that he may feel no inquietude." He has for some time wished to make known the encouraging words which your Eminence has spoken in his favor. "He may do it," said he to me.' Such were the kind expressions of Cardinal Mai, Prefect of the Congregation of the Index, which we have been authorized to publish."

We do not pretend that this is a warrant that there is no error or inaccurate statement in the Abbé Rohrbacher's history, but it seems to us highly improbable that the illustrious Cardinal Mai, in his position, would or could have expressed himself in such terms of a work in which the doctrine in question holds so prominent a place, if that doctrine was disapproved at Rome, or its assertion and defence by Catholic writers discountenanced. We do, therefore, regard this favor shown by the Prefect of the Congregation of the Index to that history as very good evidence that the doctrine is in no bad repute at Rome, and that her sentiment is with us rather than with those who oppose us for holding and maintaining it.

Temporals have a twofold relation; the one to a temporal end,—terrestrial happiness; the other to a spiritual end,—celestial and eternal beatitude. The church has jurisdiction over them only under the latter relation; the state, only under the former. Under their relation to the temporal end, the state has independent and supreme jurisdiction, and is therefore independent and supreme in its own order. Consequently, my doctrine does not destroy the autonomy of the state or absorb it in the church."

"But you subordinate the state to the church, not in dignity and rank only, but also in authority."

"Certainly I do; but subordination and identity, in my philosophy, belong to different categories. Man is subordinated to God, and owes him submission in all things. Has man therefore no autonomy? Is he absorbed in God, or is God by this fact declared to be man? Of course not, for man in obeying acts from his own centre, and it is he, with the divine concurrence, that acts in the obedience, not God. Does my learned nephew need to be told that where there there is identity there is and can be no subordination, for nothing can be subordinated to itself? The assertion of the subordination of the temporal to the spiritual necessarily implies that the two powers are distinct. Moreover, even when the church intervenes in temporals, according to the doctrine I am defending, she does not intervene directly; she intervenes *indirectly*, through the civil power, by directing it to refer them to the spiritual end. It is it, not she, that so refers them."

"Still, as you extend her jurisdiction to all temporals, I cannot see what you leave for the state to do but the bidding of the church."

"Even if as you suppose, since I admit that the state holds from no other and has no superior in its own order, and therefore that none but it can do what the church bids it do in that order, I should neither absorb it in the church nor destroy its autonomy in temporals. But you forget that I claim for the church no temporal jurisdiction over the temporal, I claim for her only spiritual jurisdiction."

"So you constantly repeat, but as you confess that it extends to all acts of man in the temporal order, as well as in the spiritual, I cannot see what difference it makes. What difference does it make whether you *call* her jurisdiction spiritual or temporal, since it is precisely of the same extent, and covers the same acts, in either case?"

"If the difference were only a difference in name, it would amount to nothing. I suppose I am capable of understanding so much. As you put the case, it can make no difference in the world whether you call it the one or the other, and you might have presumed that I could know as much without your telling me. You might, I should suppose, have concluded, when you found me insisting with so much emphasis on the distinction, that it had for me a real significance, although a significance not apparent to you. It is not always safe to infer that a man is a fool, because we fail to catch his sense. I have already told you over and over again, that temporals have a twofold relation, the one to temporal good, and the other to spiritual good. If, after the example of most Protestants, I were to identify the church with the state, I should be obliged to say that the state has jurisdiction of temporals under both of these relations; if, as you suppose, I identified the state with the church, and claimed for her real temporal authority over the temporal, I should subject temporals under both of these relations to the papal power. Now it so happens that I do neither. When, therefore, I tell you that I defend for the church only a spiritual jurisdiction, your conclusion ought to be that I defend for her jurisdiction in regard to temporals only in the respect that they are related or to be referred to a spiritual end. The distinction is real, not merely verbal, as you suppose, and necessarily implies a real distinction between the two powers.

"To make this plain to the dullest understanding, suppose a prince holds that it is for the temporal prosperity of his subjects that a railroad be constructed from his capital to the seaboard. Now if the church had temporal jurisdiction, she could say to him, No, you shall construct a canal, not a railroad; or, You shall construct neither; but as the construction of either is not *per se* contrary to the law of God, if she is assumed to have only spiritual jurisdiction she has nothing to say on the subject, and the prince, possessing in his own right the temporal power, may or may not authorize the construction of either a railroad or canal, or both, as he judges best for the good of his subjects. If I claimed temporal or civil jurisdiction for the pope, I should hold that congress ought to consult him on the question of authorizing or constructing a railroad to the Pacific; but as I claim for him only spiritual jurisdiction, I do no such thing. But suppose the prince authorizes a company

to take the land owned by private individuals for their railroad, without either their consent or making them any compensation. Here the church would have the right to step in and say, Stop there, my dear son ; you cannot do that, for it violates the right of property, and is contrary to justice, to spiritual good. Here is a fair illustration of the distinction of the two powers. The state judges supremely of the railroad as to temporal good, and the church as to spiritual good. So of any act of the government. The church has jurisdiction of it in its spiritual relation, because in that relation it is spiritual, and necessarily falls within the jurisdiction of the spiritual power ; she has not jurisdiction of it in its temporal relation, because she has only spiritual jurisdiction.

" If you are debarred by no previous contract or duty, you may be a farmer, a sailor, a soldier, a lawyer, a physician, a merchant, a mechanic, according to your taste, inclination, or judgment, marry or not marry, as you regard it most for your temporal good, for none of these things are unlawful or forbidden by the law of God. The church here may advise you, but has not authority to command you. But suppose you to take it into your head to pursue the profession of a gambler, a pickpocket, a pirate, or a highwayman, all of which are forbidden by the law of God, she would have a right to intervene and prohibit you, and, if you refused to desist, to call upon the secular government to compel you to desist. It is the same in regard to the state. If the state should make unprovoked war on its neighbors, pursue towards them a course of constant and unprovoked aggression to their serious injury, endangering their independence and existence, or should make war on religion and humanity, and oppress its subjects, she would by virtue of her spiritual jurisdiction have the right to summon it before her tribunals, because in all these spiritual good is impugned, and the law of God is violated. The question is not solely a temporal, but also a spiritual question, and as a spiritual question it comes within the jurisdiction of the spiritual courts.

" Your mistake arises from not considering that, though distinct, the spiritual and the temporal are not separate or separable in this life, any more than soul and body. You reason, and so do my Gallican friends, as if the two orders existed apart, and as if the church could point to one class of things and say to the state, These are spiritual, touch

them not; and the state to another class of things and say to the church, These are temporals, exclusively within my domain, touch them not, on your peril. But such is not the case. Man is composed of soul and body, and lives, and must live, as long as a denizen of this world, a twofold life, the one in relation to temporal good, and the other in relation to spiritual good. Every act he does or can perform has relation to both ends, is under one aspect spiritual and under the other temporal. No individual act of man, we are taught by the theologians, is morally indifferent, and the most purely spiritual acts we can perform, such as prayer, meditation, religious vows, &c., have temporal relations and a bearing more or less direct, more or less remote, on the temporal welfare of individuals and nations. So it happens that often the two powers, though distinct, are concerned with the same matters, but under diverse relations. Hence it is impossible, not to distinguish, indeed, but to separate the matter of the two powers, so that they may act apart, in not only distinct, but entirely separate, spheres. The two orders are in nature interlaced, run the one into the other, and are in reciprocal commerce with each other, as the soul and body of man, and nothing affects the one without in some measure affecting the other. God has therefore established for Christian society two governments, and ordained their mutual harmony and coöperation. It is impossible to conceive the perfect government of society without the two powers, or without coöperation and mutual concert, as the church not obscurely insinuates in calling her arrangements with temporal powers *concordats*. The errors to be avoided are, on the one hand, the *unity* or identity of church and state, an error to which Protestantism almost universally tends, and, on the other, the *isolation* of church and state, to which Gallicanism tends, when it does not tend to the subjection of the church to the state. For the complete and normal government of society, you must have the *concurrence* of church and state, that is, their harmonious coöperation, the church governing all things in the respect that they are spiritual, and the state temporal things in the respect that they are only temporal. This, if I understand it, is the Catholic doctrine, and of course supposes the state to be Catholic and animated by the Catholic faith and spirit. The state, on this supposition, would give civil effect to the canon law, and the church would give her consent to all reasonable measures proposed by the state for the temporal good of the

community. Thus each discharging its proper functions, both would move on in harmony, for the common good, temporal and spiritual, of society."

"But if the two governments are equally necessary to the government of society according to the divine ordination, why do you assert that the state is subordinate to the church!"

"Because the temporal by the law of God is subordinated to the spiritual, and because the state, which represents the former, cannot but be *de jure* subordinated to the church, in case she represents the latter. I do it also, because otherwise I must practically subject the church to the state. As all human acts have temporal relations, the absolute independence of the state in regard to the spiritual power would give it authority, under pretext of governing the temporality of temporals, to extend its power over the whole spiritual order. The state might think that monastic vows, celibacy, religious houses, and such like things, affecting as they certainly do questions of political economy, are incompatible with the temporal good of the community, and so it would, under pretence of governing the temporality, proceed to forbid them; it might be annoyed by the number of holidays instituted by the spiritual power, and proceed to suppress them, as we have lately seen in the kingdom of Sardinia; it may take it into its head that it is contrary to its dignity and the welfare of the empire to allow the church to have the supreme control of ecclesiastical seminaries, or the bishops and clergy within its dominions to have a free correspondence with the spiritual chief of the church, and therefore forbid all communication with Rome except through the secular administration, and proceed to place the ecclesiastical seminaries under the control of the state, as did Joseph II. of Germany; it may regard the spiritual dependence of the state on a power whose chief does not happen to reside within its dominions as contrary to its temporal dignity and independence, and therefore separate the national church from the centre of unity, as did Henry VIII. and the parliament of England in the sixteenth century, as Louis XIV. seemed for a moment disposed to do in the seventeenth, and as the French people actually did by their constitutional church in the eighteenth; it may allege, that to acknowledge the spiritual supremacy of the pope is incompatible with loyalty to the republic, and therefore forbid the profession and observance of the Catholic religion

vithin its dominions, as you and your rightly-named Know-
Nothing friends are attempting to do here, and as was long
done in every Protestant state in Europe. If you will believe
English history, the devout English government did never
fine, imprison, exile, massacre, or hang at Tyburn, Catholics
as Catholics, but only as traitors to the throne. If we may
believe its apologists, it always respected religious liberty,
and has persecuted Catholics only because, being Catholics,
they could not but be traitors. Moreover, the government
may say, that holding and professing such views as yours,
my dear Dick, is incompatible with the temporal welfare of
the state, which I think is perfectly true, and for that reason
forbid you to hold them, and subject you to pains and pen-
alties if you publish them. If we allow it to be independent
in face of the spiritual power, as all these things certainly
have temporal relations, we cannot deny its right to govern
them as it pleases, and therefore we necessarily subordinate
their spiritual relations to their temporal relations, and thus
the spiritual to the temporal, which, in principle, is the sub-
ordination of the soul to the body, eternity to time, God to
man."

"But I might retort, and say, since you extend her au-
thority over all human acts, that the church might, under
pretence of governing spirituals, appropriate to herself the
whole government of temporals; and this seems to be what
is supposed by some to be the necessary result of the views
of your friend, the editor of *Brownson's Review*."

"We have seen what would result, nay, what has resulted
and is every day resulting, from the assertion that the tem-
poral power is independent of the spiritual. See now what
would result, if we asserted the mutual independence of
both powers. The church says, and says truly, that all these
things ordered or forbidden by the state are spirituals; the
state says, and says truly, that they all are temporals, for
they all have a temporal relation; both are independent,
each of the other; each is equally supreme, and each com-
mands the contradictory of the other. Here is a decided
conflict of rights and duties. Two coequal authorities, both
from God, commanding contradictory things! Tell me
which I am to obey, since to obey both is impossible, or
how I can with a good conscience disobey either? Here is
a very grave practical difficulty, and every man of common
sense knows that it can be removed only by denying the
relation of equality between the two powers, and asserting

the subordination of the one in authority, as well as in excellence, rank, or dignity, to the other. You Protestants subordinate the spiritual to the temporal; we Catholics subordinate the temporal to the spiritual. One or the other must be done, and nobody with any just claims to a religious apprehension can doubt which is the true course."

"But you have not yet met my objection."

"The church claiming only spiritual jurisdiction, and knowing precisely and infallibly where the distinction between the spiritual and the temporal lies, neither will nor can encroach on the domain of the state."

"What security have you of that, when you hold the state to be subordinate to her?"

"When the question is asked by a Catholic, I answer, I have the security of the fact that she is God's church, and is indorsed by him, which is as good security, I think, as there is to be given, or as any reasonable man can ask. If the question be asked by a non-Catholic, I answer, that I claim for her the presumption of innocence till guilt is proved. In eighteen centuries she has never in a single instance encroached on the domain of the temporal, and if she has not in that long period, it is not likely that she will in any future time. In return, I remind you that, if you do not subordinate the state to her, you must subordinate her to the state. What security have you to give me that the state will never encroach on the domain of the spiritual? I am as much entitled to security for the good behavior of the state, as you are to security for the good behavior of the church, and you cannot offer me the guaranty of past good behavior, or the presumption of innocence till guilt is proved, for unhappily the guilt is but too notorious, and proofs of innocence, I think, are not forthcoming. The encroachments of the temporal on the spiritual have been with the state the rule, and its submission the exception. You need not attempt an answer, for there is no answer to be given. To avoid the conflict of rights and duties, and to solve the difficulties on both sides, we must assert both church and state indeed, but the state in subordination to the church,—the temporal in subordination to the spiritual, not the spiritual to the temporal; for the temporal is *for* the spiritual, and by the law of God is to be referred to a spiritual end. Both moving on in harmony, with this subordination, that is, the church as the superior and the state as the inferior, things will go on as God intended, and this

is what the church always teaches us. With the church alone, society would want its executive arm ; with the state alone, it would want morality, and we should have civil despotism ; without either, we should have both spiritual and temporal anarchy, what you revolutionists are laboring to introduce. With both moving on harmoniously and in mutual concert, or, if I may so speak, reciprocal commerce, you have both spiritual and temporal order, peace of conscience, and freedom of action. Here would be no absorption of the state by the church, nor of the church by the state. Both would be retained, as distinct, though not hostile or separate powers, each operating according to its own constitution, and fulfilling its own mission in its own order."

"But that doctrine presupposes the state to be Catholic, as well as the church."

"Undoubtedly. I cannot understand how there can be perfect harmony and concert of action between the two powers where one is of one religion and the other of another or of none, and as a Catholic I cannot, of course, believe that the government of society is normal and complete unless both powers are Catholic. I certainly hold that the state ought to be Catholic, for a nation should profess the true religion collectively as well as individually."

"However, the state here is not Catholic."

"So much the worse."

"That may or may not be ; but it is not, and is not likely to be in either your day or mine."

"That is probably true. Really Catholic governments were never very plenty, and there is a decided scarcity of them now."

"But how will your doctrine apply where the state is not Catholic ?"

"It remains the same *de jure*, but *de facto*, so far as the state is concerned, is inapplicable."

"What will you do in such case ?"

"What the early Christians did under pagan Rome, adhere to our religion, practise it in all respects so far as the state permits, and die for it where it does not. We have nothing else for it. We submit to what is inevitable, use our freedom so far as the state does not restrain it, and where it attempts to restrain it, we adhere to and defend our faith as martyrs and confessors. If the state leaves us free, exacts nothing of us contrary to our religion, and only

refuses to profess it or to give us positive aid, we can get along very well, and shall make no complaint. But this is aside from the real question. You wish me to prove that the church does not absorb the state or destroy its autonomy. I have shown that it does not, and that the state, where Catholic, has, to say the least, nothing to apprehend from her. This is all that the objection requires me to prove. If the church does not endanger the state where the state is Catholic, it certainly does not where it is non-Catholic.

"To this last consideration I beg you to attend. Where the state is not Catholic, and the majority, as with us, are strongly anti-Catholic, Catholics are the only party in danger. Their rights may be denied, their liberty infringed, and their consciences oppressed; but the state, the political order, has nothing to fear from them, because it holds them at its mercy. However ultramontane our views, we cannot in this country, and Rome cannot, since she can act on the American public only through us, take possession of the government and through it oppress the non-Catholic majority. We are less than one in ten of the whole population; a large portion of us are poor foreigners, strangers, some to the language, and the majority to the manners and customs of the country, without material, moral, or political weight in the community, unable even to protect our own rights and legitimate interests. Any measure we should oppose as peculiarly hostile to us as Catholics would be fastened upon the country by an overwhelming majority, and any measure we should support as favorable to us would for that reason, if for no other, be defeated by a majority equally overwhelming. We are, save on election days, treated, even though native-born, with a few individual exceptions, as aliens, as pariahs, and the slaves of the south are treated with more consideration than the Irish Catholic laborers in the Northern and Middle States. Any appeal we might make to public opinion, to the justice of the country, would be treated with contempt. Associations may be formed against us all over the Union; we may be insulted, hooted, mobbed in our own houses, or shot down in the streets by armed russians, led on by jail-birds and the dregs of American and European society, all with impunity. The local authorities seldom interfere, and when they interfere, it is invariably against us, and to arrest only us, the assailed and wronged party. What more ridiculous,

more disgraceful to your own manhood, than to pretend to fear our getting possession of the government, or that we and our religion are at present menacing to American independence and republicanism. Out upon such cowardice, or rather such malice and hypocrisy!"

"Of course, my dear uncle, we do not fear your present strength. The prudent man foreseeth the evil, and guardeth against the danger. It is the prospective danger we fear, what with your ultramontanism you will do when you become the majority and have possession of the government."

"I have shown you that you have nothing to fear then, for the state and the church, since the state is republican, will move on in harmony, for the common good, temporal and spiritual, of American society."

CONVERSATION XI.

"What you have heretofore said, my dear uncle, may quiet the apprehensions of a Catholic, but you must concede that it offers no adequate security to us Protestants. The Catholic majority may take care of themselves, conceded; but what protection will there be for the Protestant minority under dominant Romanism?"

"At the very worst, as good a protection as the Catholic minority has in a Protestant state, under a non-Catholic majority, or dominant Protestantism."

"I think not, for Protestants recognize the rights of conscience, and assert religious liberty; Catholics do not."

"You are joking, Dick. That Protestants profess religious liberty may be true, but I have yet to learn that they ever practise it. Individual Protestants have written ably in defence of religious liberty, and our own country has incorporated it into her institutions and laws; but no Protestant state, no Protestant community, has ever yet been known to practise religious liberty in regard to Catholics. You and your friends understand by religious liberty simply the liberty to deny Catholicity and to oppress Catholic conscience. What are you trying to do in this country at this moment? Do you not in the name of religious liberty seek to deprive us of our civil rights on account of our faith? Do you not proclaim it from Maine to Florida, from the Atlantic to the Pacific, that the profession of the Catholic religion is incompatible with loyalty to the re-

public; that no Catholic can be an American citizen; that every Catholic should be disfranchised, killed, or driven from the country? Have you not a secret organization all over the Union, called ‘Know-Nothings,’ ‘Know-Somethings,’ ‘United Americans,’ ‘Guard of Liberty,’ or something else, whose avowed object is the extermination of Catholics, or the suppression of the Catholic religion in this country, and who either have, or are struggling to have, the entire government, national, state, and municipal, at their command, to be wielded expressly against Catholics? Are you not doing all in your power to exasperate Catholics, to get up riots in every quarter where they are numerous, for the express purpose of obtaining a pretext for shooting them down? You know perfectly well that it is so, and you know that your professions of religious liberty are a mere mask for carrying on the meanest and most cruel persecution against Catholics that history records. Here is the sort of protection the Catholic minority receives from an American Protestant majority. It must go hard if a Protestant minority cannot find as desirable a protection under a Catholic majority, in a Catholic state.”

“Did the Huguenots find any better protection in Catholic France, under Louis XIV.?”

“Perhaps not, for Louis XIV. was one of your friends,—a thorough-going Gallican, very nearly a Protestant,—and at the time of the revocation of the edict of Nantes was at war with the Holy See, and on the eve, as it seemed, of following the example of Henry VIII. of England, and converting the church in France into a snug little national church, with himself as sovereign pontiff. This is a case which I might cite against you, but not one which you may cite against me; for you have expressed your sympathy with Gallicans, and have acknowledged that you can tolerate Gallicanism. It is only ultramontanism, you tell me, that you oppose.”

“Do you mean to say that Louis XIV. did not dragoon the poor Huguenots in obedience to Rome?”

“Certainly I do. His revocation of the edict of Nantes and his persecution of Protestants occurred precisely during the period of his quarrel with the Holy See, and while he acted in defiance of Rome, and would have scorned to obey any of her orders. Mr. Weiss, a Protestant writer of great ability, who has just given us an admirable history of the French Protestant refugees, contends that religion had

little or nothing to do with the revocation of the edict of Nantes and the persecution of Protestants, and that the king acted from political and social motives. The Protestants formed, as it were, a distinct people, in the bosom of French society, a sort of foreign colony, planted on French soil, and he was unwilling to tolerate them, as your friends the Know-Nothings are unwilling to tolerate Catholic foreigners here. He wished to have the whole population of France form one homogeneous society, and attempted to suppress the Huguenots for their social rather than their religious differences. This is no doubt a just view of the case, and proves that Gallicans and Protestants approach even more nearly in their practice than in their doctrines. If Louis had been a good papist, he would have consulted the Holy Father, who would have told him to keep the faith he had sworn, and to labor for the conversion of the Huguenots by peaceful missionaries, not by armed soldiers; that even a lawful end may be gained only by lawful means."

"After all, that persecution by Louis XIV. only proves that Gallicans cannot escape the infection of Rome, and can in reality no more be trusted than papists."

"I have never said they could, and have never believed that those who take up with Gallicanism on the ground of its being less offensive to you than ultramontanism gain any thing, even on the score of simple policy. I believe it is as prudent to be papists as Gallicans, providing Gallicans retain the Catholic faith. But you have no right to say that it was Roman *infection* that led the Gallican king to do what he did. He acted on his own responsibility, and in the spirit of his favorite maxim, *L'état, c'est moi*, which would be the maxim of every prince, if your doctrine of the absolute independence of the state were accepted.

"You Protestants have of late years made such loud professions of religious liberty, that I am not certain but you have really persuaded yourselves that you are not its most deadly enemies. There never was, if it really be so, a grosser delusion. There is not a word of truth in your professions, nor so much as the shadow of truth. There is not a country on earth where you are in the ascendency in which you treat the Catholic minority as having equal liberty with yourselves. I need but refer you to England, the model Protestant country. Where in all history will

you find any thing blacker than her treatment of Catholics? Read her penal code against English Catholics, those loyal descendants of English heroes, who refused to desert the religion of their fathers and of their fathers' God at the bidding of Henry, the wife-slayer, and of his godly daughter Elizabeth. If not satisfied, cross the English Channel, and examine the penal laws of Ireland, and the blessed effects of Protestant ascendancy on the warm-hearted and loyal Catholic population of the sister island."

"But that is all done away with now. We have granted Catholic emancipation."

"That is to say, at a moment when Protestant fervor abated, you took off from the backs of the Catholic minority a part of the burden which Protestant zeal and Protestant bigotry had imposed upon them. But dare you say that the Catholic religion is free in Great Britain and Ireland?"

"Yes, so far as compatible with the maintenance of the Protestant religion for the state."

"That is, so far as it does not interfere with your Protestantism and your Protestantism is free to maintain everywhere its ascendancy! The English government tolerates Catholicity just so far as it cannot help it, or just so far as it believes its Protestantism has nothing to apprehend from it, and no further. In no Protestant state are Catholics placed on an equal footing with Protestants, before what in fact is the governing power. Where was the protection of Catholics in the Gordon riots? Where was it in the late whirlwind of excitement in England occasioned by Lord John Russell's famous letter to the Anglican bishop of Durham? In God, where it always is, and nowhere else."

"It was where the protection of the Protestant minority is in Tuscany and Spain."

"I was not aware that in either of those countries there was any Protestant minority. All that I have seen proved against the grand duke of Tuscany is, that he did not choose to permit the emissaries of Exeter Hall to stir up disorder and sedition among his subjects. I have never heard that he disturbed Protestants, residents in his dominions, in the free and full exercise of their religion, in case they conformed to the laws of the land. As to Spain, I have not heard of her interfering with the conscience of Protestants."

"She denies Protestants burial."

"In consecrated ground, very likely."

"But she will not allow them to be buried at all."

"That, begging my nephew's pardon, is not true. What she refused was the pomp and parade of a public funeral, a thing required by no Protestant conscience whatever; and that she forbids for a temporal reason, on the ground that it might cause a breach of the peace. You can find no fault with this, for you assert the competence of the state in spirituals, so far at least as they affect temporals. Catholic funerals with processions are forbidden by the British government, and the right which that government demanded for foreign Protestants in Spain, she denies to her own Catholic subjects at home."

"But, according to your account, we Protestants are a cruel, persecuting, hypocritical set."

"You are, according to me, just what your history for three hundred years, written in the blood of Catholics, proves you to be; that is to say, when you follow your religion, which I am happy to own is not always the case. You are very nearly as bad as you are in the habit of representing us poor papists. Just recall the manner in which your anti-popery lecturers, editors, and pamphleteers speak of us and our religion, the hard names they call us, the foul-mouthed declamation they indulge in against us, the crimes, the dishonesty, the perfidy, they lay to our charge, the indignation, the spite, the venom, they vent on all occasions against us and Romanism as they call it, and then think what we must be if what they say is true, and in what estimation we must hold them, knowing as we do that what they say is false. You never rebuke them, you gloat over their filthy columns, and yet your blood is up, and you think yourselves mightily ill-used, if we just remind you that 'all is not gold that glisters,' and that you are yourselves no better than you should be. Your history is written, and you have writ yourselves down—what you are. Protestantism, you need not be told, was conceived in sin and brought forth in iniquity, and it has always, at least with our blessed Anglo-Saxon race, maintained the honor of its birth."

"But if you think our Protestantism so horrible, how could you, if you had the power to prevent it, suffer it to be professed in a state under your government?"

"If carried away by my human zeal, and unrestrained by my religion, I could not. Here learn the security that a

Protestant minority would have in a Catholic state under a sovereign who is really a papist,—a security that I would not dare promise from a Gallican monarch. The mode in which a state shall deal with heretics is a spiritual question. A papist monarch will be guided by the pope, and therefore by his religion, in dealing with them. No doubt such a sovereign would grieve to find a portion of his subjects Protestants, but his religion would tell him that he can use only lawful means for the suppression of their Protestantism. Their Protestantism is a mortal sin, no doubt, but there are a thousand mortal sins which the temporal monarch must so far as he is concerned tolerate, and not undertake to punish,—which he must leave to the spiritual physician, and to the spiritual authority. There are many evils in this world that authority cannot prevent, cannot cure, and which it must tolerate. Heresy is to be dealt with as other sins, and heretics as other sinners. The temporal authority must be guided in its action by the church, which always acts on the principle that ‘the Son of Man came to save souls, not to destroy them.’ What she seeks is the salvation, not the destruction, of the sinner. Here, whether you believe it or not, here, in the maternal spirit of the holy Catholic Church, is your best security, and as a matter of fact Rome has always been remarkable for her mildness, and her forbearance towards all classes of sinners. When kings and princes would call down fire from heaven to consume the adversaries of her heavenly Spouse, she has always rebuked them, and told them that they knew not ‘what manner of spirit they were of.’”

“That may do to tell the papist, but believing your church to be nothing better in relation to the temporal than the ‘mystery of iniquity’ or the ‘the man of sin,’ it will not do for me.”

“That is your fault, not mine, and I have no consolation to offer you but your own prediction, that the state will not become Catholic in your day or mine, if ever; and till then we are the party who need security, not you. When that time comes, if it ever come, the Catholic majority, being Catholics, will have nothing to fear. As for the Protestant minority, if a Protestant minority remain, they will at least have as ample security as the Catholic minority have now; for you cannot place less confidence in Catholicity than we do in Protestantism. Turn about is fair play, and I know not that you Protestants are moulded of finer clay, or have

richer blood in your veins, than we Catholics, that you shall be entitled to demand stronger guaranties than you are able to give. If the Protestant minority would be at the mercy of Catholics, it is no more than is the case with the Catholic minority now. If you find yourselves hereafter under a Catholic state, you will find nothing worse than Catholics have suffered and still have to suffer in every Protestant state ; and it will perhaps bring you to your senses and lead you to repent of the abuse you made of power when it was in your hands."

"But the laws protect you here."

"Hardly, and you are even agitating to alter them."

"But we are not required to persecute you by our religion."

"If not by your religion, you contend you are by your politics, which is as bad. We are required neither by our religion nor by our politics to persecute you, and we are as long as the world stands much more likely to be persecuted, whether the state be nominally Catholic or Protestant, than to persecute. We know, indeed, in whatever land or condition we are, persecution awaits us. No one who follows Christ can escape it.

"But in the present prevalence of statolatry, the church can expect from the state at most only that it will not oppress her. The normal government of Christendom has pretty much everywhere been broken up, and there is little to choose between nominally Catholic governments and others. The church is to-day very nearly in the condition she was in under pagan Rome. The most she can now hope for is liberty, and liberty for good, only at the expense of liberty for evil. I have asserted her powers and prerogatives *de jure*, because it will not do for her children to forget or to deny them, and because they have a practical importance for Catholics in governing their own conduct ; but I do not forget the actual state of the world, or the actual triumph of Cæsar. In practice, I am content to give what I take, and I would be among the last to ask of the government of my country any thing more than to grant to my religion the same protection it extends to the sects."

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